Effects of early institutionalization on the development of emotion processing: a case for relative sparing?

We tested the capacity to perceive visual expressions of emotion, and to use those expressions as guides to social decisions, in three groups of 8‐ to 10‐year‐old Romanian children: children abandoned to institutions then randomly assigned to remain in ‘care as usual’ (institutional care); children abandoned to institutions then randomly assigned to a foster care intervention; and community children who had never been institutionalized. Experiment 1 examined children's recognition of happy, sad, fearful, and angry facial expressions that varied in intensity. Children assigned to institutional care had higher thresholds for identifying happy expressions than foster care or community children, but did not differ in their thresholds for identifying the other facial expressions. Moreover, the error rates of the three groups of children were the same for all of the facial expressions. Experiment 2 examined children's ability to use facial expressions of emotion to guide social decisions about whom to befriend and whom to help. Children assigned to institutional care were less accurate than foster care or community children at deciding whom to befriend; however, the groups did not differ in their ability to decide whom to help. Overall, although there were group differences in some abilities, all three groups of children performed well across tasks. The results are discussed in the context of theoretical accounts of the development of emotion processing.     

Different is good: connectionism and dynamic systems theory are complementary emergentist approaches to development

Connectionist and dynamic systems approaches to development are similar in that they are both emergentist theories that take a very different perspective from more traditional symbolic systems. Moreover, they are both based on similar mathematical principles. Nevertheless, connectionism and dynamic systems differ in the approach they take to the study of development. We argue that differences between connectionist and dynamic systems approaches in terms of the basic components of the models, what they see as the object of study, how they view the nature of knowledge and their notions of developmental change mean that they each stand to make different and unique contributions to a more complete theory of development. We present an example from our work on how children learn to learn words that illustrates the complementary nature of connectionist and dynamic systems theories.