Perceived parental acceptance and female juvenile delinquency

The responses of 62 adolescent females residing at a state training school and 62 high school females on a measure of perceived parental acceptance were compared while statistically controlling for mental age, chronological age, socioeconomic status, social desirability, and family structure. Generally significant (p less than .05) results indicate that incarcerated females viewed their mothers and fathers more negatively than did nonincarcerated females. Slightly more ambivalent results were indicated in the mother-daughter relationship (delinquent girls reported mothers to be more rejecting/neglecting than did nondelinquents, but no significant differences were found between the groups on perceived mother acceptance) than in the father-daughter relationship. Results were discussed in terms of reported parental differences in acceptance-nonacceptance, providing limited support for Ausubel's satellization theory of child development, and the difficulty of inferring causality from retrospective self-report studies using "captive" subjects.     

The adaptive significance of destructiveness in primitive personalities

Destructiveness in primitive personalities is not restricted to a segment of the person as it is in the case of neurotics, but is global and pervasive. This destructiveness is meaningfully configured in a manner which cannot fully be accounted for by constitutional factors or be comprehended from the individual, intrapsychic, conflictual viewpoint of classical psychoanalysis. It follows an interpersonally meaningful pattern and therefore has adaptive significance in the contemporary life of the individual. The adaptive model I propose does not violate essential canons of psychoanalytic theory, for it can simultaneously be conceptualized in terms of intrapsychic structure and dynamics. This model holds out the possibility for a therapeutic approach to primitive personality organization which differs in some but by no means all respects from classical analysis.     

Psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic science, and psychoanalytic research--1986

The present standing of psychoanalysis as a science and the vitality of psychoanalytic research effort are reviewed. The two are interdependent, since the possibilities for empirical research rest on the necessary assumption that psychoanalysis is indeed enough a science to be susceptible to knowledge advance by the (research) methods of science. Concerning our status as a science, I review attacks on our scientific credentials (both from within our ranks and without) by the logical positivists, by the hermeneuticists (a rubric comprising a variety of hermeneutic, phenomenological, exclusively subjectivistic, and/or linguistically based conceptualizations of our field), and the most recent by the philosopher of science, Adolf Grünbaum. I try to demonstrate what I feel to be the failure of each of these assaults, and why I feel there is no reason to see psychoanalysis as anything other than a scientific psychology and, therefore, in theory amenable to empirical research approaches. I then review the history and the current status of these systematic research efforts in psychoanalysis, and the reasons why these have been far less in scope and in accomplishment than has been possible or than has been needed. Here I have focused especially on research involving technique and our theory of change and cure--i.e., research on the analytic process; on what changes take place (outcome) and how those changes come about or are brought about (process).