Youth Group Cliques: How Religious Goals Can Disguise Discriminatory Group Dynamics

This paper provides an in-depth, qualitative analysis of two Christian youth groups. Researchers conducted personal interviews with participating youth and their youth ministers and collected extensive field notes on participant observations of youth group events. Findings indicate the presence of youth group cliques with clear delineations about which participants are youth group insiders and which are outsiders. Results show that insider participants are typically socioeconomically-advantaged youth, while outsiders are typically youth from disadvantaged backgrounds. Despite the existence of these exclusionary practices within both groups, leaders in the two cases demonstrate differing levels of awareness of and response to these dynamics. This paper explores the specifics of both cases, illuminating who is targeted for exclusion within these groups and how this targeting varies across the two congregational contexts. Implications of these findings are that religious youth groups may perpetuate broader socioeconomic divisions. Specifically, the analysis reveals that rather than forming benign cliques, youth group members may be discriminating against others based on their relative socioeconomic advantage.     

Biblical Literalism: A Test of the Compensatory Schema Hypothesis Among Anglicans in England

The compensatory schema hypothesis (Hoffmann and Bartkowski, Soc Forces 86:1245–1272, 2008) has been used to explain why women seem to have higher levels of biblical literalism than men in some Christian denominations. Based on social structuration and gender theories, it proposes that biblical literalism is a key social schema in some denominations that deny women access to institutional power. Women compensate for the lack of access to institutional social resources (leadership) by stressing the accepted schema (literalism) more strongly than men. The theory was tested using two samples from the Church of England, one lay (N = 394) and one ordained (N = 1,052). Laywomen were more literal than laymen among evangelicals and Anglo-catholics, where opposition to women’s ordination is highest, but in both cases the difference was largely explained by differences in education levels between the sexes. Clergywomen, with access to leadership resources, were less literal than clergymen in both Anglo-catholic and evangelical traditions. The results offer rather weak support for the compensatory schema hypothesis, and alternative explanations of the findings are discussed.     

Exploratory Bi-factor Analysis: The Oblique Case

Bi-factor analysis is a form of confirmatory factor analysis originally introduced by Holzinger and Swineford (Psychometrika 47:41?C54, 1937). The bi-factor model has a general factor, a number of group factors, and an explicit bi-factor structure. Jennrich and Bentler (Psychometrika 76:537?C549, 2011) introduced an exploratory form of bi-factor analysis that does not require one to provide an explicit bi-factor structure a priori. They use exploratory factor analysis and a bifactor rotation criterion designed to produce a rotated loading matrix that has an approximate bi-factor structure. Among other things this can be used as an aid in finding an explicit bi-factor structure for use in a confirmatory bi-factor analysis. They considered only orthogonal rotation. The purpose of this paper is to consider oblique rotation and to compare it to orthogonal rotation. Because there are many more oblique rotations of an initial loading matrix than orthogonal rotations, one expects the oblique results to approximate a bi-factor structure better than orthogonal rotations and this is indeed the case. A surprising result arises when oblique bi-factor rotation methods are applied to ideal data.     

Distorsions cognitives et pratique de jeu de hasard et d’argent : état de la question

