The functional independence of trait self-knowledge: commentary on Sakaki (2007)

In a recent paper, Sakaki (2007) proposed that Klein and Loftus's conclusion that semantic and episodic trait self-knowledge are functionally independent (e.g., Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992b) was based on questionable assumptions and not supported by the available evidence. In this paper we show that Sakaki (2007) has misinterpreted our position on the independence of self-knowledge, omitted mention of large portions of the relevant research at odds with her contention, and conducted her studies with procedures we explicitly warned against due to interpretive ambiguities associated with their use.     

Advertising's misinformation effect

This research explores whether post-experience advertising alters information learned in a consumer's direct experience. An advertising misinformation effect was obtained for colour memory of a previously seen candy bar wrapper upon both visual and verbal misinformation. However, the misleading visual information produced more ‘remember’ judgements than misleading verbal information. This advertising misinformation effect did not dissipate when the source was discredited. We found that such memory changes can be directly linked to consumer subjective judgements and choices when the misleading information is particularly salient. Not only do these findings constitute a novel generalizability of the misinformation effect, they also have implications for social policy research on deceptive advertising. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Different confidence-accuracy relationships for feature-based and familiarity-based memories

Participants studied naturalistic pictures presented for varying brief durations and then received a recognition test on which they indicated whether each picture was old or new and rated their confidence. In 1 experiment they indicated whether each "old"/"new" response was based on memory for a specific feature in the picture or instead on the picture's general familiarity; in another experiment, we defined pictures that tended to elicit feature versus familiarity responses. Thus, feature/familiarity was a dependent variable in 1 experiment and an independent variable in the other. In both experiments feature-based responses were more accurate than those that were familiarity based, and confidence and accuracy increased with duration for both response types. However, when confidence was controlled for, mean accuracy was higher for familiarity-based than for feature-based responses. The theoretical implication is that confidence and accuracy arise from different underlying information. The applied implication is that confidence differences should not be taken as implying accuracy differences when the phenomenal basis of the memory reports differ.     

Standard errors and confidence intervals in within-subjects designs: Generalizing Loftus and Masson (1994) and avoiding the biases of alternative accounts

Repeated measures designs are common in experimental psychology. Because of the correlational structure in these designs, the calculation and interpretation of confidence intervals is nontrivial. One solution was provided by Loftus and Masson (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1:476-490, 1994). This solution, although widely adopted, has the limitation of implying same-size confidence intervals for all factor levels, and therefore does not allow for the assessment of variance homogeneity assumptions (i.e., the circularity assumption, which is crucial for the repeated measures ANOVA). This limitation and the method's perceived complexity have sometimes led scientists to use a simplified variant, based on a per-subject normalization of the data (Bakeman & McArthur, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 28:584-589, 1996; Cousineau, Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology 1:42-45, 2005; Morey, Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology 4:61-64, 2008; Morrison & Weaver, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 27:52-56, 1995). We show that this normalization method leads to biased results and is uninformative with regard to circularity. Instead, we provide a simple, intuitive generalization of the Loftus and Masson method that allows for assessment of the circularity assumption.     

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age

Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function.     

General software for an on-line eye-movement recording system

A general on-line eye-movement recording system is described which consists basically of (a) some on-line instrument capable of displaying a visual scene, (b) a device to measure eye position and output position information in the form of electrical signals (c) an analogue-to-digital converter, and (d) a computer. General software for such a system is discussed with emphasis on subroutines which perform calibration and which continuously monitor eye position.     

Misinformation and memory: the creation of new memories

Misleading information presented after an event can lead people to erroneous reports of that misinformation. Different process histories can be responsible for the same erroneous report in different people. We argue that the relative proportion of times that the different process histories are responsible for erroneous reporting will depend on the conditions of acquisition, retention, and retrieval of information. Given the conditions typical of most misinformation experiments, it appears that misinformation acceptance plays a major role, memory impairment plays some role, and pure guessing plays little or no role. Moreover, we argue that misinformation acceptance has not received the appreciation that it deserves as a phenomenon worthy of our sustained investigation. It may not tell us anything about impairment of memories, but it does tell us something about the creation of new memories.     

Vivid persuasion in the courtroom

When witnesses at a trial offer testimony that is vivid, it may be more persuasive than the same testimony offered in a pallid manner. In this paper we elucidate three categories of variables (inferential, attentional/memorial, and affective) that are likely to mediate the effects of the vividness of testimony on jury judgments. These variables are then used to explain discrepant findings among mock juror experiments investigating vividness effects. Finally, we discuss the implications of vividness effects for the legal system.     

The fate of memory: comment on McCloskey and Zaragoza

McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argue that misleading postevent suggestions do not affect the availability of originally encoded information. Their hypothesis stems from empirical work using a modified paradigm in which no effect of postevent information is observed. Although their "no impairment" hypothesis is plausible, careful consideration of the predictions of their experimental test suggests that it may be insufficiently sensitive to reveal the impact of postevent information. A small effect of postevent information can be observed when their paradigm is repeated with a more sensitive recognition test. McCloskey and Zaragoza's no impairment hypothesis is also difficult to reconcile with numerous reports of "blend" memories that reflect a compromise between the original and postevent information.     

Perceptual and conceptual masking of pictures

We report an experiment in which target pictures, presented for 50 ms, were followed by masks. Two mask variables were implemented: mask luminance and amount of attention demanded by the mask. Luminance but not attention demand affected subsequent picture-memory performance when the mask followed the picture immediately; however, attention demand but not luminance affected performance when the mask was delayed by 300 ms following the offset of the picture. We conclude that qualitatively different processes are being carried out at 0 versus 300 ms following the offset of a 50-ms picture. We argue that these processes can profitably be viewed as perceptual processes, which operate on raw stimulus input, and conceptual processes, which operate on the output of perceptual processes.