Spirit in the Cities: Searching for Soul in the Urban Landscape – Edited by Kathryn Tanner (ed.)

Book reviewed:
Spirit in the Cities: Searching for Soul in the Urban Landscape , Kathryn Tanner (ed.), Fortress Press 2004 (0-8006-3682-1), xv + 144 pp., pb $10.20     

Evaluating the evidence for pancultural self-enhancement

We do not regard the better-than-average effect as 'the only acceptable measure of self-enhancement' (Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, 2007b). Rather, we object to meta-analytical inclusion of effects that are incapable of testing the tactical self-enhancement hypothesis. In Investigation 1 of Sedikides, Gaertner, and Vevea (2007a), 12 of the 24 effects involved attributes that were unvalidated for domain (collectivistic vs individualistic): these effects are uninformative. The 12 domain-validated effects supported the hypothesis. In Investigation 2 of Sedikides et al. (2007a), 12 of the 29 effects were deemed irrelevant. None of these effects involved a correlation between: (a) a participant's rating of self and his/her rating of another person; and (b) idiographic importance rating of the comparison attributes. These effects, then, cannot test whether the self–other comparison varies with the personal importance of the comparison attributes. The 17 relevant effects supported the hypothesis. The weight of the evidence points to the panculturality of self-enhancement.     

On the Motivational Primacy of the Individual Self: ‘I’ Is Stronger than ‘We’

The self‐concept is dynamic, with momentary definition shifting from a representation of self as a unique and independent social agent to an undifferentiated and interchangeable group member. Indeed, the individual self and collective self are fundamental components of the self‐concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience. However, are those selves equally important and meaningful? We review a program of research empirically testing three competing hypotheses that suggests that the motivational core of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual factors that make a given self momentarily accessible. The research furnished unanimous and consistent evidence that the individual self is the motivationally primary form of self‐definition.     

Variables influencing memory over long periods of time for recently learned face-name pairs

The ability to match faces with corresponding names was studied under various conditions involving encoding and retrieval. Twenty photographs of undergraduates were randomly paired with 20 common names. Experiment 1 presented the photographs for 10 s each, followed by either presentation of the names alone with the instruction to write face characteristics from memory or presentation of the photographs again with instructions to write from memory the names and anything unusual about the names themselves. Later retrieval was best for the former condition and was interpreted as showing that names could prime image representations of faces. Experiment 2 was a partial replication of Experiment 1 with retrieval measured over 7 weeks. These results showed that memories for face-name matches lasted several weeks. Also, consistent with Experiment 1, the number of reported initial face characteristics was highly predictive of matches between faces and names. These studies show the importance for later retrieval of forming and maintaining vivid images of faces even when the faces have no outstanding characteristics.     

My head says yes but my heart says no: cognitive and affective attraction as a function of similarity to the ideal self

The authors hypothesized that similarity to the ideal self (IS) simultaneously generates attraction and repulsion. Attraction research has suggested that a person likes individuals who are similar to his or her IS. Social comparison research has suggested that upward social comparison threatens self-evaluation. In Experiment 1, attraction to a partner increased and then decreased as the partner became more similar to and then surpassed the participant's IS. In Experiment 2, the cognitive and affective components of attraction increased and decreased, respectively, as the partner approached and surpassed the participant's IS to the extent that the dimension of comparison was meaningful and participants andicipated meeting their partner. Similarity to the IS generates opposing cognitive and affective reactions when the self-evaluative threat of upward comparison intensifies.     

Pancultural self-enhancement reloaded: a meta-analytic reply to Heine (2005)

C. Sedikides, L. Gaertner, and Y. Toguchi (2003) reported findings favoring the universality of self-enhancement. S. J. Heine (2005) challenged the authors' research on evidential and logical grounds. In response, the authors carried out 2 meta-analytic investigations. The results backed the C. Sedikides et al. (2003) theory and findings. Both Westerners and Easterners self-enhanced tactically. Westerners self-enhanced on attributes relevant to the cultural ideal of individualism, whereas Easterners self-enhanced on attributes relevant to the cultural ideal of collectivism (in both cases, because of the personal importance of the ideal). Self-enhancement motivation is universal, although its manifestations are strategically sensitive to cultural context. The authors respond to other aspects of Heine's critique by discussing why researchers should empirically validate the comparison dimension (individualistic vs. collectivistic) and defending why the better-than-average effect is a valid measure of self-enhancement.     

Self-esteem and favoritism toward novel in-groups: the self as an evaluative base

The self-as-evaluative base (SEB) hypothesis proposes that self-evaluation extends automatically via an amotivated consistency process to affect evaluation of novel in-groups. Four minimal group studies support SEB. Personal trait self-esteem (PSE) predicted increased favoritism toward a novel in-group that, objectively, was equivalent to the out-group (Study 1). This association was independent of information-processing effects (Study 1), collective self-esteem, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and narcissism (Studies 2 and 3). A self-affirmation manipulation attenuated the association between in-group favoritism and an individual difference associated with motivated social identity concerns (RWA) but did not alter the PSE effect (Study 3). Finally, the association between PSE and in-group favoritism remained positive even when the in-group was objectively less favorable than the out-group (Study 4).     

The "I," the "we," and the "when": a meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition

What is the primary motivational basis of self-definition? The authors meta-analytically assessed 3 hypotheses: (a) The individual self is motivationally primary, (b) the collective self is motivationally primary, and (c) neither self is inherently primary; instead, motivational primacy depends on which self becomes accessible through contextual features. Results identified the individual self as the primary motivational basis of self-definition. People react more strongly to threat and enhancement of the individual than the collective self. Additionally, people more readily deny threatening information and more readily accept enhancing information when it pertains to the individual rather than the collective self, regardless of contextual influences. The individual self is the psychological home base, a stable system that can react flexibly to contextual influences.