Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof

A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.     

Cognitive predictors of parent-rated inattention in very preterm children: The role of working memory and processing speed

Inattention is one of the most common neurobehavioral problems following very preterm birth. Attention problems can persist into adulthood and are associated with negative socio-emotional and educational outcomes. This study aimed to determine whether the cognitive processes associated with inattention differ between term-born and very preterm children. Sixty-five children born very preterm (<33+0 weeks’ gestation) aged 8–11 years were recruited alongside 48 term-born controls (?37 20 +0 weeks’ gestation). Both groups included children with a wide spectrum of parent-rated inattention (above average attention to severe inattention) measured as a continuous dimension using the Strengths and Weaknesses of ADHD and Normal-Behavior (SWAN) scale. The children completed tests to assess basic cognitive processes and executive function. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was implemented to assess which neurocognitive processes explained variance in parent-rated inattention and whether these differed between preterm and term-born children. In both groups, poorer verbal and visuospatial short-term memory and poorer visuospatial working memory independently explained variance in parent-rated inattention. Slower motor processing speed explained variance in inattention among very preterm children only. The cognitive mechanisms associated with parent-rated inattention were predominantly overlapping between groups, but relationships between motor processing speed and inattention were unique to very preterm children. These associations may reflect risk factors for inattention in term and very preterm children. Future research should assess the efficacy of these cognitive processes as potential targets for intervention     

Evidence for a sensitive period in the effects of early life stress on hippocampal volume

Exposure to stress has been causally linked to changes in hippocampal volume (HV). Given that the hippocampus undergoes rapid changes in the first years of life, stressful experiences during this period may be particularly important in understanding individual differences in the development of the hippocampus. One hundred seventy‐eight early adolescents (ages 9–13 years; 43% male) were interviewed regarding exposure to and age of onset of experiences of stress; the severity of each stressful event was rated by an objective panel. All participants underwent structural magnetic resonance imaging, from which HVs were automatically segmented. Without considering the age of onset for stressful experiences, there was a small but statistically significant negative association of stress severity with bilateral HV. When considering the age of onset, there was a moderate and significant negative association between stress severity during early childhood (through 5 years of age) and HV; there was no association between stress severity during later childhood (age 6 years and older) and HV. We provide evidence of a sensitive period through 5 years of age for the effects of life stress on HV in adolescence. It will be important in future research to elucidate how reduced HV stemming from early life stress may contribute to stress‐related health outcomes.     

Reply to Dews,and a plea for Schelling

The discussion is a response to Dews on the question of how Schelling's Freiheitsschrift should be interpreted. It falls into two halves, the first defending my interpretation, and the second expanding on the case that Dews makes for the unavoidability of metaphysics in the theory of human freedom, with which I am in full agreement. The main criticism that Dews makes of my reading is that the argument I attribute to Schelling concerning the metaphysical significance of evil rests on Kantian assumptions regarding the existence of pure practical reason, which Schelling rejects. I argue that, though certainly matters are more complicated than my earlier discussion made them seem, Schelling remains sufficiently close to Kant for the argument I attribute to avoid inconsistency. In the second half I raise what I claim to be a neglected but important question: Why is the legacy of classical German philosophy not regarded as significant for contemporary discussion of human freedom? My answer in brief is that the concept of freedom has undergone a profound contraction. In this context I also try to define more precisely what is distinctive of Schelling's view of human freedom.     

Changing Kinematics as a Means of Reducing Vulnerability to Physical Attack1

Three experiments investigated whether women can change their walking style and hence reduce their vulnerability to physical attack. In Experiment 1, women were videotaped walking normally and when imagining themselves in a situation of low personal safety. Women were rated as harder to attack in the low safety condition. Differences in walking style accounted for differences in ease‐of‐attack ratings. Experiment 2 compared walking styles and vulnerability of women before and after completing a self‐defense course. No differences were seen across sessions. Experiment 3 investigated walking styles and vulnerability of women before and after completing individualized walking training programs. Differences in vulnerability between sessions were revealed and could be accounted for by changes in walking‐style features.     

A feasibility study of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for emotional dysfunction following psychosis

The experience of psychosis can lead to depression, anxiety and fear. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) facilitates individuals to accept difficult mental experiences and behave in ways that are consistent with personally held values. This study was a single (rater) blind pilot randomised controlled trial of ACT for emotional dysfunction following psychosis. Twenty-seven participants with psychosis were randomised to either: ten sessions of ACT plus treatment as usual (TAU) or TAU alone. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills and Working Alliance Inventory were used. Individuals were assessed at baseline and 3 months post-baseline. The individuals randomised to receive ACT found the intervention acceptable. A significantly greater proportion of the ACT group changed from being depressed at time of entry into the study to not being depressed at follow-up. The ACT group showed a significantly greater increase in mindfulness skills and reduction in negative symptoms. Results indicated that individuals randomised to ACT had significantly fewer crisis contacts over the study. Changes in mindfulness skills correlated positively with changes in depression. ACT appears to offer promise in reducing negative symptoms, depression and crisis contacts in psychosis.     

The influence of heightened body‐awareness on walking through apertures

The reported study measured the ratio between aperture‐width and hip‐width that marked the critical transition from frontal walking to body rotation for male and female participants. Half of the participants of each sex wore form‐fitting lycra clothes and half loose‐fitting jogging suits. Participants wearing the form‐fitting clothing reported heightened body awareness relative to those wearing the loose‐fitting clothing. For male participants this difference was reflected in a smaller aperture‐to‐hip ratio in the form‐fitting than loose‐fitting clothing condition. That is, males walked frontally through smaller apertures when wearing form‐fitting than when wearing loose‐fitting clothing. For females there was no difference in walking action as a function of clothing style. Results are discussed in terms of the perception of action opportunities in the environment, the influence of body awareness on such perception and sex differences. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.