Reduced susceptibility to confirmation bias in schizophrenia

Patients with schizophrenia (SZ) show cognitive impairments on a wide range of tasks, with clear deficiencies in tasks reliant on prefrontal cortex function and less consistently observed impairments in tasks recruiting the striatum. This study leverages tasks hypothesized to differentially recruit these neural structures to assess relative deficiencies of each. Forty-eight patients and 38 controls completed two reinforcement learning tasks hypothesized to interrogate prefrontal and striatal functions and their interaction. In each task, participants learned reward discriminations by trial and error and were tested on novel stimulus combinations to assess learned values. In the task putatively assessing fronto-striatal interaction, participants were (inaccurately) instructed that one of the stimuli was valuable. Consistent with prior reports and a model of confirmation bias, this manipulation resulted in overvaluation of the instructed stimulus after its true value had been experienced. Patients showed less susceptibility to this confirmation bias effect than did controls. In the choice bias task hypothesized to more purely assess striatal function, biases in endogenously and exogenously chosen actions were assessed. No group differences were observed. In the subset of participants who showed learning in both tasks, larger group differences were observed in the confirmation bias task than in the choice bias task. In the confirmation bias task, patients also showed impairment in the task conditions with no prior instruction. This deficit was most readily observed on the most deterministic discriminations. Taken together, these results suggest impairments in fronto-striatal interaction in SZ, rather than in striatal function per se.     

Children's Coping in the Context of Disasters and Terrorism

Disasters and terrorism present significant and often overwhelming challenges for children and families worldwide. Individual, family, and social factors influence disaster reactions and the diverse ways in which children cope. This article links conceptualizations of stress and coping to empirical knowledge of children's disaster reactions, identifies limitations in our current understanding, and suggests areas for future study of disaster coping. Coping strategies, developmental trajectories influencing coping, and the interplay between parent and child coping represent critical areas for advancing the field and for informing programs and services that benefit children's preparedness and foster resilience in the face of mass trauma.     

Reflexive orienting in response to short- and long-duration gaze cues in young,young-old,and old-old adults

Shifting visual focus on the basis of the perceived gaze direction of another person is one form of joint attention. In the present study, we investigated whether this socially relevant form of orienting is reflexive and whether it is influenced by age. Green and Woldorff (Cognition 122:96–101, 2012) argued that rapid cueing effects (i.e., faster responses to validly than to invalidly cued targets) were limited to conditions in which a cue overlapped in time with a target. They attributed slower responses following invalid cues to the time needed to resolve the incongruent spatial information provided by the concurrently presented cue and target. In the present study, we examined the orienting responses of young (18–31 years), young-old (60–74 years), and old-old (75–91 years) adults following uninformative central gaze cues that overlapped in time with the target (Exp. 1) or that were removed prior to target presentation (Exp. 2). When the cue and target overlapped, all three groups localized validly cued targets more quickly than invalidly cued targets, and validity effects emerged earlier for the two younger groups (at 100 ms post-cue-onset) than for the old-old group (at 300 ms post-cue-onset). With a short-duration cue (Exp. 2), validity effects developed rapidly (by 100 ms) for all three groups, suggesting that validity effects resulted from reflexive orienting based on the gaze cue information rather than from cue–target conflict. Thus, although old-old adults may be slow to disengage from persistent gaze cues, attention continues to be reflexively guided by gaze cues late in life.     

Interference of spoken word recognition through phonological priming from visual objects and printed words

Three cross-modal priming experiments examined the influence of preexposure to pictures and printed words on the speed of spoken word recognition. Targets for auditory lexical decision were spoken Dutch words and nonwords, presented in isolation (Experiments 1 and 2) or after a short phrase (Experiment 3). Auditory stimuli were preceded by primes, which were pictures (Experiments 1 and 3) or those pictures’ printed names (Experiment 2). Prime–target pairs were phonologically onset related (e.g., pijl–pijn, arrow–pain), were from the same semantic category (e.g., pijl–zwaard, arrow–sword), or were unrelated on both dimensions. Phonological interference and semantic facilitation were observed in all experiments. Priming magnitude was similar for pictures and printed words and did not vary with picture viewing time or number of pictures in the display (either one or four). These effects arose even though participants were not explicitly instructed to name the pictures and where strategic naming would interfere with lexical decision making. This suggests that, by default, processing of related pictures and printed words influences how quickly we recognize spoken words.     

Gesture for generalization: gesture facilitates flexible learning of words for actions on objects

Verb learning is difficult for children (Gentner, 1982 ), partially because children have a bias to associate a novel verb not only with the action it represents, but also with the object on which it is learned (Kersten & Smith, 2002 ). Here we investigate how well 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children (N = 48) generalize novel verbs for actions on objects after doing or seeing the action (e.g., twisting a knob on an object) or after doing or seeing a gesture for the action (e.g., twisting in the air near an object). We find not only that children generalize more effectively through gesture experience, but also that this ability to generalize persists after a 24‐hour delay.     

Delay knowledge and trial set count modulate use of proactive versus reactive control: A meta-analytic review

The AX-continuous performance task (AX-CPT) and dot pattern expectancy (DPX) are the predominant cognitive paradigms used to assess the relative utilization of proactive versus reactive cognitive control. Experimental parameters vary widely between studies and systematically between different modalities (i.e., fMRI vs. EEG) with unknown consequences for the implementation of control. This meta-analytic review systematically surveyed these bodies of literature (k = 43, 73 data points) to resolve how cue–probe delay knowledge, delay length, and trial set count modulate the preferential use of proactive versus reactive control. In healthy young adults, delay knowledge and increasing trial set count each bias participants toward greater proactive control. Further, the interaction of delay knowledge and trial set count accounts for ~40% of variability in proactive/reactive control performance. As trial count varies reliably between experimental modalities, it is critical to understand how these parameters activate distinct cognitive processes and tap into different neural mechanisms for control. Subgroup analyses revealed important distinctions from our results in healthy young adults. Healthy, slightly older adults (ages 30–45 years) performed more reactively compared to healthy young adults. In addition, participants with schizophrenia showed evidence of more proactive control as trial set count increased. In light of this meta-analytic review, we conclude that delay knowledge and trial set length are important parameters to account for in the assessment of proactive versus reactive control. More broadly, this metaregression provides strong evidence that cognitive control becomes more reactive when timing demands are not known, and that both healthy persons and persons with schizophrenia shift toward proactive control with increasing repetitions of a task set.