Applied Philosophy and Business Ethics

Given the socio-economic incentives for academic relevance, the sceptic may well challenge the academic integrity of the evolving discipline of business ethics. For, the question is, how could such an emerging field of enquiry constitute applied philosophy? I critically examine certain arguments, principally advanced by Michael Oakeshott and Stephen Clark, which might be thought to underwrite such scepticism, via a wholesale suspicion of applied ethics. Yet, I argue, philosophy can be and is properly concerned with our practical experience and actions. The significance of more general, abstract ethical questions derives, in great part, from their bearing upon our practical deliberations and actions. Moreover, reflection about the nature and role of ethical principles need not deny a role for moral judgement. Although for contingent reasons we may be right to be worried, I present an argument to show that, as a matter of principle, the sceptical challenge regarding business ethics can be refuted.     

Pathways Triple P‐Positive Parenting Program: Effects on Parent‐Child Relationships and Child Behavior Problems

This study examined the effects of Pathways Triple P (PTP), an early intervention program designed to promote positive parent‐child relationships. Sixty parents met the inclusion criteria of borderline to clinically significant relationship disturbance and child emotional and behavioral problems. They were randomly allocated into PTP or a wait‐list (WL) control group. PTP was delivered in a group format for 9 weeks and consisted of parent skills training and cognitive behavior therapy targeting negative attributions for child behavior. Significant intervention effects were found for improving parent‐child relationships and reducing behavior problems with gains maintained at 3‐month follow‐up. Limitations of the study and implications for future research are discussed.     

The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection

In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justified nor unjustified—but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgements about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one’s attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time‐travel—a case of re‐visiting, or re‐acquaintance with, some past episode.     

Friendship and Trinitarian Theology: Response to Karen Kilby

Abstract:  In a recent article, Karen Kilby expresses the concern that some contemporary Thomistic theologians have, despite themselves, fallen into a form of theological rationalism. Kilby suggests that in fact some statements, while necessary for trinitarian grammar, are as unintelligible to theologians as to common believers. In dialogue with Kilby's critique, the present article suggests that the theology of friendship illumines how Augustine and Aquinas, like many other patristic and medieval theologians, offer their trinitarian theology as a 'spiritual exercise', and thereby indicates why their approaches do not constitute trinitarian theologians as a particular elite above all others.