Cognitive distorsions are inherent to any gambling situation whatever the level of commitment of the gambler. Irrational beliefs lead the subject to overestimate his share of control over the game's outcome to the detriment of chance. Knowing the objective probability to win and having good numeric capacities of reasoning does not prevent the gamblers from developing these false beliefs. According to the concept of double switching proposed by Ladouceur and Sévigny (2005), irrational beliefs would coexist with objective knowledges on the game and would bustle in situation of gambling. The progress and the outcome of the game influence the development and the maintenance of cognitive distorsions, which influences the subject's practice of gambling. Pathological gambling, repeated and persistent gambling behavior, is characterized in particular by the presence of cognitive distortions, leading the subject to maintain, even to increase his gambling practice. Indeed, if cognitive distorsions are present in any situation of gambling, it seems nevertheless that it is more frequent and more intense in problem and pathological gamblers. Cognitive distorsions, in particular illusion of control, thus lead to a more important practice of gambling and a financial risk-taking, favoring the installation and the preservation of problem gambling. Certain factors seem to influence cognitive distorsions. There is a gender effect: women would present fewer irrational beliefs than men. Depression, anxiety and stress would also favor the development of these beliefs in situation of gambling. Several methods exist to estimate cognitive distorsions in gamblers. The first researches are based on assessment made by others (observation and analysis of gambler's verbalizations). Afterward, several self-report scales were created. At the moment, none of these scales has been validated in French language. The identification of gambling related cognitive distortions permit to elaborate adapted modes of treatment. So, the cognitive therapy suggests identifying and restructuring the beliefs to bring the subject to change his gambling behavior. In spite of the current knowledge on cognitive distorsions, certain questions remain open, in particular about the implication of theses beliefs in games implying a part of strategy, in which the subject has effectively a certain control over the game.     

The Illusion-of-Transparency and Episodic Memory: Are People Egocentric or Do People Think that Lies are Easy to Detect?

The illusion-of-transparency seems like an egocentric bias, in which people believe that their inner feelings, thoughts and perspectives are more apparent to others than they actually are. In Experiment 1, participants read out true and false episodic memories to an audience. Participants over-estimated the number of people who would think that they were the liar, and they overestimated how many would correctly identify the liar. Experiment 2 found that with lessened task demands, and by using a scale of doubt, participants distinguished lies from truthful statements (albeit with a degree of error). Over the two experiments, results indicated that people have some ability to distinguish lies from truth (in illusion-of-transparency tasks), although people often overestimate this ability, and participants sometimes think their own lies are easier to detect than is really the case.     

A realist partner for Linda: confirming a theoretical hypothesis more than its observational sub-hypothesis

It is argued that the conjunction effect has a disjunctive analog of strong interest for the realism–antirealism debate. It is possible that a proper theory is more confirmed than its (more probable) observational sub-theory and hence than the latter’s disjunctive equivalent, i.e., the disjunction of all proper theories that are empirically equivalent to the given one. This is illustrated by a toy model.     

A computer simulation of the argument from disagreement

In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. Our conclusion is however not conclusive; the simulation also indicates what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument from Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds on the work of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Social Simul 5(3); 2002, J Artif Soc Social Simul 9(3), 2006).     

Experiment and theory building

I examine the role of inference from experiment in theory building. What are the options open to the scientific community when faced with an experimental result that appears to be in conflict with accepted theory? I distinguish, in Laudan’s (1977), Nickels’s (1981), and Franklin’s (1993) sense, between the context of pursuit and the context of justification of a scientific theory. Making this distinction allows for a productive middle position between epistemic realism and constructivism. The decision to pursue a new or a revised theory in response to the new evidence may not be fully rationally determined. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish the question of whether there is reason to pursue a theory from the question of whether that theory, once it has been pursued over time, solves a problem of interest to science. I argue that, in this context, there is a solid way to distinguish between the contexts of pursuit and of justification, on the basis of a theory’s evidential support and problem-solving ability.     

A functional account of degrees of minimal chemical life

This paper describes and defends the view that minimal chemical life essentially involves the chemical integration of three chemical functionalities: containment, metabolism, and program (Rasmussen et al. in Protocells: bridging nonliving and living matter, 2009a). This view is illustrated and explained with the help of CMP and Rasmussen diagrams (Rasmussen et al. In: Rasmussen et al. (eds.) in Protocells: bridging nonliving and living matter, 71–100, 2009b), both of which represent the key chemical functional dependencies among containment, metabolism, and program. The CMP model of minimal chemical life gains some support from the broad view of life as open-ended evolution, which I have defended elsewhere (Bedau in The philosophy of artificial life, 1996; Bedau in Artificial Life, 4:125–140, 1998). Further support comes from the natural way the CMP model resolves the puzzle about whether life is a matter of degree.