What does it mean to ‘live’ and ‘die’? A cross‐linguistic analysis of parent–child conversations in English and Indonesian

Previous work on children's intuitive knowledge about the natural world has documented their difficulty in acquiring an overarching concept of biological life that includes plants as well as humans and non‐human animals. It has also suggested that the acquisition of fundamental biological concepts like alive and die may be influenced by the language used to describe them, as evidenced by differences between English‐ and Indonesian‐speaking children's performance in tasks involving these concepts. Here, we examine one particularly important source of linguistic information available to children during this acquisition process: everyday conversations with their parents. We take a cross‐linguistic approach in analysing the evidence available to English‐ and Indonesian‐speaking children as they acquire meanings for words corresponding to the concepts alive and die . Our analysis illustrates that young children acquiring English and Indonesian are faced with distinct problems, but that parental input in both languages does little to support the acquisition of broad, inclusive biological concepts.     

Inferred characteristics of successful suicides as function of gender and context.

This paper examines college students' attributions about suicide as a function of gender and context (athletic vs. relationship failure). Results indicated that male athletes who suicided were considered more emotionally well-adjusted compared to males who suicided because of a relationship failure and all females. Male and female athletes who suicided were seen as more competent and less distressed compared to those who suffered a failed relationship. Females were also seen as more distressed compared to males. These results are discussed in terms of a positive bias toward athletes in our society as well as gender stereotypes. Implications of these findings as well as methodological limitations are discussed.     

Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.     

Observing responses in rats: Support for the secondary reinforcement hypothesis

Rats' lever presses on a retractable lever earned brief presentations of discriminative stimuli signalling periods in which responding on an alternative lever was either non-reinforced (extinction) or reinforced on a random ratio schedule. The predictions of two theoretical accounts of this behaviour were tested by studying the effects of omitting either the stimulus signalling the reinforced or that signalling the non-reinforced schedule component. Under these conditions rats' behaviour is determined by the conditioned, affective properties of the stimuli rather than by their purely informational properties.