Language access and theory of mind reasoning: evidence from deaf children in bilingual and oralist environments

This investigation examined whether access to sign language as a medium for instruction influences theory of mind (ToM) reasoning in deaf children with similar home language environments. Experiment 1 involved 97 deaf Italian children ages 4-12 years: 56 were from deaf families and had LIS (Italian Sign Language) as their native language, and 41 had acquired LIS as late signers following contact with signers outside their hearing families. Children receiving bimodal/bilingual instruction in LIS together with Sign-Supported and spoken Italian significantly outperformed children in oralist schools in which communication was in Italian and often relied on lipreading. Experiment 2 involved 61 deaf children in Estonia and Sweden ages 6-16 years. On a wide variety of ToM tasks, bilingually instructed native signers in Estonian Sign Language and spoken Estonian succeeded at a level similar to age-matched hearing children. They outperformed bilingually instructed late signers and native signers attending oralist schools. Particularly for native signers, access to sign language in a bilingual environment may facilitate conversational exchanges that promote the expression of ToM by enabling children to monitor others' mental states effectively.     

The secret is in the sound: from unsegmented speech to lexical categories

When learning language, young children are faced with many seemingly formidable challenges, including discovering words embedded in a continuous stream of sounds and determining what role these words play in syntactic constructions. We suggest that knowledge of phoneme distributions may play a crucial part in helping children segment words and determine their lexical category, and we propose an integrated model of how children might go from unsegmented speech to lexical categories. We corroborated this theoretical model using a two‐stage computational analysis of a large corpus of English child‐directed speech. First, we used transition probabilities between phonemes to find words in unsegmented speech. Second, we used distributional information about word edges – the beginning and ending phonemes of words – to predict whether the segmented words from the first stage were nouns, verbs, or something else. The results indicate that discovering lexical units and their associated syntactic category in child‐directed speech is possible by attending to the statistics of single phoneme transitions and word‐initial and final phonemes. Thus, we suggest that a core computational principle in language acquisition is that the same source of information is used to learn about different aspects of linguistic structure.     

Do Coping Strategies Discriminate Eating Disordered Individuals Better Than Eating Disorder Features? An Explorative Study on Female Inpatients with Anorexia and Bulimia Nervosa

The purpose of this explorative research was to examine how the COPE (Coping Orientation to Problem Experienced Inventory), an established instrument for measuring coping styles, and EDI-2 (Eating Disorder Inventory-2), a widely used questionnaire for assessing psychological and behavioural features of eating disorders (ED), discriminate among healthy individuals, inpatients with anorexia nervosa (AN) and inpatients with bulimia nervosa (BN). A discriminant analysis approach was used. Results showed that coping styles such as positive attitude, planning and social support are even more discriminative variables than eating disorder features. Implications for further studies are discussed.     

On Modal <Emphasis Type="Italic">μ</Emphasis>-Calculus and Gödel-Löb Logic

We show that the modal μ-calculus over GL collapses to the modal fragment by showing that the fixpoint formula is reached after two iterations and answer to a question posed by van Benthem in [4]. Further, we introduce the modal μ ^~-calculus by allowing fixpoint constructors for any formula where the fixpoint variable appears guarded but not necessarily positive and show that this calculus over GL collapses to the modal fragment, too. The latter result allows us a new proof of the de Jongh, Sambin Theorem and provides a simple algorithm to construct the fixpoint formula. Presented by Melvin Fitting     

What good is a diachronic will?

There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent’s capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive view of the diachronic will: the rationale for it is that it makes possible to engage in activities with a radically novel temporal structure, activities that are not merely continuous over time, but temporally integrated and unified. These activities are essential to our form of life and to our existence as temporally unified agents. The instrumental and cognitive benefits, if any, are merely secondary to the ontological ones.

