Selective attention and stimulus-reinforcer interactions in the pigeon

The study supplies further evidence that non-associative effects and temporal-spatial similarities between certain combinations of cue and consequence cannot explain all instances of stimulus-reinforcer interactions. Pigeons were trained to press a treadle in the presence of a discriminative compound stimulus either to avoid shock or to obtain a food reinforcer. The compound stimulus was composed of diffuse tone and light cues which had identical temporal patterns of onset, duration and offset. With the avoidance schedule the auditory cue acquired more control than the visual cue; however, when food was the reinforcer, the visual cue exerted more control. This pattern of stimulus control on the appetitive schedule did not change if random shocks were also added, even though these shocks were equal in density to the food presentations and equal in magnitude to those used for the avoidance schedule. Other changes in the appetitive procedure, such as making the tone spatially contiguous with food and removing the light in the food hopper, also failed to alter the relative control by the different cues. Prior training with a food reinforcer did not produce any change in the relative control by the two cues when the birds were retrained on the shock-avoidance schedule. The results suggest that some frequently stated alternatives to selective associability are not adequate explanations of this instance of a stimulus-reinforcer interaction.     

Book reviews

Arnold, M. Memory and the brain. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1984. Pp. 532. ISBN 0-89859-290-9. £47.90.

Green, T. R. G., Payne, S. P. and van der Veer, G. C. (Eds.). The psychology of computer use.. London: Academic Press. 1983. Pp. 225. ISBN 0-12-2974204. $9.50.

Stunkard, A. J. and Stellar, E. (Eds.). Eating and its disorders. New York: Raven Press. 1984. Pp. 302. ISBN 0-89004-891-6. $58.50.

Spillmann, L. and Wooten, B. R. (Eds.) Sensory experience, adaptation, and perception: Festschrift for Zero Kohler. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1984. Pp. xxvii + 748. ISBN 0 8985-3-218-6. £70.85.

Geschwind, N. and Galaburda, A. M. (Eds.)Cerebral dominance: The biological foundations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1984. Pp. 232. ISBN 0-674-10658-X. £24.35.

Annett, M. Left, right, hand and brain: The right shift theory. 1985. London and Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Pp. xiii + 474. ISBN 0-86377418-5 £29.95.

Ericsson, K. A. and Simon, H. A. Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press. 1984. Pp. 426. ISBN 0-262-05029-3. £28.95.     

AQUINAS'S ARGUMENT AGAINST SELF-HATRED

Aquinas's argument against the possibility of genuine self‐hatred runs counter to modern intuitions about self‐hatred as an explanatorily central notion in psychology, and as an effect of alienation. Aquinas's argument does not deny that persons experience hatred for themselves. It can be read either as the claim that the self‐hater mistakes what she feels toward herself as hatred, or that, though she hates what she believes is her “self,” she actually hates only traits of herself. I argue that the argument fails on both readings. The first reading entails that all passions are really self‐love, and so is incompatible with Aquinas's own “cognitivist” view of what it is that distinguishes specific passions in experience. The second reading entails that persons have no phenomenal access to “self,” rendering self‐reference—how it is that the self can be an intentional object of conscious mental states—a mystery. Augustine's claim, which Aquinas accepts on authority, that all sin originates in inordinate self‐love seems to entail the impossibility of genuine self‐hatred because both thinkers fail to distinguish between two distinct forms of self‐love: amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae.