The Causal Organisation of Emotional Knowledge: A Developmental Study

Abstract

Using a theory of emotional understanding, the basis for distinguishing among happiness, anger, and sadness was investigated. Three and six-year-old children and adults predicted and explained people's emotional responses to different types of events. The events varied as to whether a person's goal was to attain or to avoid a state, whether the goal was achieved or not, who or what was responsible for success or failure, and whether the outcome was intentional or accidental. For all groups, the attainment and maintenance of goals was the primary focus of explanations for emotions and for the plans that followed emotions. A distinct set of features was used to infer and explain happiness as opposed to anger and sadness. Happiness was elicited by goal success and was followed by plans to maintain or enjoy current goal states. Anger and sadness were elicited by goal failure and were followed by plans to reinstate, replace, or forfeit goals. Anger occurred more frequently than sadness when an aversive rather than a loss state occurred, when an animate agent rather than a natural event caused a negative outcome, and when attention was focused on the cause rather than the consequence of goal failure. Two dimensions associated with anger changed as a function of age. First grade children, and adults were more likely than preschool children to predict anger in response to intentional harm, and their explanations for anger were more likely to refer to the agent or cause of goal failure. For all age groups, however, the majority of subjects responded to aversive situations with anger responses, independent of the causal conditions that produced the aversive state. The results therefore indicate that anger can be produced without intentional harm, but that intentional harm becomes an important dimension in attributing anger, especially as a function of development.     

Cognitive and motor deficits in older adults with HIV infection: Comparison with normal ageing and Parkinson’s disease

Despite the life-extending success of antiretroviral pharmacotherapy in HIV infection (HIV), the prevalence of mild cognitive impairment in HIV remains high. Near-normal life expectancy invokes an emerging role for age–infection interaction and a potential synergy between immunosenescence and HIV-related health factors, increasing risk of cognitive and motor impairment associated with degradation in corticostriatal circuits. These neural systems are also compromised in Parkinson’s disease (PD), which could help model the cognitive deficit pattern in HIV. This cross-sectional study examined three groups, age 45–79 years: 42 HIV, 41 PD, and 37 control (CTRL) participants, tested at Stanford University Medical School and SRI International. Neuropsychological tests assessed executive function (EF), information processing speed (IPS), episodic memory (MEM), visuospatial processing (VSP), and upper motor (MOT) speed and dexterity. The HIV and PD deficit profiles were similar for EF, MEM, and VSP. Although only the PD group was impaired on MOT compared with CTRL, MOT scores were related to cognitive scores in HIV but not PD. Performance was not related to depressive symptoms, socioeconomic status, or CD4⁺ T-cell counts. The overlap of HIV-PD cognitive deficits implicates frontostriatal disruption in both conditions. The motor-cognitive score relation in HIV provides further support for the hypothesis that these processes share similar underlying mechanisms in HIV infection possibly expressed with or exacerbated by ageing.     

Duration of attention: The perceptual deprivation effect

College students viewed 18-sided randomly generated polygons. They were told to attend to each form until they “finished looking at it.” Before each stimulus presentation, 2, 16, 30, or 44 sec of perceptual deprivation was administered. The results indicated that there was a direct relationship between the duration of perceptual deprivation and the duration of attention. The results were interpreted in terms of the deprivation establishing a need for stimulation that is satisfied by attending.     

Face recognition: a general or specific right hemisphere capacity?

Face-recognition ability has been claimed to be qualitatively different from other pattern-recognition abilities. One argument for this claim is the finding of a significant right hemisphere advantage for the recognition of upright but not inverted faces. However, this argument is justified only if this orientation-sensitive pattern is unique to faces. In the present study, comparable patterns of orientation-sensitive involvement of the right hemisphere are found for the recognition of faces and houses. This finding is interpreted as evidence for a right hemisphere schema formation capacity that is applied not only to upright faces but also to other familiar classes of stimuli in their canonical upright orientation. It is suggested that any greater right hemisphere involvement in the recognition of upright faces is due to our greater expertise at recognizing faces than other stimulus types. We also find evidence that only a subset of right-handed adults show orientation-sensitive right hemisphere involvement in the recognition of faces and houses: in particular, those dextrals with a characteristic hemispheric arousal asymmetry in favor of the right hemisphere. In contrast, dextrals with a characteristic arousal asymmetry in favor of the left hemisphere do not show significant visual field asymmetries for faces or houses in either upright or inverted orientations.     

The (In)validity of Self‐Construal Scales Revisited

This paper offers a critical rejoinder in the discussion concerning the viability of self‐construal scales. It is our contention that the existing data reported in our previous article (Levine et al., 2003) and elsewhere are more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that self‐report scales purporting to measure interdependent and independent self‐construals as 2 orthogonal constructs lack validity. The arguments to the contrary offered by Gudykunst and Lee (2003) and Kim and Raja (2003) are disputed. Additional data (N = 1,013) show that neither age, occupation, sample size, standardization, nor a 2nd‐order structure can account for the problems we documented previously. Although we see potential utility in the self‐construal construct, we believe that the 3 primary scales fail to meet reasonable and accepted social scientific standards. Difficult conceptual problems will need to be solved prior to the development of new and improved measures.