More is still not better: testing the perturbation model of temporal reference memory across different modalities and tasks

The ability of the perturbation model (Jones & Wearden, 2003) to account for reference memory function in a visual temporal generalization task and auditory and visual reproduction tasks was examined. In all tasks the number of presentations of the standard was manipulated (1, 3, or 5), and its effect on performance was compared. In visual temporal generalization the number of presentations of the standard did not affect the number of times the standard was correctly identified, nor did it affect the overall temporal generalization gradient. In auditory reproduction there was no effect of the number of times the standard was presented on mean reproductions. In visual reproduction mean reproductions were shorter when the standard was only presented once; however, this effect was reduced when a visual cue was provided before the first presentation of the standard. Whilst the results of all experiments are best accounted for by the perturbation model there appears to be some attentional benefit to multiple presentations of the standard in visual reproduction.     

Religious Fundamentalism as Schema: Influences on Memory for Religious Information

Those with differing levels of religious fundamentalism (RF) may be selective in their memory for religious information. In Study 1, participants read a text about money or sex, with a judgmental or not-judgmental message. Higher RF was associated with more accurate recall and fewer intrusions. In Study 2, participants high or low in RF read texts about sex. High-RF participants had more accurate recall and fewer intrusions. However, high-RF participants had more recognition false alarms to sentences that were not presented. High RF may aid memory for religious information, but also increase familiarity of related but not presented information. Exposure to not-judgmental messages decreased RF scores, suggesting that textual messages can impact responses to fundamentalism scales.     

Impulsiveness and resource allocation: Testing Humphreys and Revelle’s (1984) explanation of impulsive personality

Humphreys and Revelle [Humphreys, M. S., Revelle, W. (1984). Personality, motivation and performance: A theory of the relationship between individual differences and information processing. Psychological Review, 91, 153–184] suggest that impulsive individuals have relatively greater capacity to improve performance through task-directed resource allocation. This implies that there will be a differential effect of increases in effort intensity on performance for high and low impulsive individuals. Two quasi-experiments tested this prediction using a relative-judgement task (total N = 108, 68 females), however neither revealed the predicted interaction. In light of these findings, we re-consider the Humphreys–Revelle model in relation to independent but potentially related theory and research.     

Fear Appeals in Political Rhetoric about Terrorism: An Analysis of Speeches by Australian Prime Minister Howard

This paper explores fear-arousing content in Australian former Prime Minister John Howard's political rhetoric about terrorism. We coded 27 speeches delivered between September 2001 and November 2007 for the presence of statements promoting fear-consistent appraisals ( Smith & Lazarus, 1993 ). Fear-arousing content was present in 24 of these speeches, but the amount of fear-arousing content varied markedly. In particular, rhetoric that raised doubts about the capacity of Australia and its allies to cope with terrorism was most strongly present in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq and at times of declining support for government policies. Textual analysis of three key speeches confirmed a marked difference between Howard's speech given immediately after the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the second and third speeches presented prior to and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These findings indicate that Howard has not consistently employed fear-inducing rhetoric in his speeches about terrorism, but that particular speeches appear to take this form, raising the possibility that fear-arousing rhetoric may have been selectively deployed to support his political purposes at those times.     

Categories of Historical Thought

This paper argues that the identity of history as a discipline derives from its distinctive combination of intellectual assumptions, or categories. Many of these categories are shared with other fields of thought, including science, literature, and common sense, but in history are understood in a unique way. This paper first examines the general notion of categories of historical understanding, then scrutinises some of the specific categories suggested by classic authors on the philosophy of history such as Dilthey and Collingwood. More recent works by Goldstein, Oakeshott, Bevir, and Tucker are treated as contributions to the same discussion. It concludes that the various categories these writers have proposed are neither trivial nor incompatible and that when collated they do indeed compose a framework capable of characterising historical thought.

Contextual Sources of Ambivalence

When will people become ambivalent about politics? One possibility is that the roots of ambivalence lie within the individual, with differences in political knowledge and attitude strength predicting whether a person internalizes the conflicts of politics. Alternately, attitudinal ambivalence could result from structural differences in the way political choices are presented in the wider political environment. We explore the degree to which different environments promote or limit ambivalence using a matching approach in conjunction with a set of multilevel models. We find that campaign environments can induce candidate ambivalence. In presidential elections, campaign efforts promote ambivalence most when competition between partisan campaign efforts is high. In House elections, campaign spending has a direct effect on levels of candidate ambivalence, where a candidate's spending decreases ambivalence about that candidate and increases ambivalence about opponents.     

Openness/Intellect and Susceptibility to Pseudo‐Profound Bullshit: A Replication and Extension

‘Pseudo‐profound bullshit’ (PPBS) is a class of meaningless statements designed to appear profound. Profundity ratings for PPBS have been found to be negatively related to analytical thinking and positively related to epistemically suspect beliefs (e.g. belief in the paranormal). Conceptually similar traits within the Openness/Intellect (O/I) domain form a simplex, whereby traits are arranged along a single dimension from intelligence to apophenia (i.e. observing patterns or causal connections were none exist). Across two studies (total N = 297), we attempted to replicate the O/I simplex and determine how it relates to perceiving PPBS as profound. Participants completed questionnaires measuring traits from the O/I simplex and provided profundity ratings for PPBS. Profundity ratings of PPBS tended to correlate negatively with intelligence and positively with apophenia. The association with intelligence generally reflected a greater ability to discriminate the profound from the pseudo‐profound, whereas the association with apophenia reflected poorer discrimination in Study 1, with less conclusive results in Study 2. In both studies, the O/I simplex was closely replicated. The results suggest a link between the O/I domain and perceiving PPBS as profound and tentatively support the theory that intelligence may protect against apophenia. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Distinguishing between learning and motivation in behavioral tests of the reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality

According to Gray's (1973) Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST), a Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and a Behavioral Activation System (BAS) mediate effects of goal conflict and reward on behavior. BIS functioning has been linked with individual differences in trait anxiety and BAS functioning with individual differences in trait impulsivity. In this article, it is argued that behavioral outputs of the BIS and BAS can be distinguished in terms of learning and motivation processes and that these can be operationalized using the Signal Detection Theory measures of response-sensitivity and response-bias. In Experiment 1, two measures of BIS-reactivity predicted increased response-sensitivity under goal conflict, whereas one measure of BAS-reactivity predicted increased response-sensitivity under reward. In Experiment 2, two measures of BIS-reactivity predicted response-bias under goal conflict, whereas a measure of BAS-reactivity predicted motivation response-bias under reward. In both experiments, impulsivity measures did not predict criteria for BAS-reactivity as traditionally predicted by RST.