Investigating the Effects of a Persuasive Digital Game on Immersion,Identification, and Willingness to Help

Abstract

Recent years have seen a tremendous rise in the development and distribution of persuasive games: digital games that are used to influence players’ attitudes and/or behavior. Three studies (N_{Study 1}?=?134; N_{Study 2}?=?94; N_{Study 3}?=?161) tested the effects of a persuasive game on immersion, identification, and willingness to help. The results showed that playing the persuasive game did not result in substantially stronger willingness to help, relative to the control conditions. Video and printed text resulted in more immersion than the digital game, but playing the game resulted in substantially higher perceptions of embodied presence.     

How automatic is “automatic vigilance”? The role of working memory in attentional interference of negative information

Whereas attentional interference of negative information has previously been assumed to be automatic, the present research hypothesised that this effect depends on the availability of working-memory resources. In two experiments, participants judged the gender of angry versus happy faces. Working-memory load was manipulated by the presence or absence of a math task (Study 1) or mental rehearsal of a one- versus 8-digit number (Study 2). The results showed that angry faces interfered more with gender naming than happy faces, but only when working-memory load was low. As such, attentional interference of negative stimulus features can be modulated by top-down attentional control processes.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is Established Knowledge About Cross-Cultural Differences in Individualism–Collectivism Not Applicable to the Military? A Multi-Method Study of Cross-Cultural Differences in Behavior

Preparing for international military collaboration includes raising knowledge about cultural differences. The differences in individualism–collectivism between countries are among the most central aspects likely to impact collaboration. However, are the differences in individualism–collectivism between countries as documented in a significant amount of civilian research (e.g., Hofstede, 2001a Hofstede, G. (2001a). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. [Google Scholar]) generalizable to a military context? Or are the differences not the same in a military context, as suggested by Soeters (1997) Soeters, J. L. (1997). Value orientations in military academies: A thirteen country study. Armed Forces and Society, 24, 7–32. 10.1177/0095327X9702400101[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] on the bases of a values survey? Quasi-experiments were conducted in a distributed collaborative computer game environment. The study is multimethod, employing self-reporting, observer ratings and direct behavioral measures, and it is the first study of cross-cultural differences in individualism–collectivism in behavior in a military context. By studying differences in collectivist-type behaviors in a sample of military officers (N = 154) in 4 different countries (the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway), this study seeks to determine whether the cross-cultural differences in values found by Soeters from a military context are reflected in behavior. The study also includes a values survey using Hofstede’s (2007) Hofstede, G. (2007). Values survey module 1994 (VSM-94). Retrieved from www.geerthofstede.com [Google Scholar] measurement tool, the Values Survey Module (VSM), consistent with Soeters’ study. The study is considered exploratory because of a somewhat limited sample. The results from the 6 different measures of collectivist behaviors provide no support for the suggestion that cross-cultural differences in individualism–collectivism are not the same in military organizations as in civilian organizations. Although not conclusive, the results raise doubt concerning the appropriateness of using the VSM in military samples. The implications are discussed.     

Prospective and concurrent correlates of emotion perception in psychotic disorders: A naturalistic,longitudinal study of neurocognition,affective blunting and avolition

This naturalistic study investigated longitudinal and cross‐sectional symptomatic and neurocognitive correlates of social cognition indexed by emotion perception. Participants were 31 persons admitted to a psychiatric emergency ward due to acute psychosis. Positive and negative (i.e., affective blunting and avolition) symptoms were assessed at baseline and 12‐month follow‐up using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. Participants completed neuropsychological assessments with alternative versions of the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status at baseline and at 12‐month follow‐up. Emotion perception was measured using the Face/Voice Emotion Test at 12‐month follow‐up. Correlational analyses (Spearman's rho) revealed strong and statistically significant associations between neurocognition and emotion perception (baseline r = 0.58, follow‐up r = 0.43). Associations between positive symptoms and emotion perception were weak or non‐existent (baseline r = 0.13, follow‐up r  =  –0.01). Emotion perception was moderately, but not significantly, associated with affective blunting at follow‐up (r = 0.33), but not at baseline (r = 0.21). The association with avolition was non‐existent (baseline r  =  –0.05, follow‐up r = 0.01). This study supports the notion that emotion perception has neurocognitive correlates. The cross‐sectional trend level association with affective blunting suggests that the ability to perceive emotions might be related to, but dissociable from the ability to express emotions.     

