Concreteness effects in free recall: The roles of imaginai and relational processing

Two experiments reevaluated the possible role of mental imagery in free recall of concrete and abstract words. In Experiment 1, the number and rate of list presentations were manipulated. Incidental recall following an imagery rating task yielded reliable concreteness effects after two presentations but not after a single presentation, regardless of presentation rate. In Experiment 2, we examined the effects of relational (categorization) and item-specific (imagery rating) processing tasks on memory for categorically related or unrelated concrete and abstract words. Concreteness effects were obtained when unrelated words were sorted into categories but not when they were rated on imagery. Related words failed to yield concreteness effects under any orienting condition. The results support the view that the presence or absence of concreteness effects in free recall depends on the relative salience of distinctive and relational information. This conclusion constrains theoretical explanations of the role of mental imagery in memory and cognition.     

Social Capital and Fear of Crime in Adolescence: A Multilevel Study

Hierarchical linear modeling was used to examine the relationships between social capital (at the individual, the neighborhood, and the regional levels) and adolescents' fear of crime, while controlling for the main individual (sociodemographics, television viewing, and bullying victimization), neighborhood (neighborhood size and aggregated victimization), and regional (crime rate and level of urbanization) variables. Data were analyzed using a three‐level model based on 22,639 15.7‐year‐old (SD = 0.67) students nested within 1081 neighborhoods and 19 Italian regions. The findings revealed that individual and contextual measures of social capital, modeled at the individual, neighborhood, and regional levels simultaneously, showed negative associations with adolescents' fear of crime. Males and participants with higher family affluence were less likely to feel fear of crime, whereas victimization, both at the individual and neighborhood levels, had a positive association with fear of crime. Strengths, limitations, and potential applications of the study are discussed.     

Infants' individuation of agents and inert objects

Using the violation-of-expectancy method, we investigated 10-month-old infants' ability to rely on dynamic features in object individuation processes. Infants were first familiarized to events in which two different objects repeatedly appeared and disappeared, one at a time from behind a screen; at test, the screen was removed, revealing either one or two objects. In Experiment 1, one self-moving non-rigid agent and one inert object were involved in each trial, while in Experiment 2 two different agents were presented. Infants preferred to look at one-object outcomes in Experiment 1, but they did not show any preference for one- or two-object outcomes in Experiment 2. The results suggest that infants can use dynamic information to detect agents in complex individuation tasks before they can rely on shape or surface features. We propose that the sortals agent and inert object appear in development before 12 months without a substantial contribution of linguistic experience. These findings may motivate a revision of current theories on the development of kind-based individuation and object files.     

Finger-digit compatibility in Arabic numeral processing

Finger-digit response compatibility was tested by asking participants to identify Arabic digits by pressing 1 of 10 keys with all 10 fingers. The direction of the finger-digit mapping was varied by manipulating the global direction of the hand-digit mapping as well as the direction of the finger-digit mapping within each hand (in each case, from small to large digits, or the reverse). The hypothesis of a left-to-right mental number line predicted that a complete left-to-right mapping should be easier whereas the hypothesis of a representation based on finger counting predicted that a counting-congruent mapping should be easier. The results show that when all 10 fingers are used to answer, a mapping congruent with the prototypical finger-counting strategy reported by the participants leads to better performance than does a mapping congruent with a left-to-right oriented mental number line, both in palm-down and palm-up postures of the hands, and they demonstrate that finger-counting strategies influence the way that numerical information is mentally represented and processed.     

What face inversion does to infants' counting abilities

Infants younger than 1 year do not correctly count the number of objects in a scene by using differences among their properties, unless these differences cross the broad category boundaries separating humans, animals, and artifacts. Here we show that face orientation influences whether 10- and 12-month-old infants count correctly or incorrectly. When infants saw two puppets appearing and disappearing behind an occluder successively and had no cues for numerosity other than differences among the puppets' properties, they correctly counted two puppets if one had an upright face and one an upside-down face. However, when the same puppets were both shown with faces upright, infants failed the task. Overall, this pattern of success and failure closely parallels the pattern of brain activations registered when adults and infants watch objects characterized by the same property contrasts.     

Inconsistent probability estimates of a hypothesis: the role of contrasting support

This paper studies consistency in the judged probability of a target hypothesis in lists of mutually exclusive nonexhaustive hypotheses. Specifically, it controls the role played by the support of displayed competing hypotheses and the relatedness between the target hypothesis and its alternatives. Three experiments are reported. In all experiments, groups of people were presented with a list of mutually exclusive nonexhaustive causes of a person's death. In the first two experiments, they were asked to judge the probability of each cause as that of the person's decease. In the third experiment, people were asked for a frequency estimation task. Target causes were presented in all lists. Several other alternative causes to the target ones differed across the lists. Findings show that the judged probability/frequency of a target cause changes as a function of the support of the displayed competing causes. Specifically, it is higher when its competing displayed causes have low rather than high support. Findings are consistent with the contrastive support hypothesis within the support theory.     

Why should we abandon the mental logic hypothesis?

Two hypotheses on deductive reasoning are under development: mental logic and mental models. It is often accepted that there are overwhelming arguments to reject the mental logic hypothesis. I revise these arguments and claim that they are either not conclusive, or point at problems which are troublesome for the mental model hypothesis as well.     

Numerical representations and intuitions of probabilities at 12 months

Recent research shows that preverbal infants can reason about single‐case probabilities without relying on observed frequencies, adapting their predictions to relevant dynamic parameters of the situation (Téglás, Vul, Girotto, Gonzalez, Tenenbaum & Bonatti, 2011 ; Téglás, Girotto, Gonzalez & Bonatti, 2007 ). Here we show that intuitions of probabilities may derive from the ability to represent a limited number of possibilities. After watching a scene containing moving objects of two ensembles, 12‐month‐olds looked longer at an unlikely than at a likely single‐case outcome when the objects were within the parallel individuation range. However, they did not do so when the scene contained the same ratio between ensembles but a larger number of objects. At the same time, they could form rational expectations about single‐case outcomes in scenes containing the same large number of objects when they could exploit subtle physical parameters induced by the objects’ movements and their spatial configuration. Our findings demonstrate that at early stages of development the mental representations involved in probability estimations of future individual situations are powerful and sophisticated, but at the same time they depend on infants’ overall cognitive architecture, being constrained by the numerical representations spontaneously induced by the situations.