Delayed-matching-to-sample by marsh tits and great tits

The ability of two species of tits to remember the location and/or features of an object was tested in a delayed-matching-to-sample procedure. Three values of retention interval between presentation of the sample stimulus and the choice--30 sec, 5 min, and 15 min--were used. Both species performed at above-chance level at all retention intervals, and there was no significant decline in accuracy with increasing interval. A pool of 100 stimulus objects was used, but the results of control trials indicated that the birds responded primarily to location rather than stimulus features of the object itseif. Although the food-storing marsh tit tended to perform at a higher level than the non-storing great tit, the only significant difference between the species was in the first 50 trials of the first treatment, when the birds were acquiring the task. The results are discussed in relation to the hypothesized special memory capacity of food-storing birds.     

On the relation between feeling of knowing and lexical decision: persistent subthreshold activation or topic familiarity?

Experiment 1 replicated Yaniv and Meyer's (1987) finding that lexical decision and episodic recognition performance was better for words previously yielding high-accessibility levels (a combination of feeling-of-knowing and tip-of-the-tongue ratings) in comparison with those yielding low-accessibility levels in a rare word definition task. Experiment 2 yielded the same pattern even though lexical decisions preceded accessibility estimates by a full week. Experiment 3 dismissed the possibility that the Experiment 2 results may have been due to a long-term influence from the lexical decision task to the rare word judgment task. These results support a model in which Ss (a) retrieve topic familiarity information in making accessibility estimates in the rare word definition task and (b) use this information to modulate lexical decision performance.     

A comparison of the effects of partial reinforcement schedules using a within-subject serial autoshaping procedure

Three experiments, each using a single group of pigeons, are reported. In Experiment 1 subjects were initially trained with two stimuli, one of which was always followed by food, the other being reinforced according to a 50% partial reinforcement schedule. Subsequently a serial procedure was adopted in which an additional stimulus, C, was consistently followed by the partially reinforced CS. A second additional stimulus, A, was followed on half of its occurrences by the continuously reinforced CS, its remaining presentations being followed by nothing. The rate of autoshaped keypecking was substantially greater during A than during C. In the remaining experiments subjects received first-order conditioning with a single stimulus that was either partially (Experiment 2) or continuously (Experiment 3) reinforced. The stimuli A and C were then again introduced for serial autoshaping. Stimulus A was occasionally paired with the CS and occasionally followed by nothing, whereas stimulus C was always followed by the CS. As in Experiment 1, the rate of responding during A was greater than during C. It is proposed that one influence on the rate of autoshaped keypecking during a CS is the accuracy with which the immediate consequences of that CS are predicted.     

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.     

AN EMPIRICAL APPRAISAL OF THE PRCA FOR MEASURING ORAL COMMUNICATION APPREHENSION

Since 1970 about 80% of the research on oral communication apprehension has used one of two versions of McCroskey's Personal Report of Communication Apprehension. The original 20-item PRCA was introduced for the purpose of measuring apprehension beyond the traditional public speaking context. Although the PRCA-20 is reliable, some serious criticism of it has centered on its ability to tap interpersonal behavior outcomes. In an attempt to bolster its interpersonal applicability, five “interpersonally-oriented” items were added to form the PRCA-25. The studies reported herein demonstrate that both versions fail to possess sufficient reliable variance to be applicable to contexts other than public settings. In addition, it was found that the interpersonal items are a separate component of the PRCA, and as such, do not justify being treated equal in terms of additivity and, therefore, reduce the construct integrity of the PRCA.     

Book reviews

Arnold, M. Memory and the brain. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1984. Pp. 532. ISBN 0-89859-290-9. £47.90.

Green, T. R. G., Payne, S. P. and van der Veer, G. C. (Eds.). The psychology of computer use.. London: Academic Press. 1983. Pp. 225. ISBN 0-12-2974204. $9.50.

Stunkard, A. J. and Stellar, E. (Eds.). Eating and its disorders. New York: Raven Press. 1984. Pp. 302. ISBN 0-89004-891-6. $58.50.

Spillmann, L. and Wooten, B. R. (Eds.) Sensory experience, adaptation, and perception: Festschrift for Zero Kohler. Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1984. Pp. xxvii + 748. ISBN 0 8985-3-218-6. £70.85.

Geschwind, N. and Galaburda, A. M. (Eds.)Cerebral dominance: The biological foundations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1984. Pp. 232. ISBN 0-674-10658-X. £24.35.

Annett, M. Left, right, hand and brain: The right shift theory. 1985. London and Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Pp. xiii + 474. ISBN 0-86377418-5 £29.95.

Ericsson, K. A. and Simon, H. A. Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press. 1984. Pp. 426. ISBN 0-262-05029-3. £28.95.