A New Logic of Technical Malfunction

Aim of the paper is to present a new logic of technical malfunction. The need for this logic is motivated by a simple-sounding philosophical question: Is a malfunctioning corkscrew, which fails to uncork bottles, nonetheless a corkscrew? Or in general terms, is a malfunctioning F, which fails to do what Fs do, nonetheless an F? We argue that ‘malfunctioning’ denotes the modifier Malfunctioning rather than a property, and that the answer depends on whether Malfunctioning is subsective or privative. If subsective, a malfunctioning F is an F; if privative, a malfunctioning F is not an F. An intensional logic is required to raise and answer the question, because modifiers operate directly on properties and not on sets or individuals. This new logic provides the formal tools to reason about technical malfunction by means of a logical analysis of the sentence “a is a malfunctioning F”.     

Avoiding unbearable pain

This presentation describes the way in which defence mechanisms and resistance manifested themselves in the analysis of a man with a narcissistic personality disorder. In the course of the analysis, there were changes in the forms taken by the defence and the resistance, signalling important genetic and dynamic conditions in his life. Both represented desperate attempts to avoid the unbearably painful feelings and affects which he had experienced in his childhood, and bore witness to early and primitive defence mechanisms such as denial, splitting and projective identification. The defence can also be seen as an expression of an unconscious fear of being re-traumatised. The idealisation of the analyst in the first years of the analysis can therefore be understood as a precondition for entering into this kind of process. It also represented a defence against aggressive and homosexual feelings in the transference which first became clear during the final phase of the analysis and could then be worked through. At this point, the analyst's reactions to his own unconscious countertransference were of help in understanding what was actually going on. This analysis may also suggest that defects and trauma in the earliest years may be conducive to alexithymia, deficient contact between feelings and words, linked to the risk of developing serious psychosomatic illnesses. This may be a consequence of the fact that the child's feelings and affects were neither accepted, understood nor affirmed in words, or they may even have been met with rejection or ridicule. A connection between narcissistic personality disorders and alexithymia can possibly be seen here.     

The relation between achievement goal and expectancy-value theories in predicting achievement-related outcomes: A test of four theoretical conceptions

Although achievement goal and expectancy-value theories are both dominant in the achievement motivation literature, the relation between goals and expectancy-value variables in predicting achievement-related behaviors remains unclear. The present study evaluated the empirical validity of four contrasting theoretical conceptions which posit that (1) goals and expectancy-value variables are independent predictors of achievement-related outcomes (2) goals predict expectancy-values, (3) goals mediate the relation between expectancies and task-values, and (4) goals partially mediate the relation between expectancy-values and achievement outcomes, in predicting course performance, career intentions and academic aspirations. Path models evaluating these conceptions were tested separately in mathematics and language arts domains among 697 6th and 8th grade students. Results supported the fourth theoretical approach suggesting that expectancy-value variables predict achievement-related outcomes both directly and indirectly through achievement goals. These findings provide insight about the relation between expectancy-value and achievement goal theories and highlight their complementary role in predicting achievement behaviors.     

Penn State Worry Questionnaire: Findings Form Normative and Clinical Samples in Denmark

Anxiety disorders are among the most prevalent psychiatric disturbances in childhood. None-the-less, they often go unrecognized and untreated, which puts the child at risk for developing additional difficulties, such as academic difficulties, depression, and substance abuse. Further knowledge and valid assessment tools are essential to identify at-risk children. The present study investigates (i) the factor structure of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children (PSWQ-C) using a large Danish community sample (N?=?933), and (ii) its treatment sensitivity in clinically anxious children (N?=?30) treated with cognitive behavioral therapy. Results from the community sample replicated previous findings supporting the strong psychometric properties of the PSWQ-C, and yielded Danish norms and clinical cut-offs for the measure. Clinically anxious children with a generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; N?=?10) diagnosis reported significantly higher levels of worry than anxious children without GAD (N?=?20). At post treatment, worry levels in children with GAD but not in anxious children without GAD were normalized. Findings regarding worry in the community sample are discussed in light of normal child development. Implications for the use of the PSWQ-C as a useful and important tool in clinical assessment by psychiatrists and psychologists in their treatment of anxious children and adolescents are also discussed.