Personality Traits Predict Smartphone Usage

The present study investigates to what degree individual differences can predict frequency and duration of actual behaviour, manifested in mobile application (app) usage on smartphones. In particular, this work focuses on the identification of stable associations between personality on the factor and facet level, fluid intelligence, demography and app usage in 16 distinct categories. A total of 137 subjects (87 women and 50 men), with an average age of 24 (SD = 4.72), participated in a 90‐min psychometric lab session as well as in a subsequent 60‐day data logging study in the field. Our data suggest that personality traits predict mobile application usage in several specific categories such as communication, photography, gaming, transportation and entertainment. Extraversion, conscientiousness and agreeableness are better predictors of mobile application usage than basic demographic variables in several distinct categories. Furthermore, predictive performance is slightly higher for single factor—in comparison with facet‐level personality scores. Fluid intelligence and demographics additionally show stable associations with categorical app usage. In sum, this study demonstrates how individual differences can be effectively related to actual behaviour and how this can assist in understanding the behavioural underpinnings of personality. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Risk Perception and Psychological Distress in Genetic Counselling for Hereditary Breast and/or Ovarian Cancer

Oncological Genetic Counselling (CGO) allows the identification of a genetic component that increases the risk of developing a cancer. Individuals’ psychological reactions are influenced by both the content of the received information and the subjective perception of their own risk of becoming ill or being a carrier of a genetic mutation. This study included 120 participants who underwent genetic counselling for breast and/or ovarian cancer. The aim of the study was to examine the relation between their cancer risk perception and the genetic risk during CGO before receiving genetic test results, considering the influence of some psychological variables, in particular distress, anxiety and depression. Participants completed the following tools during a psychological interview: a socio-demographic form, Cancer Risk Perception (CRP) and Genetic Risk Perception (GRP), Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) and Distress Thermometer (DT). The data seem to confirm our hypothesis. Positive and significant correlations were found between the observed variables. Moreover, genetic risk perception determined an increase in depressive symptomatology and cancer risk perception led to an increase in anxious symptomatology, specifically in participants during cancer treatment. The present results suggest the importance of assessing genetic and cancer risk perception in individuals who undergo CGO, to identify those who are at risk of a decrease in psychological well-being and of developing greater psychological distress.     

Too Naturalist and Not Naturalist Enough: Reply to Horsten

Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC.

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A characterization of the concept of independence in knowledge structures

In knowledge space theory a knowledge structure provides a deterministic representation of the implications among the items in a given set Q. Concrete procedures for the efficient assessment of knowledge by means of a knowledge structure have been proposed by Doignon and Falmagne [Falmagne, J.-C., & Doignon, J.-P. (1988a). A class of stochastic procedures for the assessment of knowledge. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 41, 1-23; Falmagne, J.-C., & Doignon, J.-P. (1988b). A markovian procedure for assessing the state of a system. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 32, 232-258]. The primitive idea at the core of such procedures is that the (correct or wrong) answers of a student to a subset A⊆Q of items could be inferred from the answers to a subset B⊆Q of items that were previously presented to that student. Since B provides information about A, from the viewpoint of the teacher these two subsets are not independent. This idea of dependence vs. independence is formalized in this paper in terms of an independence relation on the power set of Q. A nice characterization of this relation allows to express an arbitrary knowledge structure as the combination of a number of substructures each of which is independent of each other. An algorithm is then proposed which checks for independence in a knowledge structure and decomposes this last into a collection of independent substructures.     

(I can’t get no) antisatisfaction

Synthese - Substructural approaches to paradoxes have attracted much attention from the philosophical community in the last decade. In this paper we focus on two substructural logics, named...     

So close no matter how far: counterfactuals in history of science and the inevitability/contingency controversy

This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it aims at highlighting one difference (albeit in degree and not in kind) in how counterfactuals work in general history, on the one hand, and in history of the natural sciences, on the other hand. As we show, both in general history and in history of science good counterfactual narratives need to be plausible, where plausibility is construed as appropriate continuity of both the antecedent and the consequent of the counterfactual with what we know about the world. However, in general history it is often possible to imagine a consequent dramatically different from the actual historical development, and yet plausible; in history of science, due to plausibility concerns, imagining a consequent far removed from the results of actual science seems more complicated. The second aim of the paper is to assess whether and to what degree counterfactual histories of science can advance the cause of the so-called “contingency thesis,” namely, the claim that history of science might have followed a path leading to alternative, non-equivalent theories, as successful as the ones that we currently embrace. We distinguish various versions of the contingency thesis and argue that counterfactual histories of science support weak versions of the thesis.

     

Extending the Basic Local Independence Model to Polytomous Data

Psychometrika - A probabilistic framework for the polytomous extension of knowledge space theory (KST) is proposed. It consists in a probabilistic model, called polytomous local independence model,...     

First steps toward an understanding of procedural fairness

In four experiments, we tested whether 20‐month‐old infants are sensitive to violations of procedural impartiality. Participants were shown videos in which help was provided in two different ways. A main character provided help to two other agents either impartially, by helping them at the same time, or in a biased way, by helping one agent almost immediately while the other after a longer delay. Infants looked reliably longer at the biased than at the unbiased help scenarios despite the fact that in both scenarios help was provided to each beneficiary. This suggests that human infants can attend to departures from impartiality and, in their second year, they already show an initial understanding of procedural fairness.