Marital conflict and adjustment: speech nonfluencies in intimate disclosure

Speech nonfluency in response to questions about the marital relationship was used to assess anxiety. Subjects were 31 husbands and 31 wives, all white, college educated, from middle- to lower-middle-class families, and ranging from 20 to 30 years of age. Three types of nonfluencies were coded: filled pauses, unfilled pauses, and repetitions. Speech-disturbance ratios were computed by dividing the sum of speech nonfluencies by the total words spoken. The results support the notion that some issues within marriage are more sensitive and/or problematic than others, and that, in an interview situation, gender interacts with question content in the production of nonfluencies.     

TEACHING SELF-PROTECTION TO CHILDREN USING TELEVISION TECHNIQUES

This study compared the effectiveness of a videotape training program with other methods of teaching children self-protection to prevent child abduction. Subjects were kindergarten and first-grade students. Four experimental conditions were presented: videotape with behavior rehearsal, videotape only, a standard safety program, and no training. Acquisition of self-protective behaviors was measured at posttraining and follow-up by having confederate adults entice the children near their schools and homes. Results revealed that the videotape program with behavior rehearsal was highly effective in teaching children safe responses to potential abductors. The standard safety program was effective with fewer than half of the children. Three fourths of the children who received no training immediately agreed to go with the confederate suspects. The videotape program can be easily used with groups of young children in a classroom setting.     

The universality of a contempt expression: A replication

Two experiments replicated Ekman and Friesen's finding of an expression that signals contempt across cultures. The subjects, from West Sumatra, Indonesia, were members of a culture that differs in a number of ways from Western cultures. In one experiment the subjects judged photographs of Japanese and American faces, both males and females, which showed many different emotions. There was very high agreement about which expressions signaled contempt in preference to anger, disgust, happiness, sadness, fear, or surprise. In a second experiment the Indonesian subjects judged expressions shown by members of their own culture, and again there was very high agreement about which expression signals contempt.This study was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 41100). Paul Ekman's work is also supported by a Research Scientist Award from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 06092). Karl G. Heider's work was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 38221). We are grateful to Maureen O'Sullivan for her many helpful comments on this report.     

The foundations of epistemological probability

Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of awareness internalism. The article draws three main concluding lessons. First, epistemological probability is not to be identified with the sort of objective, experience-independent probability that is familiar from statistical and propensity interpretations of probability. Second, it is doubtful that epistemological probability is measurable, in any useful way, by real numbers, even if it admits of comparative assessments. Third, contrary to the familiar claim of C. I. Lewis, epistemological probability should not be viewed as requiring a basis of certainty.