Referenzsemantik in der Partnermodellierung

How can we explain that an assertion on something perceived can be understood in the same manner by somebody who cannot perceive that scene? This problem bases the interest in computational linguistics in how listener modeling could possibly be harmonized with reference semantics. Mental images substituting real perception appear as a way out. The architecture of the listener model has to be adapted to the creation and use of such pictorial data structures. Furthermore, the relation between the latter and a verbal (i. e., propositional) representation must be understood. The resulting architecture of a listener model with reference semantics can be employed to solve communicational problems from three general classes in a better way, as is demonstrated by an example implementation.     

Performance Self-Predictions: The Impact of Expectancy Strength and Incentives1

Performance self-predictions represent an individual's anticipated level performance on an upcoming task. This study focused on the accuracy of these predictions, as well as subjective reactions to making them under varying expectancy and incentive conditions. Results indicate that performance-contingent incentives had a positive effect on task performance, but a negative effect on preferences for making performance predictions. Expectancy strength also influenced these predictions, their subjective interpretations, and task performance. Additional results address the role of other task-relevant judgments (e.g., self-assessed ability and intended effort) when predicting one's performance on a task. Implications of these findings for work motivation and judgment accuracy are discussed.     

Stimulus-independent thought depends on central executive resources

Stimulus-independent thoughts (SITs) are streams of thoughts and images unrelated to immediate sensory input. Four experiments examined the contribution of aspects of working memory to production of SITs. In Experiments 1 and 2, interventions that were targeted on, respectively, phonological and visuospatial components of working memory both interfered with production of SITs, but there was evidence that these tasks also made demands on central executive resources. Experiments 3 and 4 specifically examined the hypothesis that production of SITs and control of nonproceduralized tasks both depend on central executive resources, and so should show mutual interference. In Experiment 3, prior practice on pursuit rotor and memory tasks reduced the interference with SITs from concurrent task performance. In Experiment 4, randomness within a task involving random-number generation was less when SITs were being produced concurrently than it was when they were not. The results suggest that production of SITs depends on central executive resources.     

Case vignette: cybertherapy

Dr. Neuro Transmitter, a psychotherapist in Paramus, New Jersey, provides services through an online, real-time consultation service known as CyberShrink, Inc., of Dallas, Texas. He is paid by the hour for his consultation services to subscribers who are billed by credit card through CyberShrink. One afternoon he logs on and is connected via private "chat channel" to a new subscriber to the service. She is Ann Hedonia of Simi Valley, California. Ten minutes into the session, Dr Transmitter recognizes that Ms. Hedonia is seriously depressed with suicidal ideation and is feeling on the edge of her ability to cope. He gently suggests that perhaps she ought to think about hospitalization near her home. Ms. Hedonia replies, "Even you don't care about me! That's it. I'm going to do it!" and disconnects. Discussion questions: Is offering psychotherapy services online ethical? What are Dr. Transmitter's obligations in general and at this particular moment to Ms. Hedonia? Suppose Ms. Hedonia has a complaint about Dr. Transmitter. From whom can she seek a remedy? Which state's laws apply regarding professional practice, confidentiality, or licensing qualifications? Must Dr. Transmitter be licensed in any state to offer this service?     

Infant search tasks reveal early concepts of containment and canonical usage of objects

It is difficult to gain unambiguous evidence on the use of concepts by infants. Many results can be accounted for in terms of action-based strategies. The evidence reported here fulfils the minimal criteria for the operation of working concepts in infants. Search tasks are used with a filled interval which forces memory-search, and the object is hidden in containers which fulfil their customary job or violate it. Infants treat an upright cup as a more reliable location marker than an inverted one. A series of experiments probes the phenomenon. The results indicate that the infants have a working concept of containment which can be triggered by the provision of containers in their canonical orientation. Even “object permanence tasks” lead infants to access their knowledge of the relationships into which things typically enter in the world outside the laboratory.     

Methinks they do protest too much

A serious methodological error was committed by Stephens et al. (1972), the protestations of the present critics notwithstanding. When studying the relationship between two sets of variables, it is clearly wrong to hold chonological age constant in one set and allow it to vary in the other. This error spuriously reduces the correlation between the two sets. A demonstration that the two sets define different first-order factors provides very little information about the degree of relationship present, which must be derived from the intercorrelations of those factors. In the original research, these were also biased by the methodological error. The conclusion of Humphreys and Parsons that Piagetian tasks and intelligence tests could be used interchangeably is reinforced. The hypothesis that the relatively small amount of unique variance in the Piagetian composite is relatively unimportant psychologically can only be discarded on the basis of good empirical research, not debater's arguments.     

Analysis of variances and covariances is misleading as a guide to a common factor model

The “factor” analyses published by Schultz, Kaye, and Hoyer (1980) confused component and factor analysis and led in this case as in many others to unwarranted conclusions. They used component analysis to develop factor models that were subjected to restricted (confirmatory) maximum likelihood analysis, but the final models for which good fits with the observed correlations were obtained were not common factor models. They were, however, discussed as such and conclusions drawn accordingly. When their correlation matrices are analyzed by the principal factors method, two factors are sufficient to account for the intercorrelations. These two factors generally support the a priori expectation of a difference between intelligence tasks and spontaneous flexibility tasks. They are also quite similar in younger and older subjects, when similarity is judged in terms of factor pattern. Factor loadings for the younger subjects, however, are much smaller than expectations based on the respective ranges of talent in the two groups of subjects or on past experience with similar tests in undergraduate student populations.