Is knowledge justified true belief?

Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the flaw helps us better understand the nature of knowledge and epistemic justification. I propose a crucial improvement to the traditional view, relying on an intuitive and independently plausible metaphysical distinction pertaining to the manifestation of intellectual powers, which supplements the traditional components of justification, truth and belief.     

Warrant <Emphasis Type=Italic>does</Emphasis> entail truth

Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows. Suppose fallibilism is true. An implication of fallibilism is that the property that makes the difference between knowledge and mere belief (which I dub ‘warrant*’) is the conjunctive property being warranted and true. I show that this implication of fallibilism conflicts with an uncontroversial thesis we have learned from reflection on Gettier cases: that nonaccidental truth is a constituent of warrant*. It follows that infallibilism is true. In the second part of the paper, I present and criticize a new argument against infallibilism. The argument states that there are plausible cases where, intuitively, the only thing that is keeping a belief from counting as knowledge is the falsity of that belief. Furthermore, it is plausible that such a belief is warranted and false. So, the argument goes, infallibilism is false. I show that this argument fails.     

The effects of prior knowledge on the encoding of episodic contextual details

A positive relationship between prior knowledge and item memory is a consistent finding in the literature. In the present study, we sought to determine whether this relationship extends to episodic details that are present at the time of encoding, namely source memory. Using a novel experimental design, we were able to show both between- and within-subjects effects of prior knowledge on source memory. Specifically, the results revealed that the degree of prior knowledge positively predicted memory for source specifying contextual details. In addition, by including two conditions in which attention was divided either at encoding or retrieval, we were able to show that prior knowledge influences memory by affecting encoding processes. Overall, the data suggest that a priori knowledge within a specific domain allows attentional resources to be allocated toward the encoding of contextual details.     

Smaller holistic processing of faces associated with face drawing experience

The type of experience involved with an object category has been regarded as one important factor in shaping of the human object recognition system. Laboratory training studies have shown that different kinds of learning experience with the same set of novel objects resulted in different perceptual and neural changes. Whether this applies to natural real-world objects remains to be seen. We compared two groups of observers who had different learning experiences with faces, using holistic processing as a dependent measure. We found that, while ordinary observers had extensive individuation experience with faces and displayed typical holistic face processing, art students who had acquired additional experience in drawing faces, and thus in attending to parts of a face, showed less holistic processing than did ordinary observers. These results converge with laboratory training studies on the role of type of experience in the development of different perceptual markers for different object categories. It is thus insufficient to categorize expertise simply in terms of object domains (e.g., expertise with faces). Instead, perceptual expertise should be classified in terms of the underlying process or task demand.     

Revisiting backward recall and benchmark memory effects: a reply to Bireta et al. (2010)

When participants are asked to recall lists of items in the reverse order, known as backward recall, several benchmark memory phenomena, such as the word length effect, are abolished (Bireta et al. Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010). Bireta et al. (Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010) suggested that in backward recall, reliance on order retention is increased at the expense of item retention, leading to the abolition of item-based phenomena. In a subsequent study, however, Guérard and Saint-Aubin (in press) showed that four lexical factors known to modulate item retention were unaffected by recall direction. In a series of five experiments, we examined the source of the discrepancy between the two studies. We revisited the effects of phonological similarity, word length, articulatory suppression, and irrelevant speech, using open and closed pools of words in backward and forward recall. The results are unequivocal in showing that none of these effects are influenced by recall direction, suggesting that Bireta et al.’s (Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010) results are the consequence of their particular stimuli.     

Aggression Among Children with ADHD,Anxiety, or Co-occurring Symptoms: Competing Exacerbation and Attenuation Hypotheses

Competing hypotheses for explaining the role of anxiety in the relation between attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms and childhood aggression were evaluated. Two studies tested whether anxiety exacerbated, attenuated, or had no effect on the relation between ADHD and aggression subtypes among psychiatrically hospitalized children. In Study 1 (N = 99), children who scored above clinical cut-off levels for anxiety only, ADHD only, and co-occurring ADHD and anxiety were compared on aggression subtypes (i.e., reactive, proactive, overt, and relational aggression). In Study 2, the moderating role of anxiety on the relation between ADHD and aggression subtypes was examined with a larger sample (N = 265) and with continuous variables. No support was found for either the attenuation or exacerbation hypothesis, and results remained consistent when separately examining hyperactivity/impulsivity and inattention symptoms of ADHD. Although ADHD symptoms were significantly associated with all aggression subtypes, this association did not remain when including symptoms of oppositional defiant disorder.     

Individual differences in the mixture ratio of rotation and nonrotation trials during rotated mirror/normal letter discriminations

Mental rotation is thought to underlie the increase in response times (RTs) for deciding whether rotated letters are normal or mirrored versions. However, mental rotation predicts a linear increase in RTs, whereas the mirror/normal letter discrimination task typically produces a curved function. Recently, Kung and Hamm suggested that this curved function results from a mixture of trials in which mental rotation is employed and trials in which it is not. The mixture ratio may vary between individuals, with some individuals relying more on mental rotation than others. There is no factor in the Kung and Hamm model that reflects such individual differences. In the present study, we suggest that a possible exponent parameter could be added to the Kung and Hamm model to capture individual differences in the mixture ratio. This exponent parameter appears to capture an individual characteristic since the value obtained correlates between the mirror/normal letter task and a left/right object facing task. The development of a quantity that represents the mixture ratio will aid further testing of processes involved in the visual imagery system.     

Centre–surround inhibition is a general aspect of famous-person recognition: Evidence from negative semantic priming from clearly visible primes

A centre–surround attentional mechanism was proposed by Carr and Dagenbach (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 16: 341–350, 1990) to account for their observations of negative semantic priming from hard-to-perceive primes. Their mechanism cannot account for the observation of negative semantic priming when primes are clearly visible. Three experiments (Ns = 30, 46, and 30) used a familiarity decision with names of famous people, preceded by a prime name with the same occupation as the target or with a different occupation. Negative semantic priming was observed at a 150- or 200-ms SOA, with positive priming at shorter (50-ms) and longer (1,000-ms) SOAs. In Experiment 3, we verified that the primes were easily recognisable in the priming task at an SOA that yielded negative semantic priming, which cannot be predicted by the original centre–surround mechanism. A modified version is proposed that explains transiently negative semantic priming by proposing that centre–surround inhibition is a normal, automatically invoked aspect of the semantic processing of visually presented famous names.     

The origin of the interaction between learning method and delay in the testing effect: The roles of processing and conceptual retrieval organization

Recent research has demonstrated a relationship between retrieval organization and the efficacy of prior repeated retrieval on delayed tests. The present study asked why repeated study engenders higher recall at a short delay despite lower retrieval organization but produces a decline at a long delay, and why repeated retrieval engenders lower recall at a short delay despite higher retrieval organization but produces stable recall over time. This relationship was examined through the inclusion of two successive recall tests—one immediately after learning method and one a week later. Results replicated the interaction in recall between learning method and delay characterizing the testing effect and, critically, revealed the qualitative differences inherent in the retrieval organization of each method. Specifically, stable recall in repeated retrieval was accompanied by strong and sustained conceptual organization, whereas organization for repeated study was tenuous and weakened across tests. These differences quantitatively were assessed through the use of five targeted analyses: specifically, the examination of cumulative recall curves, the accumulation of organization across time (a curve akin to cumulative recall), item gains and losses across time, changes in the size of categories across time, and the fate of specific clusters of recalled items across time. These differences are discussed within the context of differential processes occurring during learning method.