Disentangling the belief in God and cognitive rigidity/flexibility components of religiosity to predict racial and value-violating prejudice: A Post-Critical Belief Scale analysis

Past research indicates that being religious is associated with prejudice toward racial and value-violating out-groups. However, this past research treated religiosity as a unidimensional construct without taking into account how different components of religiosity—belief in a higher power and the rigidity/flexibility of religious beliefs—are associated with measures of prejudice. Two studies examined the relationship between these two components of religiosity, as measured by the Post-Critical Beliefs Scale, and racial (African Americans, Arabs) and value-violating prejudices (atheists, gay men). As the flexibility of religious beliefs increased (literal vs. symbolic dimension), attitudes toward racial and value-violating out-groups became more positive (Study 1). As belief in God strengthened (exclusion vs. inclusion of transcendence dimension), attitudes toward value-violating out-groups became more negative. Study 2 demonstrated that these two components of religiosity fully mediated the relationship between general religiosity and prejudice toward African Americans, Arabs, and gay men and partially mediated the relationship between religiosity and prejudice toward atheists. Results are discussed in light of reexamining the conclusion that simply being religious is associated with prejudice.     

The legacy of Adolf Meyer’s comparative approach: Worcester rats and the strange birth of the animal model

The breeding of albino rats had an enormous impact on experimental psychology in the twentieth century: Rats were, and for many questions still remain, the “standard animal” for laboratory research in neurology, psychology, and physiology. Albert Meyer was one of the figures most responsible for developing the albino rat as an experimental model. Despite Meyer’s pioneering work with albino rats, his rat research has received only sparse attention. Little is known about the way in which the animal served Meyer’s more famous psychiatric program. In this article, the author discusses the role that albino rats played in Meyer’s animal research. He then turn to the contrast between the way in which Meyer viewed the animal’s role in research and the way rats were later used as a laboratory “standard” to assure scientific generality. This comparison highlights the changes that occurred in comparative psychology in the twentieth century, and it further clarifies some of the concerns associated with the use of animal models today. Reprinted from Jaan Valsiner (ed.).Thinking in Psychological Science: Ideas and Their Makers. Transaction Publishers. Previously published inFrom Past to Future, Vol. 4(1),Animal models in human psychology: The uses of comparative methodologies, pp. 23–36. @ 2003 Frances L. Hiatt School of Psychology, Clark University. Author: Cheryl A. Logan, Ph.D., Departments of Psychology and Biology, P. O. Box 26170, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greansboro, NC. The author is graterful for permission to quote from the Adolf Meyer papers, which was granted by The Alan M. Chesney Medical Archives at The Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions.     

Task-switching performance with 1:1 and 2:1 cue-task mappings: not so different after all

When task-switching studies use the task-cuing procedure with a 1:1 cue-task mapping, task switching and cue switching are confounded, which is problematic for interpreting switch costs. The use of a 2:1 cue-task mapping is a potential solution to this problem, but it is possible that introducing more cues may also introduce marked changes in task-switching performance. In 5 experiments involving 160 subjects, the authors compared performance with 1:1 and 2:1 mappings across several methodological changes. Differences in switch costs between mappings were small and, in most analyses, nonsignificant. In all experiments, both mappings yielded significant reductions in switch cost across cue-target interval, and there were significant cue-switching effects with the 2:1 mapping. A model of cue encoding fit the data from both mappings about equally well. Overall, task-switching performance was more similar than it was different between mappings, leading the authors to suggest that the use of a 2:1 mapping is a viable solution to the problem associated with a 1:1 mapping.     

Contextual control over task-set retrieval

Contextual cues signaling task likelihood or the likelihood of task repetition are known to modulate the size of switch costs. We follow up on the finding by Leboe, Wong, Crump, and Stobbe (2008) that location cues predictive of the proportion of switch or repeat trials modulate switch costs. Their design employed one cue per task, whereas our experiment employed two cues per task, which allowed separate assessment of modulations to the cue-repetition benefit, a measure of lower level cue-encoding processes, and to the task-alternation cost, a measure of higher level processes representing task-set information. We demonstrate that location information predictive of switch proportion modulates performance at the level of task-set representations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that contextual control occurs even when subjects are unaware of the associations between context and switch likelihood. We discuss the notion that contextual information provides rapid, unconscious control over the extent to which prior task-set representations are retrieved in the service of guiding online performance.     

Automatic and controlled response inhibition: associative learning in the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms

In 5 experiments, the authors examined the development of automatic response inhibition in the go/no-go paradigm and a modified version of the stop-signal paradigm. They hypothesized that automatic response inhibition may develop over practice when stimuli are consistently associated with stopping. All 5 experiments consisted of a training phase and a test phase in which the stimulus mapping was reversed for a subset of the stimuli. Consistent with the automatic-inhibition hypothesis, the authors found that responding in the test phase was slowed when the stimulus had been consistently associated with stopping in the training phase. In addition, they found that response inhibition benefited from consistent stimulus-stop associations. These findings suggest that response inhibition may rely on the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations after practice with consistent stimulus-stop mappings. Stimulus-stop mapping is typically consistent in the go/no-go paradigm, so automatic inhibition is likely to occur. However, stimulus-stop mapping is typically inconsistent in the stop-signal paradigm, so automatic inhibition is unlikely to occur. Thus, the results suggest that the two paradigms are not equivalent because they allow different kinds of response inhibition.