Validity and quantification in intuitionism

We distinguish three different readings of the intuitionistic notions of validity, soundness, and completeness with respect to the quantification occurring in the notion of validity, and we establish certain relations between the different readings. For each of the meta-logical notions considered we suggest that the most natural reading (which is not the same for all cases) is precisely the one which is required by the recent intuitionistic completeness theorems for IPC.This paper was partly written while the first author, H. C. M. de Swart, was a Visiting Fellow at Princeton University for the academic year 1976–1977. This opportunity was given to him by the Niels Stensen Stichting in Amsterdam, the department of philosophy of the Catholic University in Nijmegen and by Princeton University. He is happy to express his appreciation for that opportunity.     

Conditioned inhibition of fear: Evidence for a competing response mechanism

In two experiments, inhibitory conditioning was attempted by presenting a discrete CS in a neutral stimulus environment shortly following the termination of either shock (Experiment 1) or a second discrete CS which had been paired in a forward manner with shock (Experiment 2). Evidence of successful inhibitory conditioning was mixed in Experiment 1, where the properties of the CS were assessed within an escape-from-fear procedure. Postresponse presentations of the CS enhanced performance, whereas the presentation of the CS prior to responding did not have the expected degrading effect on performance. In Experiment 2, the inhibitory properties of the CS were assessed by combining this stimulus with an excitatory CS and presenting the compound to rats engaged in a water-reinforced licking response. Less response suppression was found in reaction to this compound relative to three separate comparison conditions, thus witnessing the success of the inhibitory-conditioning procedure used. The common assumption that inhibitory conditioning results from the nonreinforcement of a CS in a situation where reinforcement is expected, i.e., one which contains previously reinforced cues, is not supported by these data, for no previously reinforced cues were simultaneously presented with the CS during inhibitory training. The data are in agreement with a conditioned antagonistic-response interpretation of inhibitory conditioning.     

Contrast and undermatching as a function of reinforcer duration and quality during multiple schedules

Eight pigeons pecked keys under multiple variable-interval two-minute variable-interval two-minute schedules. In Experiment 1, the reinforcers were 2, 4, or 8 seconds access to a food magazine. In Experiments 2 and 3, the reinforcers were grains that had been determined to be most-, moderately-, or non-preferred. Both positive and negative behavioral contrast occurred when the reinforcers in one component were held constant and the duration or type of reinforcer obtained in the other component varied. Undermatching occurred when the relative rate of responding during a component was plotted as a function of the relative duration of the reinforcers in that component.     

“We really need to know what pastoral counseling Is”—Reflections for colleagues in other disciplines

This article suggests that pastoral counselors in the field must vigorously engage in the process of self-interpretation to colleagues in allied professions. It accordingly attempts to offer a bilateral approach to such interdisciplinary communication. Part One focuses on the psychology of id, superego and ego as an exegetical principle to describe recent trends in the field. Part Two offers a complementary theological account of pastoral counseling, seen from the inside, focusing on the image of the pastoral counselor as theviator or fellow pilgrim along the way.Chaplain and Lecturer in Religion at Wellesley College for thirteen years     

The more,the better?: Number of decisions as a determinant of memorability

Three experiments tested alternative explanations to the Johnson-Laird, Gibbs, and deMowbray (1978) proposal that the number of decisions made about a word is a major determinant of its memorability. The alternatives considered were increased processing time, retrieval aids, and the number of positive decisions. In Experiment 1, subjects made a speeded classification about each word for a category defined by three properties. Though items with more target properties were processed longer and better remembered, within a property level processing time was not associated with better memory. In Experiment 2, subjects received three properties, but different groups responded “Yes” to words with all three properties, words with any of the three properties, or whether words had each of the properties. As predicted by the number-of-decisions hypothesis, but not by the other hypotheses, with an increasing number of target properties, recall generally increased in the ALL group, decreased in the ANY group, and remained constant in the EACH group. In Experiment 3, this recall pattern was replicated with a different set of two target properties. The number-of-decisions notion is contrasted to the elaboration principle, and a simple model is proposed. It is concluded that the number of decisions is a useful technique for investigating within-level encoding differences     

Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception

Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.     

A comparison between the development of the appearance-reality distinction in the People's Republic of China and the United States

A study of the appearance-reality distinction in American 3- to 5-year-olds was replicated with Chinese 3- to 5-year-olds. The error patterns, age changes, and absolute levels of performance were similar in the two samples. It was speculated that the acquisition of this distinction may be a universal, possibly age-linked development that is probably fueled by experiences with appearance-reality discrepancies that are available in all cultures.     

Contemporary Worldviews: Personal and Policy Implications12

In the past several decades, changes in industrial societies have presented a host of issues, worldwide in scope, around which individual attitudes may form: technological growth, population expansion, environmental quality, global resources, differing societal goals, etc. This study (N= 325) was conducted to identify and assess the major attitude/belief constellations surrounding these issues and to examine their psychological basis and implications for risk perception and societal decision-making procedures. Results supported the hypotheses that assessed contemporary worldviews are related in predictable ways to (a) the pexceived risk associated with selected technologies, (b) preferences for the manner in which societal decisions should be made, and (c) a coherent set of psychological variables. Discussion focuses on policy implications of differing contemporary worldviews and on future directions and applications of this line of research.