The Left Hand Doesn't Know What the Right Hand Is Doing: The Disruptive Effects of Attention to the Hands in Skilled Typewriting

ABSTRACT— Everyone knows that attention to the details disrupts skilled performance, but little empirical evidence documents this fact. We show that attention to the hands disrupts skilled typewriting. We had skilled typists type words preceded by cues that told them to type only the letters assigned to one hand or to type all of the letters. Cuing the hands disrupted performance markedly, slowing typing and increasing the error rate (Experiment 1); these deleterious effects were observed even when no keystrokes were actually inhibited (Experiment 3). However, cuing the same letters with colors was not disruptive (Experiment 2). We account for the disruption with a hierarchical control model, in which an inner loop controls the hands and an outer loop controls what is typed. Typing letters using only one hand requires the outer loop to monitor the inner loop's output; the outer loop slows inner-loop cycle time to increase the likelihood of inhibiting responses with the unwanted hand. This produces the disruption.     

Inhibitory attentional control in patients with frontal lobe damage

The performance of a group of frontal lobe lesion and a group of frontal lobe dementia patients was compared with the performance of their respective matched normal control groups on two tests of inhibitory attentional control-the stop-signal reaction time task and a negative priming task. Both patient groups responded significantly slower than their respective normal control groups, but they showed only marginally significant selective impairments on the measures of inhibition. The data suggest that the specific inhibitory processes evaluated by these two tests are, in general, spared in patients with focal frontal lobe lesions or frontal lobe degeneration.     

When it hurts to be misled: A Stroop-like effect in a simple addition production task

In four experiments, subjects saw simple addition equations (e.g., 3 + 4 = 9) and produced the sums while ignoring the presented answer. If the presented answer was false, subjects took longer to produce the sum, as compared with when the presented answer was true (Experiment 1), when there was no answer presented (blanks; Experiment 2), when a letter was presented (Experiment 3), and when a symbol was presented (Experiment 4). The results suggest that subjects were unable to ignore the presented answers, which raises problems for theories of arithmetic verification (i.e., deciding whether 3 + 4 = 9 is true or false) that claim that subjects verify equations by first producing the sum and then comparing the produced sum with the presented answer. Our results are more compatible with theories that claim that in verification and production, an arithmetic knowledge base is used in different ways.     

Cognitive neuroscience of episodic memory encoding

This paper presents a cognitive neuroscientific perspective on how human episodic memories are formed. Convergent evidence from multiple brain imaging studies using positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) suggests a role for frontal cortex in episodic memory encoding. Activity levels within frontal cortex can predict episodic memory encoding across a wide range of behavioral manipulations known to influence memory performance, such as those present during levels of processing and divided attention manipulations. Activity levels within specific frontal and medial temporal regions can even predict, on an item by item basis, whether an episodic memory is likely to form. Furthermore, separate frontal regions appear to participate in supplying code-specific information, including distinct regions which process semantic attributes of verbal information as well as right-lateralized regions which process nonverbal information. We hypothesize that activity within these multiple frontal regions provides a functional influence (input) to medical temporal regions that bind the information together into a lasting episodic memory trace.     

Parallel memory retrieval in dual-task situations: I. Semantic memory

Can participants retrieve information about the 2nd of 2 stimuli while they are processing the 1st? Four experiments suggest they can. Reaction times to the 1st stimulus were faster if it came from the same category as the 2nd than if it came from a different category. This category-match effect was observed for letter-digit discrimination (Experiment 1), magnitude and parity judgments about digits (Experiment 2), and lexical decisions (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that the 2nd stimulus could semantically prime the 1st. The category-match effect was observed only when the same task was performed on the 2 stimuli. When the task changed from the 1st stimulus to the 2nd, there was no advantage of a category match. This dependence on task set may explain previous failures to find parallel retrieval.     

Modeling task switching without switching tasks: a short-term priming account of explicitly cued performance

Switch costs in task switching are commonly attributed to an executive control process of task-set reconfiguration, particularly in studies involving the explicit task-cuing procedure. The authors propose an alternative account of explicitly cued performance that is based on 2 mechanisms: priming of cue encoding from residual activation of cues in short-term memory and compound cue retrieval of responses from long-term memory. Their short-term priming account explains the repeated cue encoding benefit, switch cost, reduction in switch cost with preparation time, and other effects. The authors develop a mathematical model of their priming account and fit it to data from 3 experiments, demonstrating that a set of basic psychological processes can produce several effects--including putative switch costs--without switching tasks.