SELF-PRESENTATIONS OF ATTITUDES FOLLOWING COMMITMENT TO PROATTITUDINAL BEHAVIOR

Attitude statements present a particular image of the respondent to onlookers and can be tactically used for self-presentational purposes. The present study investigated the relationship between variables relevant to self-presentation and attitude statements following proattitudinal actions. Under conditions of high or low decision freedom, female subjects committed themselves to argue for a proattitudinal issue. The experimenter described the issue as either low or high in importance, and subsequent attitudes toward the issue were measured in a way which allowed low (subjects did not sign their questionnaires and placed them in a collection box) or high (subjects signed their questionnaires and handed them to the experimenter) personal association with attitude statements. A triple interaction of the variables was found on subjects'statements of personal involvement with the issue. As suggested by a self-presentation approach, subjects expressed more involvement under no-choice/low-association/high-importance conditions than under choice/low-association/high-importance conditions. Subjects who were denied personal responsibility and close association with an important action apparently increased their involvement to gain responsibility. The findings failed to support self-perception predictions of more favorable attitudes under choice rather than no-choice conditions.     

KNOWLEDGE EXTERNALISM

Abstract:  A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification.     

THE SON MORE VISIBLE: IMMATERIALISM AND THE INCARNATION

In this article we argue that an immaterialist ontology—a metaphysic that denies the existence of material substance—is more consonant with Christian dogma than any ontology that includes the existence of material substance. We use the philosophy of the famous eighteenth-century Irish immaterialist George Berkeley as a guide while engaging one particularly difficult Christian mystery: the doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ. The goal is to make plausible the claim that, from the analysis of this one example, there are strong reasons for thinking that if one wants to be a Christian one ought to be an immaterialist.