Values Education: Why the Teaching of Values in Schools is Necessary,But Not Sufficient

In recent years, a growing demand by educators, governments, and the community for the teaching of values in public schools has led to the implementation of values education. As acknowledged by the 2010 Living Skills Values Education Program, values education is an essential part of schooling. In the public school system, there have been attempts to construct and implement a values-based curriculum that reflects a naturalistic or social morality. Despite prudential credibility to values education, no naturalistic theory has within it a sufficient moral obligation with which to persuade humans from their natural self-interest. As it stands, values education as taught in schools has a grounding problem—it cannot point to a sufficient basis for validation. Values education is too individualistic, relativistic, and ultimately subversive of a serious moral commitment. This article argues that a sufficient case can be made for the explicit teaching of values but only on a theistic foundation. The discussion concludes that ultimately the most defensible grounding for values education is in the narrative given to humans by a transcendent being (in the Christian tradition, God).     

Applied Philosophy and Business Ethics

Given the socio-economic incentives for academic relevance, the sceptic may well challenge the academic integrity of the evolving discipline of business ethics. For, the question is, how could such an emerging field of enquiry constitute applied philosophy? I critically examine certain arguments, principally advanced by Michael Oakeshott and Stephen Clark, which might be thought to underwrite such scepticism, via a wholesale suspicion of applied ethics. Yet, I argue, philosophy can be and is properly concerned with our practical experience and actions. The significance of more general, abstract ethical questions derives, in great part, from their bearing upon our practical deliberations and actions. Moreover, reflection about the nature and role of ethical principles need not deny a role for moral judgement. Although for contingent reasons we may be right to be worried, I present an argument to show that, as a matter of principle, the sceptical challenge regarding business ethics can be refuted.     

A Compelling Trinitarian Taxonomy: Hans Urs von Balthasar's Theology of the Trinitarian Inversion and Reversion

In trinitarian theology, the problematic place of the Holy Spirit in the taxonomy of the immanent Trinity (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) does not seem to correspond to what is revealed in the economy (Father, Holy Spirit and Son). Because of this pneumatological problem, some theologians have abandoned the traditional trinitarian taxonomy. This approach, however, does not provide a finally convincing answer that is consistent with both the biblical witness and the theological tradition. In this article, I argue that Hans Urs von Balthasar's theology of the trinitarian inversion and reversion does provide a convincing answer to the trinitarian taxonomy problem. After supporting my thesis by first referencing the traditional trinitarian taxonomy offered in Augustine's de Trinitate and then examining the possibility of abandoning the taxonomy given by Jürgen Moltmann and Leonardo Boff, I will offer von Balthasar's solution as the most compelling trinitarian taxonomy, especially in light of the ecumenical dialogue between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches.     

The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection

In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justified nor unjustified—but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgements about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one’s attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time‐travel—a case of re‐visiting, or re‐acquaintance with, some past episode.