NATURALISM AND THE PARADOX OF REVISABILITY

Abstract:  This paper examines the paradox of revisability. This paradox was proposed by Jerrold Katz as a problem for Quinean naturalised epistemology. Katz employs diagonalisation to demonstrate what he takes to be an inconsistency in the constitutive principles of Quine's epistemology. Specifically, the problem seems to rest with the principle of universal revisability which states that no statement is immune to revision. In this paper it is argued that although there is something odd about employing universal revisability to revise itself, there is nothing paradoxical about this. At least, there is no paradox along the lines suggested by Katz.     

Towards a More Expansive Moral Community

ABSTRACT I argue for a broader understanding of the morally considerable. I propose a neo-Aristotelian account of individuals wherein some entities, often precluded from those deserving of moral consideration, are deemed proper subjects of such treatment. The criterion suggested is, roughly, that of self-regulatory development, a teleological notion, that I argue should not be viewed as archaic and useless. Not only do many non-human animals then become legitimate subjects of moral concern, but objects outside the animal kingdom, such as plants and trees, also are to be included in our ethical arena.