Supervision in rational emotive behavior therapy

This paper deals with the general process of supervision of therapists learning to understand and practice rational emotive behavior therapy. The endeavor of supervision is viewed as one of education, training, and practive with critical and constructive feedback. Major sections discuss and describe Educational Aspects of Supervision, Training Aspects of Supervision, Evaluation of Supervisees Performance, and Preferable Characteristics and Traits for REBT Practitioners.This paper is based on a chapter prepared for a forthcoming book,Handbook of Psychotherapy Supervision, edited by C. Edward Watkins, Jr.Paul J. Woods, Ph.D. is a Fellow of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, and a former Co-Editor of thisJournal. He is in private practice in Roanoke, VA. Albert Ellis, Ph.D. is the founder of REBT and the President of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York.     

Applications of rational-emotive therapy (RET) to love problems

Rational-emotive therapy (RET) can be particularly applied to individuals with serious love problems, such as people possessed by super-romantic love, limerents who are mired in obsessive-compulsive feelings, insensately jealous and possessive lovers, people who needlessly interfere with their encountering suitable partners, and those who suffer anguish and depression when they lose love. It also has important things to teach about keeping alive and enhancing normal love feelings. This paper outlines the RET theory of love and applies it to various amative difficulties.This article is to appear as a chapter inClinical applications of Rational-Emotive Therapy, edited by Albert Ellis and Michael Bernard, New York: Plenum, 1985.     

Do the mentally retarded have poor memory?

The hypothesis that mentally retarded persons have a short-term memory deficit whixh is due to inadequate rehearsal strategies is reexamined. A reevaluation of results of a number of experiments suggests that normal and retarded persons differ on short-term memory tasks, and the superiority of normals is present from the time of initial stimulus exposure. While some evidence for slope differences in retention curves is found in a few tasks, it is not strong support for memory differences. The hypothesis that “memory” differences are due to differential encoding as a result of more adequate rehearsal by the normal subjects is unacceptable. If this were the case, some differences in slope of retention curves could be expected unless rehearsal beyond the encoding stage was totally precluded. The review points to a need for an empirical reevaluation of the issue with a full recognition that deficits in particular processes may characterize some retarded persons and not others.     

TRANSITIONS IN CHILDREN'S ROLES AND CAPABILITIES*

Stage theories and empirical studies have concentrated on a few periods of childhood (e.g., age 5 to 7 years) as important times of transition. On the basis of ethnographic suggestions that the age period 8 to 10 years also involves interesting changes, the authors carried out a search of published empirical studies for findings of transitions in capabilities at 8 to 10 years. An annotated bibliography is provided summarizing the studies found in a 5-year period in three journals. The authors discuss possibilities for characterizing the transition at age 8 to 10, as well as how such a transition meshes with the concept of stage.     

How to deal with your most difficult client—You

Conclusion Therapists are human-and, believe it or not, fallible humans. Ideally, they are supremely well infored, highly confident, minimally disturbed, extremely ethical and rarely under- or overinvolved with their clients/Actually, they are hardly ideal. If you, as a therapist, find yourself seriously blocked in your work, look for the same kind of irrational beliefs, inappropriate feelings, and dysfunctional behaviors that you would investigate in your underachieving clints. When you ferret out the absolutistic philosophies and perfectionist demads that seem to underlie your difficulties, ask yoursell—yes,strongly ask yourself—these trenchant questions: (a) Why do Ihave to be an indubitably great and unconditionally lowed therapist?; (b) Where is it written that my clientsmust follow my teachings and absolutelyshould do what I advise?; (c) Where is the evidence that therapymust be easy and that Ihave to enjoy every minute of it?If you persist in asking important questions like these and insist on thinking them through to what are scientific and logical answers, you may still never become the most accomplished and sanest therapist in the world. But I wager that you will tend to be happier and more effective than many other therapists I could—but charitably will not—name. Try it and see!This article is adapted from an invited address presented at the 91 st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association at Anaheim, Calif., August 1983.     

Newborns' preferential tracking of face-like stimuli and its subsequent decline.

Goren, Sarty, and Wu (1975) claimed that newborn infants will follow a slowly moving schematic face stimulus with their head and eyes further than they will follow scrambled faces or blank stimuli. Despite the far-reaching theoretical importance of this finding, it has remained controversial and been largely ignored. In Experiment 1 we replicate the basic findings of the study. In Experiment 2 we attempt a second replication in a different maternity hospital, and extend the original findings with evidence suggesting that both the particular configuration of features, and some aspects of the features themselves, are important for preferential tracking in the first hour of life. In Experiment 3 we use a different technique to trace the preferential tracking of faces over the first five months of life. The preferential tracking of faces declines during the second month. The possible causes and consequences of this observation are discussed.     

Irrelevant thoughts,emotional mood states,and cognitive task performance

In two experiments, we investigated the relationship shared by irrelevant thoughts, emotional mood states, and cognitive task performance. At an empirical level, irrelevant thoughts were defined as thoughts that did not facilitate successful task performance. We used the same general procedure for both experiments: three groups of college students received happy-, neutral-(control), or sad-mood inductions and performed a memory task. The procedure for obtaining thoughts varied between experiments. The subjects in Experiment 1 listed their thoughts after the memory recall task. In Experiment 2, the subjects were tape-recorded while performing a memory task and producing concurrent verbal protocols. The subjects in both experiments then judged their thoughts in terms of frequency, intensity, and irrelevance. We found a similar pattern of results in both experiments: (1) The proportions of irrelevant thoughts and recall performance were negatively related, and (2) happy and sad students produced reliably greater proportions of irrelevant thoughts than did neutral (control) students.