Mental shock can produce retrograde amnesia

Subjects in three experiments saw a short film of a mentally shocking event in which a young boy is violently shot in the face. Compared to other subjects who saw a nonviolent version of the same film, those who saw the mentally shocking version showed poorer retention of the details of the film. Retention was poorer whether measured by recognition or recall. Furthermore, impaired memory occurred only when the event was mentally upsetting, and not when it was merely unexpected but not upsetting. These results suggest that mentally shocking episodes may disrupt the lingering processing necessary for full storage of information in memory.     

Accounts of the confidence-accuracy relation in recognition memory

Confidence and accuracy, while often considered to tap the same memory representation, are often found to be only weakly correlated (e.g., Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; Deffenbacher, 1980). There are at least two possible (nonexclusive) reasons for this weak relation. First, it may be simply due to noise of one sort or another; that is, it may come about because of both within- and between-subjects statistical variations that are partially uncorrelated for confidence measures on the one hand and accuracy measures on the other. Second, confidence and accuracy may be uncorrelated because they are based, at least in part, on different memory representations that are affected in different ways by different independent variables. We propose a general theory that is designed to encompass both of these possibilities and, within the context of this theory, we evaluate effects of four variables—degree of rehearsal, study duration, study luminance, and test luminance—in three face recognition experiments. In conjunction with our theory, the results allow us to begin to identify the circumstances under which confidence and accuracy are based on the same versus different sources of information in memory. The results demonstrate the conditions under which subjects are quite poor at monitoring their memory performance, and are used to extend cue utilization theories to the domain of face recognition.     

Conditions affecting the revelation effect for autobiographical memory

In four experiments involving 184 participants, people rated their confidence that particular events had happened in their childhood (e.g., "Broke a window playing ball"). If participants had to unscramble a key word in a phrase just before rating it (e.g., "Broke a nwidwo [window] playing ball"), confidence ratings increased-the revelation effect. However, the pattern of revelation effects depended on the particular way in which participants processed key words (e.g., visualizing vs. counting vowels in the word window) approximately 10 min prior to rating life events that contained those words. Prior exposure to key words never in itself directly affected confidence ratings. These results demonstrate that one can manipulate the revelation effect by altering the processing that participants perform on words prior to unscrambling them. These results also pose difficulties for many accounts of the revelation effect. The major puzzle posed by our present findings is that unscrambling key words increases confidence that an event has happened in childhood, whereas prior exposure to these words does not.     

The "saw-it-all-along" effect: demonstrations of visual hindsight bias

The authors address whether a hindsight bias exists for visual perception tasks. In 3 experiments, participants identified degraded celebrity faces as they resolved to full clarity (Phase 1). Following Phase 1, participants either recalled the level of blur present at the time of Phase 1 identification or predicted the level of blur at which a peer would make an accurate identification. In all experiments, participants overestimated identification performance of naive observers. Visual hindsight bias was greater for more familiar faces--those shown in both phases of the experiment--and was not reduced following instructions to participants to avoid the bias. The authors propose a fluency-misattribution theory to account for the bias and discuss implications for medical malpractice litigation and eyewitness testimony.     

Exploring the role of repetition and sensory elaboration in the imagination inflation effect

Two experiments were conducted to examine whether a misattribution of specific characteristics or a misattribution of global familiarity underlies false memories as assessed through imagination inflation. Using the paradigm developed by Goff and Roediger (1998), we found that the proportion of false memories increased with repeated imagination, replicating the imagination inflation effect. False memories developed through imagination were greatest in conditions that forced participants to include sensory detail in their imaginings. Finally, conscious recollection more often accompanied false memories in perceptually detailed imagination conditions, whereas feelings of familiarity more often accompanied false memories in conditions that lacked sensory cues. These results suggest that imagination that contains more perceptual information leads to more elaborate memory representations containing specific characteristics that can be confused with actually performed actions. Confusion based on these representations, as opposed to confusion based on processing fluency, is more likely to lead to false memories.     

Brief Exposure to Misinformation Can Lead to Long‐Term False Memories

Do false memories last? And do they last as long as true ones? This study investigated whether experimentally created false memories would persist for an extended period (one and a half years). A large number of subjects (N = 342) participated in a standard three‐stage misinformation procedure (saw the event slides, read the narrations with misinformation, and then took the memory tests). The initial tests showed that misinformation led to a significant amount of false memory. One and a half years later, the participants were tested again. About half of the misinformation false memory persisted, which was the same rate as for true memory. These results strongly suggest that brief exposure to misinformation can lead to long‐term false memory and that the strength of memory trace was similar for true and false memories. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dear diary, is plastic better than paper? I can't remember: Comment on Green, Rafaeli, Bolger, Shrout, and Reis (2006)

In this commentary, the authors discuss the implications of A. S. Green, E. Rafaeli, N. Bolger, P. E. Shrout, and H. T. Reis's (2006) diary studies with respect to memory. Researchers must take 2 issues into account when determining whether paper-and-pencil or handheld electronic diaries gather more trustworthy data. The first issue is a matter of prospective memory, and the second is a matter of reconstructive memory. The authors review the research on these issues and conclude that regardless of the type of diary researchers use, several factors can conspire to produce prompt--but inaccurate--data.     

Who is susceptible in three false memory tasks?

ABSTRACT

Decades of research show that people are susceptible to developing false memories. But if they do so in one task, are they likely to do so in a different one? The answer: “No”. In the current research, a large number of participants took part in three well-established false memory paradigms (a misinformation task, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [DRM] list learning paradigm, and an imagination inflation exercise) as well as completed several individual difference measures. Results indicate that many correlations between false memory variables in all three inter-paradigm comparisons are null, though some small, positive, significant correlations emerged. Moreover, very few individual difference variables significantly correlated with false memories, and any significant correlations were rather small. It seems likely, therefore, that there is no false memory “trait”. In other words, no one type of person seems especially prone, or especially resilient, to the ubiquity of memory distortion.