Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism

This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of normative reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends upon the agent's perspective and the other upon features of the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational requirements will correspond to the demands generated by normative reasons. While this proposal is prima facie plausible, it cannot ultimately unify reasons and rationality. There is no epistemic constraint that can do what reasons perspectivists would need it to do. Some constraints are too strict. The rest are too slack. This points to a general problem with the reasons‐first program. Once we recognize that the agent's epistemic position helps determine what she should do, we have to reject the idea that the features of the agent's situation can help determine what we should do. Either rationality crowds out reasons and their demands or the reasons will make unreasonable demands.     

Patterning,partial reinforcement,and N-length effects at spaced trials as a function of reinstatement of retrieval cues

Four experiments are reported which demonstrate the importance of the reinstatement of retrieval cues in partial-reinforcement experiments using spaced trials. Reinstatement occurs when the goalbox and startbox are of the same brightness (gray). Nonreinstatement occurs when the goalbox and startbox are of different brightnesses (black-and-white striped vs gray). Under reinstatement conditions, both a partial-reinforcement effect (PRE) and N-length effects were observed whether small reward or large reward was used. Under nonreinstatement conditions, a PRE was observed when large reward was used but not when small reward was used; N-length effects were not observed either with large or small reward. Finally, using a 24-hr intertrial interval, single alternation patterning was found only with a group receiving large reward, a long nonreward confinement duration, and reinstatement. These results are not consistent with the notion that massed and spaced trials are governed by separate mechanisms, and support an explanation of both massed and spaced trials based on E. J. Capaldi's sequential theory.     

Differential runway performance using goal box placement and running trials as discriminative stimuli

Two experiments compared the effects of reinforced, partially reinforced and nonreinforced intertrial goal box placements (ITR, ITP, and ITN respectively) on runway performance. In Experiment I differential responding (animals running slower on nonreinforced (N) trials than on reinforced (R) trials) was observed during acquisition for subjects receiving ITP preceding N trials or subjects receiving ITP before R trials, and also for subjects receiving ITR preceding N trials. No differential responding was observed in subjects receiving ITP prior to both N and R trials or ITN prior to N trials. In extinction, the subjects which had responded differentially during acquisition demonstrated reduced resistance to extinction in comparison to the subjects which had not. In Experiment II, a 2 × 2 factorial design was utilized with placement schedule (ITN and ITP) and type of trial predicted by placement (N and R) serving as the factors. Differential responding was observed in all four groups. The apparent contradiction between the results and the discrimination hypothesis proposed by Capaldi and Olivier (1967) to explain the attenuation of ITR and ITN effects on resistance to extinction is discussed.     

Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality

In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first‐order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher‐order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to resolve this tension and argue that the best way to do this is to reject the idea that strong evidential support is the stuff rationality is made of. In the course of doing this, I shall argue that there is a special class of propositions about the requirements of rationality that we cannot make rational mistakes about and explain how this can be.     

Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that’s notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won’t lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay.     

Does ‘Ought’ Still Imply ‘Can’?

According to ??ought?? implies ??can?? (OIC), your obligation can never be to do what you cannot do. In a recent attack on OIC, Graham has argued that intuitions about justified intervention can help us determine whether the agent whose actions we use force to prevent would have acted permissibly or not. These intuitions, he suggests, cause trouble for the idea that you can be obligated to refrain from doing what you can refrain from doing. I offer a defense of OIC and explain how non-consequentialists can accommodate his intuitions about his cases     

Justification,knowledge, and normality

There is much to like about the idea that justification should be understood in terms of normality or normic support (Smith in Between probability and certainty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Goodman and Salow in Philosophical Studies 175: 183–196, 2018). The view does a nice job explaining why we should think that lottery beliefs differ in justificatory status from mundane perceptual or testimonial beliefs. And it seems to do that in a way that is friendly to a broadly internalist approach to justification. In spite of its attractions, we think that the normic support view faces two serious challenges. The first is that it delivers the wrong result in preface cases. Such cases suggest that the view is either too sceptical or to externalist. The second is that the view struggles with certain kinds of Moorean absurdities. It turns out that these problems can easily be avoided. If we think of normality as a condition on knowledge, we can characterise justification in terms of its connection to knowledge and thereby avoid the difficulties discussed here. The resulting view does an equally good job explaining why we should think that our perceptual and testimonial beliefs are justified when lottery beliefs cannot be. Thus, it seems that little could be lost and much could be gained by revising the proposal and adopting a view on which it is knowledge, not justification that depends directly upon normality.