Epistemic Presuppositions and their Consequences

Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.     

Psychological factors associated with poor hypertension control: differences in personality and stress between patients with controlled and uncontrolled hypertension

Only one-third of patients with hypertension under pharmacological treatment achieve the recommended blood pressure goals. Psychological factors could partially account for poor hypertension control through the existence of personality traits related to treatment compliance (e.g., self-discipline, deliberation, impulsiveness), and the fact that stress and some personality traits (e.g., anxiety, depression, anger expression, Type A) are involved in the etiology of some hypertension cases. This study was aimed at examining the differences in personality and stress between patients taking antihypertensive medications with controlled and uncontrolled hypertension. Results revealed that after controlling sex, age, and traditional variables associated with poor hypertension control, the uncontrolled hypertension group showed higher scores on impulsiveness, depression, anger expression-out, and stress, with differences ranging between medium and large (Hedges' g effect size = 0.77 to 1.08). These results support the hypothesized relationship between psychological factors and poor hypertension control.     

Thick,Thin, and Becoming a Virtuous Arguer

A virtue account is focused on the character of those who argue. It is frequently assumed, however, that virtues are not action guiding, since they describe how to be and so fail to give us specific actions to take in a sticky situation. In terms of argumentation, we might say that being a charitable arguer is virtuous, but knowing so provides no details about how to argue successfully. To close this gap, I develop a parallel with the thick-thin distinction from ethics and use Hursthouse’s notion of “v-rules”. I also draw heavily from the work in argumentation by Daniel Cohen to develop Wayne Brockriede’s notion of arguing lovingly. But “argue lovingly” has a delicious ambiguity. For Brockriede it describes how we engage with others arguers. It can also mean, however, a loving attachment to knowledge, understanding, and truth. Applying the thick-thin distinction to argumentation in general and loving argumentation in particular shows that a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation is valuable for two reasons: it can provide one articulation of what it means to be a virtuous arguer and provide some insights into how to become one.     

Can linguistics contribute to the study of verbal behavior?

A number of publications during the last decade reveal a growing interest in linguistics and psycholinguistics among some radical behaviorists, who have proposed a direct rapprochement between a formal analysis of language and a functional account. It is argued that whereas function has to do with the circumstances under which verbal behavior is emitted, structure has to do with its "internal organization," the ways in which sentences or parts thereof are presumably interrelated. These are said to be different dimensions of verbal behavior; together they should lead toward a coherent psychology of language. But psychologists bent on incorporating techniques from linguistics should be aware of its underlying assumptions, lest their work be deflected in essentially unproductive directions. The line between rapprochement and subservience is thin indeed, as the extant literature shows. This paper traces the development of mainstream contemporary psycholinguistics and examines the linguist's assumptions about the subject matter in the light of a behavioral analysis. The possibility of an effective reconciliation seems to be a long way off.     

A comparative study of geometric rule learning by nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana), pigeons (Columba livia), and jackdaws (Corvus monedula)

Three avian species, a seed-caching corvid (Clark's nutcrackers; Nucifraga columbiana), a non-seed-caching corvid (jackdaws; Corvus monedula), and a non-seed-caching columbid (pigeons; Columba livia), were tested for ability to learn to find a goal halfway between 2 landmarks when distance between the landmarks varied during training. All 3 species learned, but jackdaws took much longer than either pigeons or nutcrackers. The nutcrackers searched more accurately than either pigeons or jackdaws. Both nutcrackers and pigeons showed good transfer to novel landmark arrays in which interlandmark distances were novel, but inconclusive results were obtained from jackdaws. Species differences in this spatial task appear quantitative rather than qualitative and are associated with differences in natural history rather than phylogeny.