Progress in Violence Risk Assessment and Communication: Hypothesis versus Evidence

We draw a distinction between hypothesis and evidence with respect to the assessment and communication of the risk of violent recidivism. We suggest that some authorities in the field have proposed quite valid and reasonable hypotheses with respect to several issues. Among these are the following: that accuracy will be improved by the adjustment or moderation of numerical scores based on clinical opinions about rare risk factors or other considerations pertaining to the applicability to the case at hand; that there is something fundamentally distinct about protective factors so that they are not merely the obverse of risk factors, such that optimal accuracy cannot be achieved without consideration of such protective factors; and that assessment of dynamic factors is required for optimal accuracy and furthermore interventions aimed at such dynamic factors can be expected to cause reductions in violence risk. We suggest here that, while these are generally reasonable hypotheses, they have been inappropriately presented to practitioners as empirically supported facts, and that practitioners’ assessment and communication about violence risk run beyond that supported by the available evidence as a result. We further suggest that this represents harm, especially in impeding scientific progress. Nothing here justifies stasis or simply surrendering to authoritarian custody with somatic treatment. Theoretically motivated and clearly articulated assessment and intervention should be provided for offenders, but in a manner that moves the field more firmly from hypotheses to evidence. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Models of recognition: A review of arguments in favor of a dual-process account

The majority of computationally specified models of recognition memory have been based on a single-process interpretation, claiming that familiarity is the only influence on recognition. There is increasing evidence that recognition is, in fact, based on two processes: recollection and familiarity. This article reviews the current state of the evidence for dual-process models, including the usefulness of the remember/know paradigm, and interprets the relevant results in terms of the source of activation confusion (SAC) model of memory. We argue that the evidence from each of the areas we discuss, when combined, presents a strong case that inclusion of a recollection process is necessary. Given this conclusion, we also argue that the dual-process claim that the recollection process is always available is, in fact, more parsimonious than the single-process claim that the recollection process is used only in certain paradigms. The value of a well-specified process model such as the SAC model is discussed with regard to other types of dual-process models.     

The neurobiology of substance and behavioral addictions

Behavioral addictions, such as pathological gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, compulsive buying, and compulsive sexual behavior, represent significant public health concerns and are associated with high rates of psychiatric comorbidity and mortality. Although research into the biology of these behaviors is still in the early stages, recent advances in the understanding of motivation, reward, and addiction have provided insight into the possible pathophysiology of these disorders. Biochemical, functional neuroimaging, genetic studies, and treatment research have suggested a strong neurobiological link between behavioral addictions and substance use disorders. Given the substantial co-occurrence of these groups of disorders, improved understanding of their relationship has important implications not only for further understanding the neurobiology of both categories of disorders but also for improving prevention and treatment strategies.     

The influence of prior knowledge and repeated questioning on children's long-term retention of the details of a pediatric examination

Children's recall of the details of pediatric examinations was examined over the course of a 6-month interval. Although the 83 4- to 7-year-old participants reported a substantial amount of information at each assessment, performance declined over time, dropping sharply over the course of 3 months but then remaining constant out to the final interview at 6 months. As expected, older children provided more total information than younger children did and reported a greater proportion of the event components in response to general rather than specific questions. However, comparable patterns of remembering and forgetting over time were observed at each age level. In addition, no effects of repeated questioning--in the form of an interview at 3 months for half of the children--were observed on performance at the 6-month assessment. Moreover, children's prior knowledge about routine doctor visits was assessed before the checkup for half of the participants at each age and was associated with initial but not delayed recall. Although knowledge increased with age as expected, it nonetheless affected recall over and above the influence of age.     

Hidden covariation detection produces faster, not slower, social judgments

In P. Lewicki's (1986b) demonstration of hidden covariation detection (HCD), responses of participants were slower to faces that corresponded with a covariation encountered previously than to faces with novel covariations. This slowing contrasts with the typical finding that priming leads to faster responding and suggests that HCD is a unique type of implicit process. The authors extended Lewicki's methodology and showed that participants exposed to nonsalient covariations between hair length and personality were subsequently faster to respond to faces with those covariations than to faces without, despite lack of awareness of the critical covariations. This result confirms that people can detect subtle relationships between features of stimuli and that, as with other types of implicit cognition, this detection facilitates responding.     

The role of hyperarousal in the manifestation of posttraumatic psychological distress following injury

The authors examined the temporal relation among posttraumatic stress disorder symptom clusters, using data derived from a longitudinal study of survivors of orofacial injury (N = 264). They conducted cross-lagged panel analyses, with self-reported symptom data collected at 1, 6, and 12 months postinjury. Results demonstrate that hyperarousal was a potent predictor of subsequent symptoms of reexperiencing and avoidance as well as hyperarousal. By contrast, neither reexperiencing nor avoidance was significantly related to other symptom clusters other than themselves over time. These findings underscore the distinctive nature of hyperarousal in the manifestation of posttraumatic psychological distress over time. Implications for theory, clinical intervention, and future research are discussed.     

Drug-induced amnesia hurts recognition, but only for memories that can be unitized

Midazolam is a drug that creates temporary anterograde amnesia. In a within-subjects, double-blind experiment, participants studied a list of stimuli after receiving an injection of midazolam in one session and after receiving saline in another session. The lists consisted of three types of stimuli: words, photographs, and abstract pictures. Recognition memory was tested at the end of each session. Memory was reliably poorer in the midazolam condition than the saline condition, but this amnesic effect was significantly smaller for pictorial stimuli than for words and almost nonexistent for abstract pictures. We argue that the less familiar the stimulus, the less likely it is to be associated with an experimental context. These data bolster our claim that unitization increases the chances of episodic binding and that drug-induced amnesia prevents episodic binding regardless of unitization.