Between Causes and Reasons: Sellars,Hegel (and Lewis) on “Sensation”

ABSTRACT

This paper explores Sellars’ and Hegel’s treatment of ‘sensation’ – a notion that plays a central role in the reflections of both authors but which has garnered little scholarly attention. To disentangle the issues surrounding the notion and elaborate its role, function, and fate in their thought, I begin with a methodological question: what kind of philosophical argument leads Sellars and Hegel to introduce the concept of ‘sensation’ into their systems? Distinguishing between their two argumentative approaches, I maintain that Hegel offers what I broadly label a ‘transcendental’ argument for ‘sensation,’ which he presents in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and in the corresponding Lectures, whereas Sellars introduces the notion of sensation for what I term empirically ‘explanatory’ reasons. Next, I closely analyze Hegel’s and Sellars’ theories of sensation to produce a textually supported and conceptually coherent reading of their views on the notion. To clarify my methodological distinction and its stakes in Hegel’s and Sellars’ I will reference Lewis’ notion of the given.     

Death and the Evolution of Language

My hypothesis is that the cognitive challenge posed by death might have had a co-evolutionary role in the development of linguistic faculties. First, I claim that mirror neurons, which enable us to understand others’ actions and emotions, not only activate when we directly observe someone, but can also be triggered by language: words make us feel bodily sensations. Second, I argue that the death of another individual cannot be understood by virtue of the mirror neuron mechanism, since the dead provide no neural pattern for mirroring: this cognitive task requires symbolic thought, which in turn involves emotions. Third, I describe the symbolic leap of the human species as a cognitive detachment from the here and now, allowing displaced reference: through symbols the human mind can refer to what is absent, possible, or even impossible (like the presence of a dead person). Such a detachment has had a huge adaptive impact: adopting a coevolutionary standpoint can help explain why language is as effective as environmental inputs in order to stimulate our bodily experience. In the end I suggest a further coevolutionary “reversal”: if language is necessary to understand the death of the other, it might also be true that the peculiar cognitive problem posed by the death of the other (the corpse is present, but the other is absent) has contributed to the crucial transition from an indexical sign system to the symbolic level, i.e., the “cognitive detachment”. Death and language, as Heidegger claimed, have an essential relation for humans, both from an evolutionary and a phenomenological perspective: they have shaped the symbolic consciousness that make us conceive of them.     

Individual differences and reasoning: A study on personality traits

Personality can play a crucial role in how people reason and decide. Identifying individual differences related to how we actively gather information and use evidence could lead to a better comprehension and predictability of human reasoning. Recent findings have shown that some personality traits are related to similar decision‐making patterns showed by people with mental disorders. We performed research with the aim to investigate delusion‐proneness, obsessive‐like personality, anxiety (trait and state), and reasoning styles in individuals from the general population. We introduced personality trait and state anxiety scores in a regression model to explore specific associations with: (1) amount of data‐gathered prior to making a decision; and (2) the use of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence. Results showed that all our independent variables were positively or negatively associated with the amount of data collected in order to make simple probabilistic decisions. Anxiety and obsessiveness were the only predictors of the weight attributed to evidence in favour or against a hypothesis. Findings were discussed in relation to theoretical assumptions, predictions, and clinical implications. Personality traits can predict peculiar ways to reason and decide that, in turn, could be involved to some extent in the formation and/or maintenance of psychological disorders.     

The contact principle and utilitarian moral judgments in young children

In three experiments involving 207 preschoolers and 28 adults, we investigated the extent to which young children base moral judgments of actions aimed to protect others on utilitarian principles. When asked to judge the rightness of intervening to hurt one person in order to save five others, the large majority of children aged 3 to 5 years advocated intervention in contrast to another situation with the reverse cost/benefit ratio. This course of action was seen as acceptable by most children only when it did not require the agent to have physical contact with the victim and the victim’s harm was intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number. Overall, the children’s responses were remarkably similar to those reported in adult studies. These findings document the extent to which some constraints on moral judgment are present in early human development.