Concreteness effects in free recall: The roles of imaginai and relational processing

Two experiments reevaluated the possible role of mental imagery in free recall of concrete and abstract words. In Experiment 1, the number and rate of list presentations were manipulated. Incidental recall following an imagery rating task yielded reliable concreteness effects after two presentations but not after a single presentation, regardless of presentation rate. In Experiment 2, we examined the effects of relational (categorization) and item-specific (imagery rating) processing tasks on memory for categorically related or unrelated concrete and abstract words. Concreteness effects were obtained when unrelated words were sorted into categories but not when they were rated on imagery. Related words failed to yield concreteness effects under any orienting condition. The results support the view that the presence or absence of concreteness effects in free recall depends on the relative salience of distinctive and relational information. This conclusion constrains theoretical explanations of the role of mental imagery in memory and cognition.     

Finger-digit compatibility in Arabic numeral processing

Finger-digit response compatibility was tested by asking participants to identify Arabic digits by pressing 1 of 10 keys with all 10 fingers. The direction of the finger-digit mapping was varied by manipulating the global direction of the hand-digit mapping as well as the direction of the finger-digit mapping within each hand (in each case, from small to large digits, or the reverse). The hypothesis of a left-to-right mental number line predicted that a complete left-to-right mapping should be easier whereas the hypothesis of a representation based on finger counting predicted that a counting-congruent mapping should be easier. The results show that when all 10 fingers are used to answer, a mapping congruent with the prototypical finger-counting strategy reported by the participants leads to better performance than does a mapping congruent with a left-to-right oriented mental number line, both in palm-down and palm-up postures of the hands, and they demonstrate that finger-counting strategies influence the way that numerical information is mentally represented and processed.     

What face inversion does to infants' counting abilities

Infants younger than 1 year do not correctly count the number of objects in a scene by using differences among their properties, unless these differences cross the broad category boundaries separating humans, animals, and artifacts. Here we show that face orientation influences whether 10- and 12-month-old infants count correctly or incorrectly. When infants saw two puppets appearing and disappearing behind an occluder successively and had no cues for numerosity other than differences among the puppets' properties, they correctly counted two puppets if one had an upright face and one an upside-down face. However, when the same puppets were both shown with faces upright, infants failed the task. Overall, this pattern of success and failure closely parallels the pattern of brain activations registered when adults and infants watch objects characterized by the same property contrasts.     

Why should we abandon the mental logic hypothesis?

Two hypotheses on deductive reasoning are under development: mental logic and mental models. It is often accepted that there are overwhelming arguments to reject the mental logic hypothesis. I revise these arguments and claim that they are either not conclusive, or point at problems which are troublesome for the mental model hypothesis as well.     

Numerical representations and intuitions of probabilities at 12 months

Recent research shows that preverbal infants can reason about single‐case probabilities without relying on observed frequencies, adapting their predictions to relevant dynamic parameters of the situation (Téglás, Vul, Girotto, Gonzalez, Tenenbaum & Bonatti, 2011 ; Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez & Bonatti, 2007 ). Here we show that intuitions of probabilities may derive from the ability to represent a limited number of possibilities. After watching a scene containing moving objects of two ensembles, 12‐month‐olds looked longer at an unlikely than at a likely single‐case outcome when the objects were within the parallel individuation range. However, they did not do so when the scene contained the same ratio between ensembles but a larger number of objects. At the same time, they could form rational expectations about single‐case outcomes in scenes containing the same large number of objects when they could exploit subtle physical parameters induced by the objects’ movements and their spatial configuration. Our findings demonstrate that at early stages of development the mental representations involved in probability estimations of future individual situations are powerful and sophisticated, but at the same time they depend on infants’ overall cognitive architecture, being constrained by the numerical representations spontaneously induced by the situations.     

On the unidentifiability of a certain class of skill multi map based probabilistic knowledge structures

In the process of fitting a probabilistic knowledge structure to data, standard goodness-of-fit statistics only partially describe the correctness of the fitted model. Irrespectively of how good the fit is, a too-high value of the error rates (careless error and lucky guess probabilities) might be a symptom of a misspecification of the model. In this situation, it could be critical to interpret those values as error rates. A more reasonable solution would be to hypothesize that some modifications have to be introduced in the model. In this paper, we show that in specific cases, these modifications yield basic local independence model parameterizations that are not identifiable. The applicative consequences of the theoretical results are displayed by means of an example carried out on a set of clinical data collected through the Maudsley Obsessional-Compulsive Questionnaire.     

Natural Deduction for Dual-intuitionistic Logic

We present a natural deduction system for dual-intuitionistic logic. Its distinctive feature is that it is a single-premise multiple-conclusions system. Its relationships with the natural deduction systems for intuitionistic and classical logic are discussed.     

Wright,Okasha and Chandler on transmission failure

Crispin Wright has given an explanation of how a first time warrant can fall short of transmitting across a known entailment. Formal epistemologists have struggled to turn Wright’s informal explanation into cogent Bayesian reasoning. In this paper, I analyse two Bayesian models of Wright’s account respectively proposed by Samir Okasha and Jake Chandler. I argue that both formalizations are unsatisfactory for different reasons, and I lay down a third Bayesian model that appears to me to capture the valid kernel of Wright’s explanation. After this, I consider a recent development in Wright’s account of transmission failure. Wright suggests that his condition sufficient for transmission failure of first time warrant also suffices for transmission failure of supplementary warrant. I propose an interpretation of Wright’s suggestion that shields it from objections. I then lay down a fourth Bayesian framework that provides a simplified model of the unified explanation of transmission failure envisaged by Wright.     

Uncovering the Best Skill Multimap by Constraining the Error Probabilities of the Gain-Loss Model

The Gain-Loss model is a probabilistic skill multimap model for assessing learning processes. In practical applications, more than one skill multimap could be plausible, while none corresponds to the true one. The article investigates whether constraining the error probabilities is a way of uncovering the best skill assignment among a number of alternatives. A simulation study shows that this approach allows the detection of the models that are closest to the correct one. An empirical application shows that it allows the detection of models that are entirely derived from plausible assumptions about the skills required for solving the problems.