Evidence for Implicit Risk: Delay Facilitates the Processing of Uncertainty

Humans and other animals discount the value of rewards over time. One explanation for this is that delayed rewards may be less certain than immediate rewards, what has been referred to as the implicit risk hypothesis. Although this explanation is widely accepted, little research has directly assessed the validity of the implicit risk hypothesis. In the current study, we present two experiments in which participants made decisions about rewards involving both delay and uncertainty. By manipulating the order in which information was presented, we were able to investigate whether delay information facilitates beliefs about uncertainty and vice versa. It was found that participants were more likely to prefer larger, delayed rewards when information about delay was presented before information about uncertainty than when the information was presented in the opposite order. Additionally, we describe a process model that implements the implicit risk hypothesis and show that it is consistent with the observed patterns of data. These results support the implicit risk hypothesis and suggest that information about delay facilitates the processing of information about uncertainty. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intolerance of uncertainty and decisions about delayed, probabilistic rewards

Worry is the inflated concern about potential future threats and is a hallmark feature of generalized anxiety disorder. Previous theoretical work has suggested that worry may be a consequence of intolerance of uncertainty (IU). The current study seeks to explore the behavioral consequences of IU. Specifically, we examine how IU might be associated with aspects of reward-based decision making. We utilized a simple laboratory gambling task in which participants chose between small, low-probability rewards available immediately at the beginning of each trial and large, high-probability rewards only available after some variable delay. Results demonstrate that higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty were associated with a tendency to select the immediately available, but less valuable and less probable rewards. IU also predicted decision-makers' sensitivity to outcomes. We discuss the cognitive and affective mechanisms that are likely to underlie the observed decision-making behavior and the implications for anxiety disorders.     

Yes,But Are They Happy? Effects of Trait Self‐Control on Affective Well‐Being and Life Satisfaction

Does trait self‐control (TSC) predict affective well‐being and life satisfaction—positively, negatively, or not? We conducted three studies (Study 1: N = 414, 64% female, M_age = 35.0 years; Study 2: N = 208, 66% female, M_age = 25.24 years; Study 3: N = 234, 61% female, M_age = 34.53 years). The key predictor was TSC, with affective well‐being and life satisfaction ratings as key outcomes. Potential explanatory constructs including goal conflict, goal balancing, and emotional distress also were investigated. TSC is positively related to affective well‐being and life satisfaction, and managing goal conflict is a key as to why. All studies, moreover, showed that the effect of TSC on life satisfaction is at least partially mediated by affect. Study 1's correlational study established the effect. Study 2's experience sampling approach demonstrated that compared to those low in TSC, those high in TSC experience higher levels of momentary affect even as they experience desire, an effect partially mediated through experiencing lower conflict and emotional distress. Study 3 found evidence for the proposed mechanism—that TSC may boost well‐being by helping people avoid frequent conflict and balance vice‐virtue conflicts by favoring virtues. Self‐control positively contributes to happiness through avoiding and dealing with motivational conflict.     

Integrating spatial context learning over contradictory signals: Recency effects in contextual cueing

Contextual cueing is a visual search phenomenon in which memory of global visual context guides spatial attention towards task-relevant portions of the search display. Recent work has shown that the learning processes underlying contextual cueing exhibit primacy effects; they are more sensitive to early experience than to later experience. These results appear to pose difficulties for associative accounts which typically predict recency effects; behaviour being most strongly influenced by recent experience. The current study utilizes trial sequences that consist of two contradictory sets of regularities. In contrast to previous results, robust recency effects were observed. In a second study it is demonstrated that this recency effect can be minimized, but not reversed by systematically manipulating task-irrelevant features of the search display. These results provide additional support for an associative account of contextual cueing and suggest that contextual cueing may, under some circumstances, be more sensitive to recent experience.     

Theory-based categorization under speeded conditions

It is widely accepted that similarity influences rapid categorization, whereas theories can influence only more leisurely category judgments. In contrast, we argue that it is not the type of knowledge used that determines categorization speed, but rather the complexity of the categorization processes. In two experiments, participants learned four categories of items, each consisting of three causally related features. Participants gave more weight to cause features than to effect features, even under speeded response conditions. Furthermore, the time required to make judgments was equivalent, regardless of whether participants were using causal knowledge or base-rate information. We argue that both causal knowledge and base-rate information, once precompiled during learning, can be used at roughly the same speeds during categorization, thus demonstrating an important parallel between these two types of knowledge.     

Effect of theory-based feature correlations on typicality judgments

In the present study, we examine what types of feature correlations are salient in our conceptual representations. It was hypothesized that of all possible feature pairs, those that are explicitly recognized as correlated (i.e., explicit pairs) and affect typicality judgments are the ones that are more likely theory based than are those that are not explicitly recognized (i.e., implicit pairs). Real-world categories and their properties, taken from Malt and Smith (1984), were examined. We found that explicit pairs had a greater number of asymmetric dependency relations (i.e., one feature depends on the other feature, but not vice versa) and stronger dependency relations than did implicit pairs, which were statistically correlated in the environment but were not recognized as such. In addition, people more often provided specific relation labels for explicit pairs than for implicit pairs; these labels were most often causal relations. Finally, typicality judgments were more affected when explicit correlations were broken than when implicit correlations were broken. It is concluded that in natural categories, feature correlations that are explicitly represented and affect typicality judgments are the ones about which people have theories.     

Subjective well-being and adaptation to life events: a meta-analysis

Previous research has shown that major life events can have short- and long-term effects on subjective well-being (SWB). The present meta-analysis examines (a) whether life events have different effects on affective and cognitive well-being and (b) how the rate of adaptation varies across different life events. Longitudinal data from 188 publications (313 samples, N = 65,911) were integrated to describe the reaction and adaptation to 4 family events (marriage, divorce, bereavement, childbirth) and 4 work events (unemployment, reemployment, retirement, relocation/migration). The findings show that life events have very different effects on affective and cognitive well-being and that for most events the effects of life events on cognitive well-being are stronger and more consistent across samples. Different life events differ in their effects on SWB, but these effects are not a function of the alleged desirability of events. The results are discussed with respect to their theoretical implications, and recommendations for future studies on adaptation are given.     

Time frames and the distinction between affective and cognitive well-being

We examined whether the empirical differences between affective well-being (AWB) and cognitive well-being (CWB) might be due to (a) the use of different time frames in measures of AWB and CWB or (b) structural differences. In Study 1, a multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) analysis indicated that levels of different components are more similar but do not converge completely when the same time frame is used. In Study 2, we found that people are more likely to consider global life circumstances (as opposed to specific events and activities) when they evaluate their CWB, regardless of the specific time frame. In both studies, the time frame did not moderate the associations between AWB and CWB and important correlates (personality, life circumstances).     

The meaning and computation of causal power: comment on Cheng (1997) and Novick and Cheng (2004)

D. Hume (1739/1987) argued that causality is not observable. P. W. Cheng (1997) claimed to present "a theoretical solution to the problem of causal induction first posed by Hume more than two and a half centuries ago" (p. 398) in the form of the power PC theory (L. R. Novick & P. W. Cheng, 2004). This theory claims that people's goal in causal induction is to estimate causal powers from observable covariation and outlines how this can be done in specific conditions. The authors first demonstrate that if the necessary assumptions were ever met, causal powers would be self-evident to a reasoner--they are either 0 or 1--making the theory unnecessary. The authors further argue that the assumptions the power PC theory requires to compute causal power are unobtainable in the real world and, furthermore, people are aware that requisite assumptions are violated. Therefore, the authors argue that people do not attempt to compute causal power.