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MICHAEL A. CIAVARELLA 《Journal of Employment Counseling》1976,13(3):100-101
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MICHAEL ROTA 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2005,86(4):556-576
Abstract: In this article I examine a common objection to the fine-tuning argument (an objection which may be referred to as the atheistic many universes (AMU) objection). A reply to this objection due to Roger White has been the subject of much controversy; White's reply has been criticized by Rodney Holder, on the one hand, and Neil Manson and Michael Thrush on the other. In this paper I analyze Holder's work in an effort to determine whether the AMU objection successfully defeats the fine-tuning argument. I conclude that the fine-tuning argument can be reformulated so as to avoid the AMU objection. 相似文献
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MICHAEL FISCHER 《美学与艺术评论杂志》2011,69(2):247-248
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MICHAEL F. SMITH 《Journal of applied philosophy》1991,8(2):145-154
ABSTRACT The destruction of the environment is a matter for moral concern and cannot be halted in the long term by appeals to human utility. However, the inadequacy and naïvety of humanist styles of ethical argument become apparent when attempts are made to extend them to environmental issues. They usually abstract certain supposed features of natural objects, e.g. sentience, and reify these as essential characteristics which operate to carry or ground ethical values. These arguments necessarily lead to the exclusion of objects which are, in fact, ethically valued or entail an unacceptably expansive egalitarianism. Such egalitarianism is often followed by a return to human-centred prejudices opposed to the originally stated aims of 'biocentric'ethicists like Taylor. Similarly, those physical and ecological holisms which rely not upon shared 'natural'features, but upon sharing in nature itself cannot solve this dilemma as they are incapable of explaining differential ethical values. The attempt to place boundaries on moral considerability should be abandoned in favour of an ethical pluralism which places emphasis on the context of valuations. 相似文献
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