Neurotic contentment: a self-regulation view of neuroticism-linked distress

The present hypotheses were guided by four premises, which were systematically examined in six studies involving 409 undergraduate participants. The first premise, established by prior work, is that trait neuroticism is closely associated with avoidance-related goals. The second premise, however, is that neuroticism may be uncorrelated with cognitive tendencies to recognize threats as they occur, and subsequently to down-regulate them. In support of this point, all six studies found that neuroticism was unrelated to post-error behavioral adjustments in choice reaction time. The third premise is that post-error reactivity would nonetheless predict individual differences in threat-recognition (Studies 1 and 2) and its apparent mitigation (Study 3), independently of trait neuroticism. These predictions were supported. The fourth premise is that individual differences in neuroticism and error-reactivity would interact with each other in predicting everyday experiences of distress. In support of such predictions, Studies 4-6 found that higher levels of error-reactivity were associated with less negative affect at high levels of neuroticism, but more negative affect at low levels of neuroticism. The findings are interpreted in terms of trait-cognition self-regulation principles.     

What's the use of being happy? Mood states, useful objects, and repetition priming effects

Two experiments involving 99 undergraduate participants sought to examine the influence of mood states on encoding speed within lexical decision and pronunciation tasks. Mood states were measured naturalistically in Experiment 1 and manipulated in Experiment 2. Stimuli consisted of nouns representing useful (e.g., food) and nonuseful (e.g., lint) objects. Mood states had no implications for initial encoding speed. However, when the same words were presented a 2nd time (i.e., repeated), happy individuals displayed a tendency to encode useful words faster than nonuseful ones. Thus, mood states influenced repetition priming on the basis of stimulus valence. The authors propose that happiness sensitizes individuals to useful or rewarding objects, which in turn creates a stronger memory trace for such stimuli in the future.     

Distinguishing between learning and motivation in behavioral tests of the reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality

According to Gray's (1973) Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST), a Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and a Behavioral Activation System (BAS) mediate effects of goal conflict and reward on behavior. BIS functioning has been linked with individual differences in trait anxiety and BAS functioning with individual differences in trait impulsivity. In this article, it is argued that behavioral outputs of the BIS and BAS can be distinguished in terms of learning and motivation processes and that these can be operationalized using the Signal Detection Theory measures of response-sensitivity and response-bias. In Experiment 1, two measures of BIS-reactivity predicted increased response-sensitivity under goal conflict, whereas one measure of BAS-reactivity predicted increased response-sensitivity under reward. In Experiment 2, two measures of BIS-reactivity predicted response-bias under goal conflict, whereas a measure of BAS-reactivity predicted motivation response-bias under reward. In both experiments, impulsivity measures did not predict criteria for BAS-reactivity as traditionally predicted by RST.     

Neuroticism and Affective Priming: Evidence for a Neuroticism-Linked Negative Schema

Neuroticism has been hypothesized to systematically relate to semantic memory networks favoring negative affect, but no studies using affective priming tasks have established this link. The present two studies, involving 145 undergraduate participants, sought to provide initial evidence along these lines. Study 1 used a task in which participants were asked to judge their emotions in the past, whereas Study 2 used a perceptual identification task in which participants merely had to identify the word in question. In both studies, neuroticism was positively correlated with negative affective priming, but not positive affective priming. The studies suggest that neuroticism systematically relates to the inter-connectivity of negative affect with semantic memory systems, whether involving the self-concept (Study 1) or not (Study 2). These results are novel and important in understanding individual differences in neuroticism and their affective processing correlates.     

Traits, States, and encoding speed: support for a top-down view of neuroticism/state relations

Recent theories suggest that trait neuroticism gains its pernicious power particularly among individuals less capable of making distinctions concerning present reality. Four studies, involving 272 undergraduates, sought to provide some basic, assessment-related support for such theories in the context of individual differences in choice reaction time, which reflect abilities to make distinctions at encoding. Studies 1-3 focused on somatic symptoms, whereas Study 4 focused on neurotic behaviors and negative affect. As predicted, neuroticism consistently interacted with categorization speed in predicting these dependent measures. Specifically, neuroticism/outcome relations were robust among individuals slow to make distinctions at encoding; by contrast, neuroticism did not predict the dependent measures among individuals fast to make distinctions. Such data reinforce suggestions that neuroticism is particularly pernicious among individuals less capable of making distinctions at encoding.     

Preferences and inferences in encoding visual objects: a systematic comparison of semantic and affective priming

The authors systematically compared semantic and affective priming in five studies involving words and pictures. In Studies 1 (lexical decision task) and 2 (evaluation task), irrelevant short duration (200 ms) primes were briefly flashed before relevant targets. The authors orthogonally varied both the semantic and affective relations between primes and targets. In both studies, semantic priming but not affective priming was found. Study 3 revealed that the same stimuli can produce affective priming, but only when words come from a single semantic category. Studies 4 and 5 used pictures rather than words to examine automatic encoding tendencies. The results conceptually replicated those from Studies 1 and 2. In sum, the findings suggest that affective priming may be a relatively fragile phenomenon, particularly when the semantic properties of objects vary in a salient manner.     

Using and being used by categories. The case of negative evaluations and daily well-being

Three studies involving 257 undergraduates examined whether a simple choice reaction time task could predict daily experiences of affect. Individuals who were fast to make negative evaluations experienced more negative affect and more somatic symptoms and were less satisfied with their lives, compared with individuals who were slow to make negative evaluations. A fourth study, involving 89 undergraduates, indicated that performance on the task was relatively unaffected by transitory mood states. The results support the idea that categorization provides a useful perspective on personality functioning.     

The interpretation of symptoms of severe dietary restraint

A recent cognitive-behavioural theory of eating disorders proposes that people with eating disorders interpret symptoms of dietary restraint in terms of control. The primary aim of the present study was to test this hypothesis. A second aim was to test the hypothesis derived from clinical observation that people with eating disorders view these symptoms positively. Forty-four participants meeting DSM-IV criteria for a clinical eating disorder and 80 control participants with no history of an eating disorder completed an ambiguous scenario paradigm and self-report measures of eating disorder features and depression. Patients with eating disorders were significantly more likely to interpret symptoms of dietary control in terms of control, providing support for the cognitive-behavioural theory. There was only partial support for the second hypothesis. The implications for the new cognitive-behavioural theory and therapy are discussed.