The Book at a Glance

Violence is a spectacle. Not because it is simply something that we observe but, more fundamentally, because it is a mechanism through which we observe and define other things. Violence has the capacity to shape the ways that we see, and thereby come to know, these things. In other words, violence is more than a practice that acts upon the bodies of individual subjects to inflict harm and injury. It is, metaphorically speaking, also a way of looking at these subjects.     

The effect of culture and self‐construals on predispositions toward verbal communication

This study tested the effects of culture and self‐construals (i.e., independence and interdependence) on predispositions toward verbal communication. For the purpose of this study, we focused on two main areas of verbal communication predispositions: (a) communication apprehension and (b) argumentativeness. In our path model, we expected that culture‐level individualism increases one's construal of self as independent, which, in turn, leads to a higher degree of argumentativeness and a lower level of communication apprehension. We also expected that culture‐level individualism decreases one's construal of self as interdependent, which, in turn, leads to a lower degree of argumentativeness and a higher level of communication apprehension. Data to test the model were drawn from undergraduates (N=539) studying in Korea, Hawaii, and mainland U.S. The data were partially consistent with the theoretical predictions made. The implications of the results for theory and practice are discussed.     

Two Kinds of Unknowing

Miranda Fricker claims that a “gap” in collective hermeneutical resources with respect to the social experiences of marginalized groups prevents members of those groups from understanding their own experiences (Fricker 2007). I argue that because Fricker misdescribes dominant hermeneutical resources as collective, she fails to locate the ethically bad epistemic practices that maintain gaps in dominant hermeneutical resources even while alternative interpretations are in fact offered by non‐dominant discourses. Fricker's analysis of hermeneutical injustice does not account for the possibility that marginalized groups can be silenced relative to dominant discourses without being prevented from understanding or expressing their own social experiences. I suggest that a gap in dominant hermeneutical resources is ambiguous between two kinds of unknowing: hermeneutical injustice suffered by members of marginalized groups, and epistemically and ethically blameworthy ignorance perpetrated by members of dominant groups.