Detecting Deceit Via Analyses of Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Children and Adults

This experiment examined children's and undergraduates' verbal and nonverbal deceptive behavior, and the extent to which their truths and lies could be correctly classified by paying attention to these responses. Participants (N= 196) aged 5–6, 10–11, and 14–15, as well as university undergraduates, participated in an erasing the blackboard event, and told the truth or lied about the event afterwards. Nonverbal and verbal responses were coded, the latter with Criteria‐Based Content Analysis and Reality Monitoring. Although children and undergraduates demonstrated different behaviors (for example, the children obtained lower CBCA scores and made more movements), actual cues to deceit were remarkably similar across different age groups (for example, both 5–6‐year‐olds and undergraduates obtained lower CBCA scores and made fewer movements while lying). A combination of verbal and nonverbal lie detection methods resulted in more correct classifications of liars and truth tellers than the verbal and nonverbal lie detection methods individually, with the combined method obtaining hit rates as high as 88%.     

Can rapport building strategies,age, and question type influence preschoolers’ disclosures of adult wrongdoing?

In the present experiment, we examined preschoolers’ disclosures of a secret as a function of rapport building strategies used in Scandinavian field settings (verbal rapport building vs. prop rapport building), age in months (33–75 months) and question type (open-ended free recall invitation vs. suggestive questions). Fifty-three preschoolers (M = 60.5 months old, SD = 11.4) witnessed a researcher break a toy and were asked to keep the toy breakage a secret. The children were thereafter interviewed about the incident. Overall, 18.9% of the children disclosed the secret after an open-ended free recall invitation. The disclosure rate rose to 83% after the final phase of the interviews when questions containing suggestive details were asked of the children. Notably, we did not observe any significant effects as a function of manipulating rapport building strategy. A linear regression model showed that child age (in months) significantly predicted the amount of reported details, with younger preschoolers reporting fewer details compared to older preschoolers. Age also predicted the amount of correct details, but not the amount of incorrect details. No age differences were found with regard to children’s disclosure tendencies or proportion of central details about the secret. Methodological limitations and practical implications will be addressed.     

From Treasure to Trash: The Lingering Value of Technological Artifacts

Science and Engineering Ethics - Electronic waste (e-waste) is the fastest growing form of waste worldwide, associated with a range of environmental, health, and justice problems. Unfortunately,...     

Properties of bootstrap tests for N‐of‐1 studies

N‐of‐1 study designs involve the collection and analysis of repeated measures data from an individual not using an intervention and using an intervention. This study explores the use of semi‐parametric and parametric bootstrap tests in the analysis of N‐of‐1 studies under a single time series framework in the presence of autocorrelation. When the Type I error rates of bootstrap tests are compared to Wald tests, our results show that the bootstrap tests have more desirable properties. We compare the results for normally distributed errors with those for contaminated normally distributed errors and find that, except when there is relatively large autocorrelation, there is little difference between the power of the parametric and semi‐parametric bootstrap tests. We also experiment with two intervention designs: ABAB and AB, and show the ABAB design has more power. The results provide guidelines for designing N‐of‐1 studies, in the sense of how many observations and how many intervention changes are needed to achieve a certain level of power and which test should be performed.     

An epistemology for practical knowledge

Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form.