Living donation and cosmetic surgery: a double standard in medical ethics?

The commitment of transplant physicians to protect the physical and psychological health of potential donors is fundamental to the process of living donor organ transplantation. It is appropriate that strict regulations to govern an individual's decision to donate have been developed. Some may argue that adherence to such regulations creates a doctor-patient relationship that is rooted in paternalism, which is in drastic contrast with a doctor-patient relationship that is rooted in patients' autonomy, characteristic of most other operative interventions. In this article we analyze the similarities between cosmetic plastic surgery and living donor surgery as examples of surgeries governed by different ethical principles. It is interesting that, while the prevailing ethical approach in living donor surgery is based on paternalism, the ethical principle guiding cosmetic surgery is respect for patients' autonomy. The purpose of this article is not to criticize either practice, but to suggest that, given the similarities between the two procedures, both operative interventions should be guided by the same ethical principle: a respect for patients' autonomy. We further suggest that if living organ donation valued donors' autonomy as much as cosmetic plastic surgery does, we might witness a wider acceptance of and increase in living organ donation.     

Development of a short form Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS) using nonparametric item response theory: the SIAS-6 and the SPS-6

Shortened forms of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) and the Social Phobia Scale (SPS) were developed using nonparametric item response theory methods. Using data from socially phobic participants enrolled in 5 treatment trials (N = 456), 2 six-item scales (the SIAS-6 and the SPS-6) were developed. The validity of the scores on the SIAS-6 and the SPS-6 was then tested using traditional methods for their convergent validity in an independent clinical sample and a student sample, as well as for their sensitivity to change and diagnostic sensitivity in the clinical sample. The scores on the SIAS-6 and the SPS-6 correlated as well as the scores on the original SIAS and SPS, with scores on measures of related constructs, discriminated well between those with and without a diagnosis of social phobia, providing cutoffs for diagnosis and were as sensitive to measuring change associated with treatment as were the SIAS and SPS. Together, the SIAS-6 and the SPS-6 appear to be an efficient method of measuring symptoms of social phobia and provide a brief screening tool.     

Empathic and non-empathic routes to visuospatial perspective-taking

The present study examined whether strategy moderated the relationship between visuospatial perspective-taking and empathy. Participants (N=96) undertook both a perspective-taking task requiring speeded spatial judgements made from the perspective of an observed figure and the Empathy Quotient questionnaire, a measure of trait empathy. Perspective-taking performance was found to be related to empathy in that more empathic individuals showed facilitated performance particularly for figures sharing their own spatial orientation. This relationship was restricted to participants that reported perspective-taking by mentally transforming their spatial orientation to align with that of the figure; it was absent in those adopting an alternative strategy of transposing left and right whenever confronted with a front-view figure. Our finding that strategy moderates the relationship between empathy and visuospatial perspective-taking enables a reconciliation of the apparently inconclusive findings of previous studies and provides evidence for functionally dissociable empathic and non-empathic routes to visuospatial perspective-taking.     

Distracted by distractors: eye movements in a dynamic inattentional blindness task

Inattentional Blindness (IB) occurs when observers engaged in resource-consuming tasks fail to see unexpected stimuli that appear in their visual field. Eye movements were recorded in a dynamic IB task where participants tracked targets amongst distractors. During the task, an unexpected stimulus crossed the screen for several seconds. Individuals who failed to report the unexpected stimulus were deemed to be IB. Being IB was associated with making more fixations and longer gaze times on distractor stimuli, being less likely to fixate the unexpected stimulus, and having lower working memory capacity than those who were not IB. Noticing the unexpected stimulus was not contingent upon fixating it, suggesting that some individuals processed the unexpected stimulus via covert attention. The findings support earlier research on working memory and IB. In addition, IBs were less efficient attentional allocators than those who were not IB, as reflected in their eye tracking of irrelevant distractors.     

