Molinist Thomist Calvinism: A Synthesis

Abstract: In recent years, attempts to reconcile God's exhaustive providential control over the future and human freedom frequently appeal to Molinism. Through the theory of Middle Knowledge, it is claimed, God can exercise meticulous providence over free creatures while preserving the libertarian agency of those creatures. Historically, both Thomist and Reformed theologians have critiqued the theory of Middle Knowledge for effectively eliminating God's aseity, making God's knowledge in some sense dependent on some non-God reality. In this paper, I aim to push the discussion forward by integrating Thomist, Molinist, and Reformed perspectives in the view I call Molinist Thomist Calvinism. By resourcing each of these views, I try to offer a coherent way to affirm God's meticulous providence, including God's unconditional election of some and not others, and morally significant human freedom.     

Social epistemology and the aim(s) of education

In Knowledge in a Social World (1999) Alvin Goldman has defended a ‘veritistic’ or truth-oriented, monistic account of the aim of education. In particular, he argued that the inculcation of true belief constitutes the ultimate goal of education, with other educational activities having only instrumental value insofar as they aid in this goal. In contrast, Harvey Siegel has defended a pluralistic alternative, on which the critical capacity for sustaining rational belief represents an independent, non-instrumental epistemic end of education. I argue that while some of Siegel's objections represent challenges to the sufficiency of Goldman's veritistic model, his alternative account fails to recognise the necessity of truth as an educational goal. This therefore commits Siegel to an unsatisfying pluralism regarding the ideal aim of education. Crucially, this disagreement hinges on two very different ways of understanding the nature of rationality: as instrumental or as epistemic. On Goldman's instrumentalist view, rationality merely involves the ordering of one's means to the end of true belief. However, Kelly (2003) has raised significant counterexamples against the instrumentalist view, and I adapt these to the case of the epistemic ends of education. I thus defend a non-pluralistic account of the ultimate end of education as involving knowledge in the ‘strong’ sense. This, I argue, overcomes the objections raised against Goldman and Siegel's accounts, and better accords with the notion of an ideal characterisation of the aim of education.     

‘You Wouldn’t have Your Granny Using Them’: Drawing Boundaries Between Acceptable and Unacceptable Applications of Civil Drones

Some industry and policy actors are concerned about public opposition to civil drones, in particular because of their association with military drones. However, very little is understood about public reactions to the technology. Strategies to ‘manage public acceptance’ have so far relied upon several untested assumptions. We conducted public engagement activities to explore citizens’ visions of civil drones. Several insights counteracted the prevailing assumptions. Rejecting the notion of blanket support for or opposition to civil drones, we found that citizens make nuanced decisions about the acceptability of civil drones depending upon the purpose of the flight and the actors involved. The results are positioned in support for calls to strengthen the role of citizens in civil drone development and, in particular, to shift away from the current focus on citizens’ acceptance of civil drone development towards the development of civil drones that are acceptable to citizens.     

Divine hiddenness and the problem of no greater goods

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - John Schellenberg argues that God would never withhold the possibility of conscious personal relationship with Him from anyone for the sake of...