On Culinary Authenticity

Recent discussions of culinary authenticity have focused on the problematic sociopolitical implications of Euro‐Americans seeking authenticity in food perceived as ethnic. This article seeks to rehabilitate the concept of culinary authenticity. First, the author relates the issue of culinary authenticity to other philosophical debates concerning authenticity, arguing that the concept of authenticity is value‐neutral. Second, a general theory of culinary authenticity making use of the theoretical apparatus of Kendall Walton's “Categories of Art” is developed and defended against objections. Third, a variety of reasons that authenticity is valued are discussed, with an emphasis on aesthetic reasons. Ultimately, the author acknowledges that some ways of valuing culinary authenticity are objectionable but argues that this should not lead us to abandon our interest in authenticity altogether.     

Visual Awareness of Properties

I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners of presentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness.     

“SIN IS BEHOVELY” IN JULIAN OF NORWICH's REVELATIONS OF DIVINE LOVE1

Julian, showing no inclination to accept the ‘free‐will’ defence nonetheless says that “sin is behovely”. She cannot mean by this that sin is necessary within the created order nor can she mean that it is completely contingent and outside the remit of divine providence. Sin's being behovely means, I argue, that it is conveniens, in a sense recognisable within some standard medieval scholastic theologies. This is to say that sin ‘fits’ with some story which God wills, a story of salvation history, in the way that events in any narrative can be said to ‘fit’ with the narrative they are events within. That for Julian we do not and cannot know the story shows her commitment to a negative theology.     

Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?

Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach.     

The Implicit Relationship Between Religious and Paranormal Constructs

Several decades worth of research have produced mixed results concerning the relationship between beliefs in religious and paranormal phenomena. While this previous work focused on the explicit measurement of these beliefs, these studies focused on a new level of analysis. Specifically, what is the implicit relationship between religious and paranormal constructs? In Study 1, participants completed a version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to assess the association between religious and paranormal stimuli, as well as completed measures of religiosity and paranormal belief. Results supported an association between these constructs that was moderated by intrinsic religiosity and faith in science. Study 2 again provided evidence for an association while addressing a methodological concern regarding the IAT. The results are discussed in their impact on the understanding of the cognitive representation of religious and paranormal constructs and the respective belief systems.     

Attachment as a Function of Parental and Partner Approach-Avoidance Tendencies

This two-part investigation develops a new scale of parental attachment that includes the previously under examined form of role reversal, or being a caregiver for one's parent, and explores the contention that romantic attachment is more dyadic than originally conceived, in that it is a function of an interaction between parental attachment style and specific partner romantic attachment style. It was expected that the most secure partners would have secure attachments with their parents and partners who report their own secure romantic attachment, that the most preoccupied partners would have been anxious-ambivalent in their attachment to their parents and paired with dismissively avoidant others, and that the most dismissively avoidant partners would have been role reversed by their parents and paired with preoccupied partners. Support for this expanded model was found, in that parental and partner attachments both influenced the final form of romantic attachment, with partner attachment appearing to have more influence than parental attachment. The relationship of romantic attachment style to the subsequent communication outcome of self-disclosure was also explored. Results supported expectations, with security relating positively to intentional and honest self-disclosure, preoccupation relating negatively with honesty, and dismissive avoidance relating to greater positivity and less honesty.     

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REDUCTIVE AND NONREDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM

Abtract: This article argues that the debate between reductive and nonreductive physicalists is best characterized as a disagreement about which properties are natural. Among other things, natural properties are those that characterize the world completely. All physicalists accept the “completeness of physics,” but this claim contains a subtle ambiguity, which results in two conceptions of natural properties. Reductive physicalists should assert, while nonreductive physicalists should deny, that a single set of low‐level physical properties is natural in both of these senses. This way of drawing the distinction succeeds where previous approaches have failed and illuminates why the debate about reductionism is important.