Motor timing deficits in children with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity disorder

Children with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) are thought to have fundamental deficits in the allocation of attention for information processing. Furthermore, it is believed that these children possess a fundamental difficulty in motoric timing, an assertion that has been explored recently in adults and children. In the present study we extend this recent work by fully exploring the classic Wing and Kristofferson (1973) analysis of timing with typically developing children (n=24) and children with ADHD (n=27). We provide clear evidence that not only do children with ADHD have an overall timing deficit, they also time less consistently when using a similar strategy to typically developing children. The use of the Wing and Kristofferson approach to timing, we argue, will result in the discovery of robust ADHD-related timing differences across a variety of situations.     

Sentence contexts as facilitators of noun pair learning in children

Fifth graders were asked to learn noun pairs embedded in sentence contexts varied in terms of verb voice and grammatical relations. Also, their ability to reproduce sentence contexts for nouns was examined. Recall was prompted with both first- and final-position nouns. Results indicated that variations in deep structure grammatical relations but not surface structure complexity influenced noun pair retrieval. Subjects' incidental memory for the deep structure of sentences was substantial, suggesting that learners were noticing and making use of the meaningful relations aroused between nouns by the contexts. Various sentence generative strategies involving verb voice and noun prompt position were noted.     

Adaptive changes between cue abstraction and exemplar memory in a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues

The majority of previous studies on multiple-cue judgment with continuous cues have involved comparisons between judgments and multiple linear regression models that integrated cues into a judgment. The authors present an experiment indicating that in a judgment task withadditive combination of multiple continuous cues, people indeed displayed abstract knowledge of the cue criterion relations that was mentally integrated into a judgment, but in a task withmultiplicative combination of continuous cues, people instead relied on retrieval of memory traces of similar judgment cases (exemplars). These results suggest that people may adopt qualitatively distinct forms of knowledge, depending on the structure of a multiple-cue judgment task. The authors discuss implications for theories of multiple-cue judgment.