On learning how to live in this strange place

In “How do I live in this strange place?”, Samantha Vice contends that white South Africans ought to feel shame for their unjustly acquired privilege and their morally compromised selves, and recommends that they engage with humility and political silence in projects of personal transformation though private, critical self-examination. On one view, philosophy is in part concerned with practical inquiry into how one might lead a good life, and for many, at least, this necessitates some form of moral learning. Ideally, the philosophers concerned with this question could give practical, action-guiding advice on how one might undertake this moral learning, advice well-supported by evidence and with reasonably good prospects for success. I argue that philosophically “therapeutic” projects of the kind advocated by Vice necessarily involve forms of moral learning, and that a range of empirical research in cognitive, moral, and educational psychology thus bear on their methods and prospects. These considerations undermine the outlook of therapeutic projects that rely principally on solitary methods of critical reflection and introspection. I challenge philosophers to develop more practical, actionable, evidence-based counsel on how to engage in moral learning of the type that Vice and her critics recommend, and I articulate several candidate proposals inspired by research from the educational, learning sciences and debiasing literatures.     

Introduction

The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular the Predictive Processing approach. Here, we will consider the different approaches discussed in this volume.     

Development and evaluation of a scale assessing therapist fidelity to guidelines for delivering therapist-assisted Internet-delivered cognitive behaviour therapy

Internet-delivered cognitive behaviour therapy (ICBT) is often accompanied by therapist emails, but there is limited research on the quality of this therapist-assistance. In this study, an ICBT Therapist Rating Scale (ICBT-TRS) was developed and evaluated to assess whether therapist emails showed fidelity to specific therapist behaviours. Using data from a previous ICBT trial for depression and anxiety, the ICBT-TRS was used to rate 706 emails sent by 39 therapists to 91 randomly selected patients. Emails were rated for adherence (absent/present) and quality (inadequate/competent) on the following behaviours: Builds Rapport, Seeks Feedback, Provides Symptom Feedback, Provides Psychoeducation, Facilitates Understanding, Praises Effort, Encourages Practice, Clarifies Administrative Procedures, and Communicates Effectively. Inter-rater reliability was high. Most behaviours were identified as present in 72–100% of emails, with the exception of Provides Symptom Feedback and Facilitating Understanding which were only present in 54 and 61% of emails. The majority of emails were rated as high quality (88–98% of messages). While not related to symptom improvement, ICBT-TRS ratings were higher when patients were more engaged in ICBT (e.g. log-ins) and among therapists who specialized in ICBT or had a background in Psychology. The ICBT-TRS has potential to facilitate ICBT research and clinical training.     

Oculomotor and cognitive control of eye movements in reading: Evidence from mindless reading

In the present study, we investigated the influence of cognitive factors on eye-movement behaviors in reading. Participants performed two tasks: a normal-reading task, as well as a mindless-reading task in which letters were replaced with unreadable block shapes. This mindless-reading task served as an oculomotor control condition, simulating the visual aspects of reading but removing higher-level linguistic processing. Fixation durations, word skipping, and some regressions were influenced by cognitive factors, whereas eye movements within words appeared to be less open to cognitive control. Implications for models of eye-movement control in reading are discussed.