Wittgenstein and the Animal Origins of Linguistic Communication

Wittgenstein's notorious sample of a ‘complete primitive language’ (viz. the builders’ game of the Philosophical Investigations) is often thought to be closer in kind to animal forms of communication than human language. Indeed, it has been criticised on precisely these grounds. But such debates make little sense if we take seriously Wittgenstein's idea that language is a family resemblance concept. So, rather than argue that the builders’ game ‘really is a language’ (or not), I propose to turn the debate on its head and welcome the comparison. By changing our perspective in this way, I suggest that we can see that the learning of language is crucially dependent on forms of communication that are animal in nature. I then discuss how these lessons might shed light on empirical research into both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of linguistic communication.     

The Sociocultural Determination of Planned Behaviour

Goochani, Ghanian, Baradaran & Azadi’s (2017) study provides support for an extension of the theory of planned behaviour through inclusion of the variables of Trust and Perceived Benefits in the determination of attitudes. Considering the fact that the only other direct effect observed in this study is exercised by Subjective Norms, we argue that this new model provides support for the sociocultural determination of attitudes and, by extension, planned behaviour. We argue that understanding behavioural intentions for cultivating Bt rice requires an understanding of the social representations concerning this technology and its regulation in Iran. We further argue that due concern is required regarding the evolution of these representations over time. We conclude by proposing different avenues for future research.     

Children and adolescents coordinate group and moral concerns within different goal contexts when allocating resources

Coordinating complex social and moral concerns when allocating resources is a key issue in late childhood and early adolescence. This study explored resource allocation in three goal contexts that required children to focus to differing degrees on moral and group concerns. Children (9–11-years, M^age = 9.84, n = 190) and adolescents (14–16-years, M^age = 14.92, n = 154) were informed their school peer group held an in-group norm (competition, cooperation). Participants allocated resources between their in-group and an outgroup within one of three goal contexts (prosocial, learning-focused, and group-focused). Participants allocated in favour of their in-group to achieve a prosocial goal but attenuated this when the goal was focused on learning and cooperation. Adolescents, more than children, reasoned about the goals of resource allocation to justify their decisions. From 9 years old, children begin to coordinate peer group norms and goal information when deciding how to allocate resources within intergroup contexts.     

What if they knocked down the library and nobody noticed? The failure to detect large changes to familiar scenes

The purpose of the current study was to investigate people's ability to detect changes to familiar scenes. College students were asked either to identify what was wrong with a picture of a familiar location on their college campus (e.g., the library had been removed from the scene), or to estimate the difficulty of change detection for a hypothetical cohort performing the same task. Performance in the change-detection condition was extremely poor, even when changes were large. Participants who were familiar with the scenes and those who were unfamiliar with the scenes both overestimated the actual levels of change-detection performance. A follow-up analysis indicated that the participants who were unfamiliar with the scenes produced estimations of difficulty that were highly correlated with the mathematical area of the change, whereas participants who were familiar with the scenes produced estimations of difficulty that were highly correlated with the actual difficulty of change detection. The results indicate that people's visual long-term memory for familiar scenes lacks the precision to be able to effectively identify even large-scale changes, although subjectively people believe this should be relatively easy.