Response to Kathleen Fisher's “Look Before You Leap”

This article provides two short responses to Kathleen M. Fisher's essay “Look Before You Leap: Reconsidering Contemplative Pedagogy,” published in this issue of the journal.     

Further analysis of subtypes of automatically reinforced SIB: A replication and quantitative analysis of published datasets

Hagopian, Rooker, and Zarcone (2015) evaluated a model for subtyping automatically reinforced self‐injurious behavior (SIB) based on its sensitivity to changes in functional analysis conditions and the presence of self‐restraint. The current study tested the generality of the model by applying it to all datasets of automatically reinforced SIB published from 1982 to 2015. We identified 49 datasets that included sufficient data to permit subtyping. Similar to the original study, Subtype‐1 SIB was generally amenable to treatment using reinforcement alone, whereas Subtype‐2 SIB was not. Conclusions could not be drawn about Subtype‐3 SIB due to the small number of datasets. Nevertheless, the findings support the generality of the model and suggest that sensitivity of SIB to disruption by alternative reinforcement is an important dimension of automatically reinforced SIB. Findings also suggest that automatically reinforced SIB should no longer be considered a single category and that additional research is needed to better understand and treat Subtype‐2 SIB.     

Contemplative Pedagogy: Frequently Asked Questions

Contemplative Pedagogy is a new and sometimes controversial pedagogical practice. Faculty often have basic questions about how to implement the pedagogy in their classrooms, in addition to questions that challenge the educational value and appropriateness of the practice. Assembled here are the most frequently asked questions about Contemplative Pedagogy, with responses from six contemplative professors, each from a different institutional and philosophical location. The respondents are founding members of the Contemplative Studies Consultation of the American Academy of Religion. The diversity of views expressed by the respondents invites the reader to see that there is no single theory or praxis of contemplative pedagogy.     

Effects of preference on verification of discriminated mands

Previous research suggests that motivating operation (MO) manipulations may assist in assessing discriminated manding (Gutierrez et al., 2007). The current study partially replicated and extended previous research by varying access to concurrently available reinforcers with different preference values (i.e., MO manipulations). Manding did not occur (a) for reinforcers that were freely available and (b) for lower preference items when relatively higher preference reinforcers were freely available. Results further demonstrated the utility of manipulating MOs to verify discriminated mands but suggest that relative preference of alternative reinforcers should be controlled during these assessments.     

Quantifying variability in phase portraits: application to gait ontogeny

We describe new Fourier- and shape-based methods for quantifying variation in phase-portraits, and re-analyze previously-published ontogenetic and adult data [Clark, J. E., & Phillips, S. J. (1993). A longitudinal study of intralimb coordination in the first year of independent walking: A dynamical systems approach. Child Development, 64, 1143–1157]. Results show considerable variation between individuals and through development, but after 6 months of walking some gait patterns stabilize.     

The “dual usage problem” in the explanations of “joint attention” and children’s socioemotional development: A reconceptualization

The term “joint attention”, which first gained currency in the early 1960s in studies of the development of language and symbolic thought, remains significant in the developmental literature. However, its meaning is unclear. A definitional problem exists similar to what Patterson [Patterson, M. L. (1982). A sequential functional model of nonverbal exchange. Psychological Review, 89, 231–249] described as the “dual usage” problem in the study of behaviour. The dual usage problem manifests when the behaviours of interest are used interchangeably with the function served by those behaviours. Similarly, the behaviours or skills that are taken to show joint attention are used interchangeably with the functions served by these behaviours. Scant attention is given to how the behaviours are generated and regulated and how they contribute to development. The purpose of the present position paper was: (1) to identify and illustrate the ways in which the behaviours and functions of joint attention have been confounded in the literature; (2) to provide a revised operationalization of joint attention incorporating the idea of Consummative Joint Attention, which is defined as a process variable that integrates these two theoretically different and complementary aspects of “joint attention;” and (3) to test this revised definition with evidence from a sample of hearing mothers and their 18- to 36-month-old hearing or deaf toddlers. We suggest that a reconceptualization and revised definition of joint attention as a process served by a particular sequence of complementary and well-timed events in the behaviour of mother–child interaction are particularly well-suited to testing joint attention as an early prelingual mechanism and to detecting early problems with psychosocial and adaptive development created by ineffective patterns of social interaction.     

Bypassing the central bottleneck after single-task practice in the psychological refractory period paradigm: Evidence for task automatization and greedy resource recruitment

In this research, the controversial issue of whether the central bottleneck can be bypassed through task automatization was investigated. To examine this issue, participants received six single-task practice sessions with an auditory-vocal task (low vs. high pitch). We then assessed dual-task performance using the analytically tractable psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, in which the highly practiced auditory-vocal task was presented as Task 2, along with an unpracticed visual-manual Task 1. The results provide evidence of bottleneck bypass for virtually all the participants (17 out of 20). Several converging tests suggest that the bottleneck reemerged, however, in a follow-up experiment with tasks presented in the opposite order (auditory-vocal Task 1 and visual-manual Task 2). One possible explanation is that tasks greedily recruit central resources when available, even though they can operate without central resources when unavailable.     

Serial and single-victim rapists: differences in crime-scene violence, interpersonal involvement, and criminal sophistication

Three categories of crime-scene behaviors (violence, interpersonal involvement, and criminal sophistication) among a group of 22 serial and 22 single-victim rapists were studied. Findings indicate that serial rapists were more likely to display a higher level of criminally sophisticated behaviors to avoid detection, whereas single-victim rapists were more likely to behave violently and engage in some form of interpersonal involvement with their victims. Implications of these findings for investigation and for understanding offenders' behavior are discussed.     

Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction

Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference is justified is part of the data to be explained. Bad argument is therefore excluded as the cause of inductive inference; and there is no good argument to cause it. Does this reinstate the problem of induction, undermining Hume’s own assumption that induction is justified? It does so only if justification must derive from “reason”, from the availability of a cogent argument. Hume rejects this internalist thesis; induction’s favorable epistemic status derives from features of custom, the mechanism that generates inductive beliefs. Hume is attracted to this externalist posture because it provides a direct explanation of the epistemic achievements of children and non-human animals—creatures that must rely on custom unsupplemented by argument.