Altered and asymmetric default mode network activity in a "hypnotic virtuoso": an fMRI and EEG study

Very highly hypnotizable subjects are rare, easily induced, and able to manifest the whole spectrum of hypnotic phenomena, including post-hypnotic amnesia. The aim of this study was to detect and localize by means of quantitative functional MRI and EEG changes in cortical activity during hypnosis induction and deep "pure hypnosis" in a hypnotic "virtuoso" subject. We focused on areas forming the default mode network (DMN), since previous studies found that very highly suggestible subjects in hypnosis showed decreased activity in anterior DMN. During undisturbed hypnosis, our "virtuoso" subject showed not only detectable changes in DMN, but also peculiar activations of non-DMN areas and hemispheric asymmetries of frontal lobe connectivity. Our findings confirm that hypnosis is associated with significant modulation of connectivity and activity which involve the DMN but are not limited to it, depending on the depth of the hypnotic state, the type of mental content and emotional involvement.     

Veridical and false memory for scenic material in posttraumatic stress disorder

The question whether memory aberrations in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) also manifest as an increased production of false memories is important for both theoretical and practical reasons, but is yet unsolved. Therefore, for the present study we investigated veridical and false recognition in PTSD with a new scenic variant of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, which was administered to traumatized individuals with PTSD (n=32), traumatized individuals without PTSD (n=30), and non-traumatized controls (n=30). The PTSD group neither produced higher rates of false memories nor expressed more confidence in errors, but did show inferior memory sensitivity. Whereas depressive symptoms did not correlate with veridical nor false recognition, state dissociation was positively associated with false memories.     

Induction of lucid dreams: A systematic review of evidence

In lucid dreams the dreamer is aware of dreaming and often able to influence the ongoing dream content. Lucid dreaming is a learnable skill and a variety of techniques is suggested for lucid dreaming induction. This systematic review evaluated the evidence for the effectiveness of induction techniques. A comprehensive literature search was carried out in biomedical databases and specific resources. Thirty-five studies were included in the analysis (11 sleep laboratory and 24 field studies), of which 26 employed cognitive techniques, 11 external stimulation and one drug application. The methodological quality of the included studies was relatively low. None of the induction techniques were verified to induce lucid dreams reliably and consistently, although some of them look promising. On the basis of the reviewed studies, a taxonomy of lucid dream induction methods is presented. Several methodological issues are discussed and further directions for future studies are proposed.     

Genuine and drug-induced synesthesia: A comparison

Despite some principal similarities, there is no systematic comparison between the different types of synesthesia (genuine, acquired and drug-induced). This comprehensive review compares the three principal types of synesthesia and focuses on their phenomenological features and their relation to different etiological models. Implications of this comparison for the validity of the different etiological models are discussed. Comparison of the three forms of synesthesia show many more differences than similarities. This is in contrast to their representation in the literature, where they are discussed in many respects as being virtually similar. Noteworthy is the much broader spectrum and intensity with the typical drug-induced synesthesias compared to genuine and acquired synesthesias. A major implication of the phenomenological comparison in regard to the etiological models is that genuine and acquired synesthesias point to morphological substrates, while drug-induced synesthesia appears to be based on functional changes of brain activity.     

Reducing self-control by weakening belief in free will

Believing in free will may arise from a biological need for control. People induced to disbelieve in free will show impulsive and antisocial tendencies, suggesting a reduction of the willingness to exert self-control. We investigated whether undermining free will affects two aspects of self-control: intentional inhibition and perceived self-control. We exposed participants either to anti-free will or to neutral messages. The two groups (no-free will and control) then performed a task that required self-control to inhibit a prepotent response. No-free will participants showed less intentional inhibitions than controls, suggesting a reduction of self-control. We assessed perceived self-control by asking participants whether the response resulted from a deliberate intention or from an impulsive reaction. Perceived self-control was lower in the no-free will group than in control group. Our findings show that undermining free will can degrade self-control and provide insights into how disbelieving in free will leads to antisocial tendencies.