"... As you would have them do unto you": Does imagining yourself in the other's place stimulate moral action?

Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another's place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other's place did little to increase the morality (fairness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other's feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other's place did significantly increase moral action.     

Early childhood education and crime

This article presents new evidence on the crime-reducing impacts of a high-quality, intensive early childhood program with long-term follow-up, evaluated by a randomized controlled trial. Proportionately, more women than men decrease their criminal activity after participating in the program. This gender difference arises because of the worse home environments for girls, with corresponding greater scope for improvement by the program. For both genders, treatment effects are larger for the least-advantaged children, as measured by their mother's education at baseline. The dollar value of the social cost of criminal activity averted is higher for men because they commit more costly violent crimes.     

Variation, repetition, and choice

Experiment 1 investigated the controlling properties of variability contingencies on choice between repeated and variable responding. Pigeons were exposed to concurrent-chains schedules with two alternatives. In the REPEAT alternative, reinforcers in the terminal link depended on a single sequence of four responses. In the VARY alternative, a response sequence in the terminal link was reinforced only if it differed from the n previous sequences (lag criterion). The REPEAT contingency generated low, constant levels of sequence variation whereas the VARY contingency produced levels of sequence variation that increased with the lag criterion. Preference for the REPEAT alternative tended to increase directly with the degree of variation required for reinforcement. Experiment 2 examined the potential confounding effects in Experiment 1 of immediacy of reinforcement by yoking the interreinforcer intervals in the REPEAT alternative to those in the VARY alternative. Again, preference for REPEAT was a function of the lag criterion. Choice between varying and repeating behavior is discussed with respect to obtained behavioral variability, probability of reinforcement, delay of reinforcement, and switching within a sequence.     

Perceived reachability in hemispace

A common observation in studies of perceived (imagined) compared to actual movement in a reaching paradigm is the tendency to overestimate. Of the studies noted, reaching tasks have been presented in the general midline range. In the present study, strong right-handers were asked to judge the reachability of visual targets projected onto a table surface at midline, right- (RVF), and left-visual fields (LVF). Midline results support those of previous studies, showing an overestimation bias. In contrast, participants revealed the tendency to underestimate their reachability in RVF and LVF. These findings are discussed from the perspective of actor 'confidence' (a cognitive state) possibly associated with visual information, perceived ability, and perceived task demands.     

Expectations about numerical events in four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, Eulemur mongoz, Lemur catta and Varecia rubra)

Although much is known about how some primates—in particular, monkeys and apes—represent and enumerate different numbers of objects, very little is known about the numerical abilities of prosimian primates. Here, we explore how four lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, E. mongoz, Lemur catta, and Varecia rubra) represent small numbers of objects. Specifically, we presented lemurs with three expectancy violation looking time experiments aimed at exploring their expectations about a simple 1+1 addition event. In these experiments, we presented subjects with displays in which two lemons were sequentially added behind an occluder and then measured subjects duration of looking to expected and unexpected outcomes. In experiment 1, subjects looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of only one object than at an expected outcome of two objects. Similarly, subjects in experiment 2 looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of three objects than at an expected outcome of two objects. In experiment 3, subjects looked reliably longer at an unexpected outcome of one object twice the size of the original than at an expected outcome of two objects of the original size. These results suggest that some prosimian primates understand the outcome of simple arithmetic operations. These results are discussed in light of similar findings in human infants and other adult primates.This revised version was published online in March 2005 with corrections to Fig. 6.