AWKWARD SILENCES: BEHAVIORAL ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONVERSATIONAL LAPSE

Audio tape-recordings of 30-minute conversations between pairs of strangers (N=90) were scored for the frequency and duration of conversational lapses, interactive silences of three or more seconds occurring at the recognizable completion of a turn-constructional unit. Ten-utterance segments of conversation immediately prior and immediately subsequent to lapses were transcribed from the tapes of 45 of the conversations characterized by multiple lapses. Pre-and post lapse behaviors were coded as (A) (B) discloses, questions, edifies, acknowledges, advises, interprets, confirms, reflects. Also coded were gaps and laughter outbursts. Lag sequential analysis of the pre lapse data indicated that behavior sequences prior to lapses were characterized by a pattern of “minimal response” by one of the participants. Post lapse sequences were characterized by the presence of question-answer adjacency pairs.     

SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES ON THE SELECTION OF STRATEGIES TO RESIST COMPLIANCE-GAINING ATTEMPTS

This study investigated the effects of situational variables on the likelihood of use of four types of strategies to resist compliance-gaining attempts: identity managing, negotiation, justifying, and non-negotiation. Subjects rated strategies on the probability that they would actually use them to resist complying in each of eight situations, which varied systematically in the level of agent-target intimacy, the consequences to the target-agent relationship of noncompliance, and the rights of the target to resist. Significant second-order interactions of the situational factors were obtained for the likelihood of use of each of the four types of strategies. Resistance message selection was concluded to be based upon an assessment of the relative risk associated with the implementation of a given strategy in conjunction with a particular combination of situational constraints.     

The Problem of Social Cost: Coase's economics versus ethics

ABSTRACT Coase's now famous paper, 'The Problem of Social Cost', argues that social harms caused by industry are best addressed through a policy which would be optimal in terms of market efficiency. I argue that this narrowly based policy represents a classic example of the failure of many welfare economists to consider adequately the ethical implications of their recommendations. I also indicate the manner in which Coase's recommendations conflict with intuitively well-established ethical principles. I conclude that only an approach that considers many more features than market efficiency can produce an optimal policy for dealing with the social costs of production.