Stem cell research: a target article collection: Part II--what's in a name: embryos,clones, and stem cells

In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Human Cloning Prohibition Act" and President Bush announced his decision to allow only limited research on existing stem cell lines but not on "embryos." In contrast, the U.K. has explicitly authorized "therapeutic cloning." Much more will be said about bioethical, legal, and social implications, but subtleties of the science and careful definitions of terms have received much less consideration. Legislators and reporters struggle to discuss "cloning," "pluripotency," "stem cells," and "embryos," and whether "adult" are preferable to "embryonic" stem cells as research subjects. They profess to abhor "copying humans" or "killing embryos." Do they know what they are talking about? Do we? This paper explores the historical, philosophical, and scientific contexts that inform this heated discussion.     

When it hurts to be misled: A Stroop-like effect in a simple addition production task

In four experiments, subjects saw simple addition equations (e.g., 3 + 4 = 9) and produced the sums while ignoring the presented answer. If the presented answer was false, subjects took longer to produce the sum, as compared with when the presented answer was true (Experiment 1), when there was no answer presented (blanks; Experiment 2), when a letter was presented (Experiment 3), and when a symbol was presented (Experiment 4). The results suggest that subjects were unable to ignore the presented answers, which raises problems for theories of arithmetic verification (i.e., deciding whether 3 + 4 = 9 is true or false) that claim that subjects verify equations by first producing the sum and then comparing the produced sum with the presented answer. Our results are more compatible with theories that claim that in verification and production, an arithmetic knowledge base is used in different ways.     

The relation between children's reading comprehension level and their comprehension of idioms

We report an investigation of 9-year-olds' ability to interpret idioms in relation to their reading comprehension level. We manipulated whether the idioms were transparent or opaque, whether they were real or novel, whether they were presented in isolation or in a supportive narrative context. As predicted, children were better able to explain the meanings of idioms in context than in isolation. The good and poor comprehenders did not differ in their abilities to interpret transparent idioms in context, but the poor comprehenders were significantly worse at using context to work out the meanings of opaque idioms. The explanation task revealed the source of information used by the children to derive nontarget interpretations. We discuss these findings in relation to idiom processing strategies and Levorato and Cacciari's global elaboration model.     

Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)

K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000; see record 2000-02818-008) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989; see record 1989-38845-001)) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.     

Testing comprehension abilities in users of British Sign Language following CVA

Recent imaging (e.g., MacSweeney et al., 2002) and lesion (Hickok, Love-Geffen, & Klima, 2002) studies suggest that sign language comprehension depends primarily on left hemisphere structures. However, this may not be true of all aspects of comprehension. For example, there is evidence that the processing of topographic space in sign may be vulnerable to right hemisphere damage (e.g., Hickok, Say, Bellugi, & Klima, 1996), and the influence of iconicity on comprehension has yet to be explored. In this study, comprehension testing was conducted with 15 signers with unilateral brain damage, and with elderly Deaf controls. Four tests were administered: a test of iconic and non-iconic noun comprehension, a test of verb and sentence comprehension, a test of locative sentence comprehension, and a test of classifier comprehension. All tests were administered in British Sign Language (BSL), a language that has only recently been explored with lesioned signers (see Atkinson, Marshall, Thacker, & Woll, 2004; Marshall, Atkinson, Thacker, Woll, & Smulevitch, 2004; Marshall, Atkinson, Woll, & Thacker, in press). People with left hemisphere damage were impaired relative to controls on all tests. Those with right hemisphere damage performed well in the first two tests, but were impaired on locative sentences and classifiers. Neither group showed any effect of iconicity. The results shed further light on the laterality of sign language comprehension.     

Attentional inhibition has social-emotional consequences for unfamiliar faces

Visual attention studies often rely on response time measures to show the impact of attentional facilitation and inhibition. Here we extend the investigation of the effects of attention on behavior and show that prior attentional states associated with unfamiliar faces can influence subsequent social-emotional judgments about those faces. Participants were shown pairs of face images and were asked to withhold a response if a transparent stop-signal cue appeared over one of the faces. This served to associate the cued face with an inhibitory state. Later, when asked to make social-emotional choices about these face pairs, participants chose uncued faces more often than cued faces as "more trustworthy" and chose cued faces more often than uncued faces as "less trustworthy." For perceptual choices, there was no effect of how the question was framed (which face is "on a lighter background" vs. "on a darker background"). These results suggest that attentional inhibition can be associated with socially relevant stimuli, such as faces, and can have specific, deleterious effects on social-emotional judgments.     

Suicide compared to other causes of mortality in physicians

Physicians frequently are early adopters of healthy behaviors based on their knowledge and economic resources. The mortality patterns of physicians in the United States, particularly suicide, have not been rigorously described for over a decade. Previous studies have shown lower all-cause mortality among physicians yet reported conflicting results about cause-specific mortality such as suicide. In this study, we compared all-cause and cause-specific mortality in a sample of physicians to the age-gender matched general U.S. population from 1948 through 1998. We also compared the mortality experience across medical specialties. The risk of all-cause mortality was 56% lower than expected in men, and 26% lower in women, compared to the general population. Standardized mortality ratios (SMRs) were markedly lower for diseases strongly linked to smoking, e.g., cardiovascular diseases, respiratory diseases, and lung cancer. Suicide was the only cause of death where risk was greater than the general population. Overall, we found that physicians are at substantially lower risk of dying compared to the general population for all causes of death except suicide. The findings for suicide are strikingly different than other causes of death and should provide impetus for new research on the mental health of physicians.     

The imaginer and the imagined

A transference of the imaginer and the imagined, arising from largely unconscious fantasies of the way parent and child interact to construct a view of reality, is present in all analyses. For narcissistic patients, primitive fantasies of the imaginer and imagined form an enduring organization, and the enactment of these fantasies in transference and countertransference distorts the way analyst and patient construct meaning. Clinical material demonstrates the deepening that occurs when these fantasies are interpreted.