Cohort differences in Big Five personality factors over a period of 25 years

The notion of personality traits implies a certain degree of stability in the life span of an individual. But what about generational effects? Are there generational changes in the distribution or structure of personality traits? This article examines cohort changes on the Big Five personality factors Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience, among first-year psychology students in The Netherlands, ages 18 to 25 years, between 1982 and 2007. Because measurement invariance of a personality test is essential for a sound interpretation of cohort differences in personality, we first assessed measurement invariance with respect to cohort for males and females separately on the Big Five personality factors, as measured by the Dutch instrument Five Personality Factors Test. Results identified 11 (females) and 2 (males) biased items with respect to cohort, out of a total of 70 items. Analyzing the unbiased items, results indicated small linear increases over time in Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness and small linear decreases over time in Neuroticism. No clear patterns were found on the Openness to Experience factor. Secondary analyses on students from 1971 to 2007 of females and males of different ages together revealed linear trends comparable to those in the main analyses among young adults between 1982 onward. The results imply that the broad sociocultural context may affect personality factors.     

Contextual influences on resistance to disruption in children with intellectual disabilities

Training context can influence resistance to disruption under differing reinforcement schedules. With nonhumans, when relatively lean and rich reinforcement schedules are experienced in the context of a multiple schedule, greater resistance is found in the rich than the lean component, as described by behavioral momentum theory. By contrast, when the schedules are experienced in separated blocks of sessions (i.e., as single schedules), resistance is not consistently greater in either component. In the current study, two groups of 6 children with intellectual disabilities responded to stimuli presented in relatively lean or rich components. For both, reinforcers were delivered according to the same variable-interval reinforcement schedule; additionally, the rich component included the delivery of response-independent reinforcers. The Within group was trained on a multiple schedule in which lean and rich components alternated regularly within sessions; the Blocked group was trained on two single schedules in which sessions with either the lean or rich schedule were conducted in successive blocks. Disruption tests presented a concurrently available alternative stimulus disrupter signaling the availability of tangible reinforcers. All 6 Within participants showed greater resistance to disruption in the rich component, consistent with behavioral momentum theory. By contrast, there was no consistent or significant difference in resistance for Blocked participants. This finding is potentially relevant to the development of interventions in applied settings, where such interventions often approximate single schedules and include response-independent reinforcers.     

Van Inwagen’s modal skepticism

In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism, offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology.