Dissociating word stem completion and cued recall as a function of divided attention at retrieval

The aim of this study was to investigate the widely held, but largely untested, view that implicit memory (repetition priming) reflects an automatic form of retrieval. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we explored whether a secondary task (syllable monitoring), performed during retrieval, would disrupt performance on explicit (cued recall) and implicit (stem completion) memory tasks equally. Surprisingly, despite substantial memory and secondary costs to cued recall when performed with a syllable-monitoring task, the same manipulation had no effect on stem completion priming or on secondary task performance. In Experiment 2 we demonstrated that even when using a particularly demanding version of the stem completion task that incurred secondary task costs, the corresponding disruption to implicit memory performance was minimal. Collectively, the results are consistent with the view that implicit memory retrieval requires little or no processing capacity and is not seemingly susceptible to the effects of dividing attention at retrieval.     

Remembrance of remembrance past

Arnold and Lindsay (2002) found that individuals more often failed to remember they had previously recalled an item if that item had been cued in a qualitatively different way on two recall occasions: the “forgot-it-all-along” (FIA) effect. Experiment 1 was designed to determine if the FIA effect arises because participants incorrectly believe they have not been previously tested for an item, or because they incorrectly believe they have failed to recall the item when previously tested. Experiment 2 measured participants' confidence in their incorrect prior-recall judgements, and Experiment 3 tested participants' ability to “recover” their previous recollection when the prior-recall context was restored. Results indicated that participants usually believed they had not previously been cued for the items they failed to remember previously recalling; they were often confident in their incorrect judgements of prior non-remembering; and re-introducing the context of prior remembering sometimes enabled them to recapture their memories of previous recall.