Electrode placement,EMG feedback,and relaxation for tension headaches

Fifteen tension headache subjects were allocated to one of three groups: direct EMG feedback (from a site corresponding to the source of pain), indirect EMG feedback (from a site not corresponding to the source of the pain) and relaxation instructions. There were two base-line, six treatment and one post-treatment sessions. No significant differences were found between base-line and post-treatment EMG levels, for any of the groups; however, some significant reductions in levels were obtained within sessions. EMG levels recorded during headache attacks did not differ significantly from levels recorded during base-line. Frequency and intensity of headaches were significantly reduced, particularly in the relaxation group. At follow-up this improvement was maintained for subjects with forehead pain, but differences between the groups had disappeared.     

NATURALISTIC OBSERVATIONS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED RETARDED PERSONS: A COMPARISON OF LICENSURE DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS

In the last several years, various organizations have produced strikingly similar documents by which institutions for retarded persons are judged for licensure. The purpose of the present study was to determine whether residential units that were licensed differed from residential units that were not licensed in terms of the active programming behaviors of their staff and residents. Data were collected through a time-sampling procedure that yielded about 160,000 observations on eight staff and six resident behaviors. Results showed that the licensed units were just as derelict as unlicensed units in providing habilitative programming for their retarded residents. Maladaptive responding by residents occurred at least as much as task-related behaviors: residents spent as much time self-stimulating as they did in programming; they also engaged in self-abusive behavior about as much time as they engaged in on-task responding. Results were discussed in terms of the failure of governmental regulations that are not based on observation to adequately assess habilitative programming.     

On the evaluation of one-sided evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent's side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.     

Image-size disparity reduces difference detection in face matching

Face matching is the act of deciding whether two facial images depict the same person or different people. The real-world face-matching task of checking photo IDs typically occurs under conditions of image-size disparity: A small picture is compared with a life-size face. We examined the effect of image-size disparity on face-matching accuracy. In three experiments, subjects were presented with pairs of equivalently or disparately sized images that depicted the same person or different people. Subjects made same/different judgments and, in two experiments, also reported confidence. Difference detection was significantly poorer given disparate (versus equivalent) image size. Confidence was significantly higher when responses were correct versus incorrect. These findings held whether viewing and decision time was unlimited or limited. Our results raise the practical concern that image-size disparity may undermine difference detection in ID checking, while also indicating that people have some insight into the accuracy of their face-matching judgments.     

Mechanisms of source confusion and discounting in short-term priming: 1. Effects of prime duration and prime recognition

Huber, Shriffrin, Lyle, and Ruys (2001) measured short-term repetition priming effects in perceptual identification with two-alternative forced-choice testing. There was a preference to choose repeated words following passive viewing of primes and a preference against choosing repeated words following active responding to primes. In this present study, we explored conditions of prime processing that produce this pattern of results. Experiment 1 revealed that increased prime duration under passive viewing instructions produces the active priming pattern. Experiment 2 assessed memory for primes: With poor recognition of primes, there was a strong preference for repeated words; however, with good recognition of primes, this preference was eliminated. These results are modeled by a computational theory of optimal decision making, responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence (ROUSE). In ROUSE, a preference for repeated words results from source confusion between primes and choice words. A reversal in the direction of preference arises from the discounting of words known to have also appeared as primes.     

Mechanisms of source confusion and discounting in short-term priming 2: effects of prime similarity and target duration

D. E. Huber, R. M. Shiffrin, K. B. Lyle, and K. I. Ruys (2001) tested two-alternative, forced-choice (2-AFC) perceptual identification in a short-term priming task. For repetition priming, passive viewing of primes resulted in a preference to choose repeated words, but actively responding to primes resulted in a preference against choosing repeated words. These results were explained with a computational model, responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence (ROUSE), using the offsetting mechanisms of source confusion and discounting. An analysis of ROUSE revealed conditions under which discounting efficacy should diminish, causing a preference for primed words even with active prime processing. Two new studies confirm 2 such conditions: very short target flash durations and very low similarity between primes and primed choice words. These a priori predictions contrast with the a posteriori data fits of a multinomial model developed by R. Ratcliff and G. McKoon (2001).     

Who is exaggerating cognitive impairment and who is not?

This chart review examined the effects of effort on neuropsychological assessment and test performance patterns among genuine and exaggerating patients, with and without neurological findings, as aids to diagnosing symptom exaggeration. The sample consisted of 561 consecutive patients involved in compensation claims. With a flexible neuropsychological test (NPT) battery, the claims were assessed over 2 days. The sample included 303 patients evaluated for traumatic brain injury, 55 patients with neurological disease, and 203 patients assessed for other conditions (eg, depression or chronic pain). An average of 38 ability measures per patient were used to generate an overall NPT domain score. Composite scores were also computed for symptom validity tests, self-report measures of psychiatric symptoms, and memory complaint inventory. Seven NPT cognitive subdomain scores were multiply regressed onto the symptom validity test composite, accounting for 45% of its total variance. Patients were also assigned to Genuine or Exaggerator groups based on symptom validity test performance. The NPT for Exaggerating patients averaged 1.43 standard deviations below that of Genuine patients, suggesting that NPT scores for most Exaggerating patients are underestimates of their true ability. Factor analysis results differed between these groups. As a result, clinicians might avoid falsely identifying genuine patients as exaggerating by incorporating their self-reports of psychiatric symptoms and memory complaints into the diagnostic process.